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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

February 29, 2012

Quote of the Day: New START Implementation and Next Steps Edition

“Over the life of the New START treaty (10 years), our best estimate of the total estimated cost for DOD activities associated with implementation of the New START treaty would be between $880.5 million and $1,169 million. This estimate is tentative and does not include potential offsetting cost savings such as reducing operations and maintenance costs of eliminated forces. However, until final decisions are made on U.S. Air Force strategic delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for ICBM silos and conversion methods for the B–52 and SLBM launchers, it is not feasible to provide an accurate total cost estimate.”

Then-Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller in response to questions for the record after a May 4th hearing of the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 4, 2011 (Hat Tip: the Federation of American Scientists Secrecy News blog). To my knowledge this is the first public record of a cost-estimate to implement the treaty. An interesting question is whether it would be more expensive or cheaper if the Pentagon achieved the reductions required by the treaty prior to the 2018 implementation deadline. At this point the Pentagon has no plans to implement the treaty early.

DoD’s responses to other questions for the record contain some additional interesting nuggets.  Here’s Gen. Robert Kehler, Commander of STRATCOM, responding to Sen. Jeff Sessions about the prudence of considering further reductions below New START levels:

General KEHLER: It is prudent to consider any actions that have the potential to improve the security of the United States and its allies by enhancing deterrence and maintaining strategic stability. I will always evaluate any such actions carefully and provide my best military judgment accordingly. In the meantime, STRATCOM is fully engaged in implementing the New START treaty.

And here are Dr. Miller and Gen. Kehler responding to a question from Sen. Sessions about nuclear policy and targeting guidance:

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is wrong with the current guidance?

Dr. MILLER. Current guidance is not ‘‘wrong.’’ Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting strategy have continually evolved with the global strategic environment. The United States would be remiss if we did not reexamine our nuclear strategy in today’s dynamic security environment. Revisions to current guidance may be required to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured for the real threats of today and tomorrow. Updating guidance to support deterrence is a key responsibility of any administration and both previous NPRs preceded pres- idential updates in nuclear guidance.

General KEHLER. Reviewing nuclear employment guidance following a NPR is a logical follow-on step, given past precedent and today’s dynamic security environment.

Remember that existing nuclear doctrine and targeting principles are based on guidance from the George W. Bush administration, which was developed approximately a decade ago. As Kehler and Miller note, the ongoing Obama administration review of this outdated guidance is something that every administration does. It’s smart national security due diligence.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 24, 2012

Advocates for War Might Look Before They Leap on Iran

Over the past few weeks, pronouncements and threats concerning Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly worrisome. Inflammatory remarks by the US and Israel have elicited an equally inflammatory response from Iran, and the end result is anyone’s guess.

The tension has been building for months, and recently some top American officials have begun to question whether Israel really is on the brink of (overt) military action. After all, this scenario seems quite familiar. In an interview with CNN, Defense Secretary Panetta asserted that Israel has a tendency to go through cycles of belligerent statements in an effort to pressure the U.S. and Europe into more forceful action, but whether this amounts to another round of bluffing and bluster, an attempt to deliver a “credible military threat,” or something more, the rhetoric is equally dangerous.

The threat of accidental war due to unintended escalation by one or both sides is greater than ever, and the U.S. lacks a direct line of communication to Iran that might prevent such a catastrophe. Shortly before departing as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen expressed his concern that without such a line of communication, “it’s virtually assured that we won’t get it right—that there will be miscalculation, which would be extremely dangerous in that part of the world.”

Read the Center’s full analysis here.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 24, 2012

More on Republican Disarmers

In his latest New York Post column, the Heritage Foundations Peter Brookes lambasts the Obama administration for allegedly considering reductions in deployed strategic warheads below the New START limit of 1,550.  No surprise here, given that Brookes vehemently opposed the New START treaty.

We could have plenty of fun with most everything in the op-ed, but the third to last paragraph was my favorite:

Yes, Republican presidents have ditched plenty of nukes over the years. But those reductions came with US arms-control wins, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and our indisputable conventional superiority.

