• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

  • Policy Issues
    • 25 Years Since September 11
    • Fact Sheets
    • Biological & Chemical Weapons
    • Countries
    • Pentagon and Weapons Spending
    • No First Use
    • Non-Proliferation
    • Nuclear Security
    • Nuclear Testing
    • Nuclear Weapons
    • Missile Defense
  • Nukes of Hazard
    • Podcast
    • Blog
      • Next Up In Arms Control
    • Videos
  • Join Us
  • Press
  • About
    • Staff
    • Boards & Experts
    • Jobs & Internships
    • Financials and Annual Reports
    • Contact Us
  • Donate
  • Search
You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

March 6, 2012

"Mr President: Say No to War of Choice with Iran"

Yesterday the National Iranian American Council sponsored a full page ad in the Washington Post from several former high-ranking military, intelligence and State Department officials that urges President Obama to say no to war with Iran. The backdrop o…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 5, 2012

Quote of the Day: So Much for the Sprint to Parity Edition

Mr. TURNER. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek (or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?

General KEHLER. China has a long-standing ‘‘No First Use’’ policy regarding nuclear weapons. China’s modernization of their nuclear forces is in line with this policy, with their nuclear arsenal designed to be a sufficient and effective deterrent to foreign use (specifically the U.S. and Russia) of nuclear weapons against China. At this time, China doesn’t appear to seek to expand their nuclear arsenal beyond what they perceive as a credible deterrent and is unlikely to attempt to match numbers of nuclear weapons or warheads with either the U.S. or Russia.

STRATCOM Commander Gen. Robert Kehler, response to a question for the record pursuant to a House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the Status of United States Strategic Forces, March 2, 2011.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 2, 2012

Op-Ed on North Korea

A new op-ed on North Korea is out written by yours truly. You can find it on the Center website here or at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ site here . Some key points are: – In reaching an agreement with the United States, North Korea took a…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

March 1, 2012

Center Op-Eds on Sequestration, Iran

In case you missed them, the Center published two op-eds yesterday. The first, on defense budget sequestration, appeared in Roll Call.  In it, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard and I argue that: Rather than spin its wheels or continue to pretend that sequestr…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 29, 2012

N.Korea Agrees to Nuclear, Missile and Uranium Enrichment Activity Moratoria

In a rare move, the U.S. and North Korea simultaneously released statements on the results of their February 23rd exploratory meeting in Beijing. While the overall gist and key points appear to be in sync, there are some differences in nuances and details.

Here are the key points of the State Department’s statement:

-“To improve the atmosphere for dialogue and demonstrate its commitment to denuclearization, the DPRK has agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including uranium enrichment activities. The DPRK has also agreed to the return of IAEA inspectors to verify and monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon and confirm the disablement of the 5-MW reactor and associated facilities.”

-“The United States still has profound concerns regarding North Korean behavior across a wide range of areas, but today’s announcement reflects important, if limited, progress in addressing some of these. We have agreed to meet with the DPRK to finalize administrative details necessary to move forward with our proposed package of 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance along with the intensive monitoring required for the delivery of such assistance.”

Here are the key points of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s statement issued through the regime’s state media KCNA:

-“The DPRK, upon request by the U.S. and with a view to maintaining positive atmosphere for the DPRK-U.S. high-level talks, agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at Nyongbyon and allow the IAEA to monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment while productive dialogues continue.”

-“The U.S. promised to offer 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance with the prospect of additional food assistance, for which both the DPRK and the U.S. would finalize the administrative details in the immediate future.”

-“Once the six-party talks are resumed, priority will be given to the discussion of issues concerning the lifting of sanctions on the DPRK and provision of light water reactors.”

The agreement of key points in principle is a positive and encouraging step forward, but the key is whether North Korea will follow through on its latest agreements.

It is a positive step development since food aid was a key sticking point that had stalled progress over the last several months. It is also positive since international monitors have not been able to confirm Pyongyang’s claims that it is operating a uranium enrichment facility revealed to American scientists in November 2010. If all goes well, the resumption of Six Party Talks may be possible in the next few months if roadblocks do not emerge along the way.

However, it appears more discussions need to take place particularly in the details and logistics. For example, the method for halting North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility, the timing of IAEA inspectors back into Yongbyon in relation to the timing of receiving nutritional assistance, and the physical limits (boundaries) for IAEA inspectors in Yongbyon.

South Korea’s Yonhap News reported on the 29th that Pyongyang suggested it would be willing to temporarily “halt” its UEP facility using the “no-load method” to prepare for the day it would restart its uranium enrichment activities. This temporary halt method reportedly would proceed until its UEP facility is proven to be used for peaceful purposes.

“No-load operation” means that centrifuges would continue to spin (operate) without uranium fuel, which is used for actual enrichment. The purpose of the “no-load method” would be to continue to optimize cascade operations and management because centrifuge rotors spinning at lower speeds than their normal operating speed could lead to “crashing” or self-destruction due to possible violent vibrations. Technical experts say, the fraction of centrifuges that would crash is difficult to predict since it depends on the manufacturing quality of the North’s machines. Regardless, Pyongyang’s reported suggestion implies that it may be concerned about possible crashing.

The U.S. and South Korea have been demanding a complete halt in uranium enrichment activities. If the “no-load operation” method is true, it would still be an encouraging step if it meant granting the IAEA access – even limited access – to its UEP facility. It remains to be seen whether Washington and Seoul would accept this method.

However, hidden uranium enrichment facilities – not this disclosed plant at Yongbyon – is the greatest concern.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 31
  • Page 32
  • Page 33
  • Page 34
  • Page 35
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 138
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Expert Reacts to First U.S.-Russia-China Summit: Pageantry, Policy and Nuclear Diplomacy November 20, 2026
  • Arms control expert: Threat of Iran attack on DC is ‘relatively low’ November 18, 2026
  • Reflections on My Fall Internship: Rana Agahi November 18, 2026
  • Trump’s nuclear trilateral long-shot November 17, 2026
  • Trump warns Iran over reported dirty bomb plot targeting US officials, report says November 17, 2026

Footer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

820 1st Street NE, Suite LL-180
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: 202.546.0795

Issues

  • 25 Years Since September 11
  • Fact Sheets
  • Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Countries
  • Pentagon and Weapons Spending
  • No First Use
  • Non-Proliferation
  • Nuclear Security
  • Nuclear Testing
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Missile Defense

Countries

  • China
  • France
  • India and Pakistan
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • United Kingdom

Explore

  • Nukes of Hazard blog
  • Nukes of Hazard podcast
  • Nukes of Hazard videos
  • Front and Center
  • Fact Sheets

About

  • About
  • Meet the Staff
  • Boards & Experts
  • Press
  • Jobs & Internships
  • Financials and Annual Reports
  • Contact Us
  • Council for a Livable World
  • Twitter
  • YouTube
  • Instagram
  • Facebook

© 2026 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator GuideStar Seal of Transparency