In other words, it’s fine when Republican presidents move to reduce the arsenal (1) by pursuing arms control agreements, (2) because the world has changed, and (3) due to our overwhelming conventional superiority. But it’s basically appeasement when Democratic presidents move to reduce the arsenal (1) by pursuing arms control agreements, (2) because the world has changed, and (3) due to our overwhelming conventional superiority.

Sounds like Robert Burns’ follow-up story on the administration’s review titled “Boldest nuclear cutters recently? It’s been GOP” struck a nerve with the Heritage folks.

There are legitimate arguments one can make against further reductions in the arsenal.  See this contribution from Elbridge Colby, for example. I strongly disagree with Colby (that’s a post for another night), but it’s a seriously argued case.

The same can’t be said of Brookes latest diatribe.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 22, 2012

Gen. Gard Op-Ed in the Hill: "Reason over relics: Restructuring our nuclear force"

Center Chairman Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.) published an op-ed in The Hill today on the ongoing, Pentagon-led review of U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements. A February 14 Associated Press story reported that as part of this review the Pentagon has prepared a range of options for future nuclear force levels.

Below is Gen. Gard’s closing argument:

In a time of limited budgets and scarce resources, it would be irresponsible not to consider reductions in weapons that most national security experts see as of marginal strategic value. Those scarce funds certainly can be better directed toward addressing 21st century national security threats, not those of the 20th century. The mere consideration of that possibility, however, will mean overcoming the passionate objections of the defenders of the last century’s Cold War thinking.

The Associated Press story appears to be the result of a leak aimed at embarrassing the president and preemptively limiting the range of possible actions he may consider, but that kind of approach to policy making is profoundly irresponsible. What should be embarrassing is attempting to block the president and the Pentagon from considering all options. Seeking to derail deliberative policy-making and play national security for political points is hardly the stuff of responsible leadership.

Many things happen in Washington because of an entrenched status quo. Maintaining a hugely expensive and colossally redundant nuclear force of declining strategic significance shouldn’t be one of them. History is rich with examples of nations that failed to adapt to changing times: they fought for the status quo instead of meeting the needs of their people. America cannot afford to become that example.

You can read the whole thing here.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 21, 2012

The Dawn of Nuclear Sanity? – and a few other observations

By now most readers have undoubtedly read Robert Burns’ Associated Press story that as part of the Obama administration’s ongoing review of deterrence requirements, the Pentagon has prepared options for future nuclear force levels that could eventually lead to steep reductions below the New START level of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Burns alleges that one of the options under consideration calls for a reduction to 300 deployed warheads. Predictably, the usual Republican suspects freaked out, because that’s what they do when anyone suggests altering the unsustainable nuclear status quo.  

Others have noted that the timing of this leak is suggestive, given that it came days before scheduled speeches by Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  

Our Dear Leader has already weighed in on this issue. You can read his article entitled “The Dawn of Nuclear Sanity” here.  For other contributions from friends of NoH, see here, here, here, here, and here. Below are a few of my observations…

First, some background.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was not meant to be the last word from the Obama administration on nuclear weapons policy.  While it stated that the U.S. and Russia “still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence, the NPR largely punted on the question of the desirability and feasibility of deeper reductions below New START levels, directing instead a follow-on analysis of deterrence requirements to set a goal for future reductions with Russia.  As the Brookings Institutions Steve Pifer notes, “Several options for what that guidance would look like, along with illustrative strategic nuclear force structures, are being prepared for the president’s review.”  The ongoing study is affectionately known by some as the “NPR Implementation Study.”

The President didn’t order the Pentagon to study specific force levels.

Most of the media and Republican depictions of the ongoing review allege that President Obama ordered the Pentagon to study a force structure option of 300 deployed strategic warheads. Mounting evidence suggests that this is not the case.  Last Friday, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little stated that “While the details are classified, the president asked DOD to develop several alternative approaches to deterrence and stability, to include illustrative force size and postures to best support those alternatives.” Little added that “No decisions have been made.”  In fact, it’s my understanding that the President has yet to review any of the proposed options. What appears to have happened is that the White House likely gave the Pentagon some general guidance, which the Pentagon then translated into some specific force structures, ranging from something close to the New START levels to something in the low hundreds.  

The Strategic Posture Commission knows best.

Pentagon officials involved in authoring the NPR have often proclaimed that they used the May 2009 final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States as a starting point for their analysis.  Thus it should come as no surprise that the ongoing NPR-mandated deterrence requirements review is once again following in the footsteps of the Commission, which during the preparation of its report tasked one its supporting working groups to set out force posture options it thought should be studied in the future, including options for deep cuts. As the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Stephen Young notes, “The person selected by the Commission to lead that effort to establish the options to study was none other Jim Miller, who now is directing the Pentagon’s study for the Obama administration. (See Chapter 12 of the Commission’s In the Eyes of Experts.)” Republicans often cite the conclusions of the Commission as the authoritative word on nuclear policy. Except, apparently, when the administration actually follows the advice of the Commission.

Republican Disarmers.

As John observes, “An obvious but important fact about the politics of nuclear weapons is that Republicans seem to oppose only nuclear reductions (bilateral or otherwise) proposed by Democratic Presidents.” The Federation of American Scientists’ Hans Kristensen reminds us that the George H.W. Bush administration reduced the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile was by nearly 50 percent from 22,217 to 11,511 warheads. Likewise, George W. Bush cut the stockpile by nearly 50 percent from 10,526 to 5,113 warheads. I don’t recall Republicans grumbling very loudly when these Republican presidents were unilaterally decimating our deterrent. Fortunately the press has begun to pickup on the GOP’s hypocrisy.

Hamstringing Democratic Presidents.

Last year Rep. Turner included language in the House version of the defense bill that would have constrained the Pentagon’s ability to implement New START and condition reductions below New START levels on several onerous conditions.  While the provisions were not included in the final version of the bill, Turner has already announced that he plans to offer similar legislation again this year and no doubt feels emboldened by the news that the administration is evaluating further reductions in the deployed arsenal. As I’ve written previously, such legislation mirrors Republican efforts in the mid/late 1990s to impose legislative constraints on the ability of President Bill Clinton to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the limits in the START I treaty, which forced the Navy and the Air Force to spend money to keep weapons, including 4 Trident submarines and 50 Peacekeeper missiles, that they no longer needed, when the resources could have been better used elsewhere. While this constraint barred President Clinton from making reductions, it was removed without Republican opposition in the FY 2002 defense bill in part to accommodate President George W. Bush’s desire to unilaterally eliminate the Peacekeeper missiles and remove the Trident submarines from the nuclear force.

Lower is Better

On January 5 President Obama, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, and other high-ranking defense officials previewed the results of the recently completed strategic defense review at a press briefing at the Pentagon.

The new strategy document states that “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” Outgoing Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy was more forward leaning at the rollout, noting that “it’s…our judgment…that we can maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, but I will defer any discussion of specific programmatic details to the budget when it rolls out.” Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller echoed similar sentiments last week, stating that “I do believe that there are steps that we can take to further strengthen our deterrence posture and assurance of allies, and that I believe we can do so with lower numbers.”

These statements suggest that while the U.S. not likely go as low as 300 deployed warheads anytime soon, some key Pentagon officials are in favor of reducing the arsenal below New START levels (the flavor of the moment appears to be 1,000, which is one of the options the Pentagon has reportedly considered). This is as it should be. As we’ve argued on countless occasions, maintaining existing nuclear force levels in perpetuity makes neither strategic nor financial sense. Its long past time we abandoned Cold War era assumptions about nuclear warfighting as a key organizing principle of U.S. nuclear posture (doing so would pave the way for a much smaller arsenal). Moreover, current plans for replacing all three legs of the nuclear triad are unaffordable and pose significant opportunity costs, especially in light of the current budget environment.

Bilateral or Unilateral?

Assuming the ongoing nuclear guidance review lays the groundwork for deeper cuts, a key question is whether reductions ought to be implemented bilaterally with Russia or unilaterally. Administration officials have suggested that they believe further reductions should be negotiated. However, whether the Russians will be interested in such reductions remains an unanswered question for the time being, though their force is likely to shrink over the next decade regardless. Alternatively the U.S. could pursue some reductions unilaterally, in the hopes that Russia might follow suit. An intriguing development to keep an eye over the next year is the fate of the Pentagon budget given the looming threat of sequestration. Budget cuts could end up forcing cuts to the arsenal with our without the blessing of the guidance review or Russian reciprocity.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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