On Wednesday April 20, the New America Foundation hosted a daylong event, entitled “Afghanistan War: Containing or Leveraging U.S. Power” which I attended.  

There were four panels, but the difficult-to-sit-on-chairs got to me after two.  Okay, I’ll admit,  the last panel was with Ann Coulter, who is both not an expert on Afghanistan and extremely stressful.  I made a conscious decision to skip it.   However, the first two panels were excellent (see end for a list of the panelists and their affiliation).

At this event, I came to grips with a sad realization:  the more I learn about Afghanistan, the more hopeless the situation seems.  I can better appreciate the range of consequences no matter what the U.S. decides to do, and find every proposed less-than-perfect.  

I’m sure I’m not the only one; it just took me longer.

The first panel at the event tackled the cost of the Afghan war. The cost is too high, in dollars and lives, and the war does not advance our national interests, the panelists said.  At a time when the U.S. Congress is quibbling about cutting $60 billion from the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, the war in Afghanistan will cost $108 billion this year alone.  If Obama pulled the troops out, we could save hundreds of billions of dollars a year, and the U.S. public would not notice, Richard Vague argued.  

Only Peter Bergen said that the cost of the war was worth it.  He said that the U.S. has a moral obligation to remain and ensure security because “we overthrew their government.”  

Bergen’s argument is one that I used to subscribe to, but as the years have gone on, our continued presence in Afghanistan has only caused more U.S., Afghan and Pakistani casualties, served as a recruiting tool for the insurgency and created great instability rather than security, as Matthew Hoh said.  

Even though I was put off by Vague’s depiction of how unaffected most Americans are by the war (because the Afghans would notice American troops leaving), he is right that the costs are too high for a war with little benefit.  Ours is a basic strategic mistake, Katulis explained, we are not able to recognize what we cannot achieve.

We cannot “succeed” in Afghanistan because we are in a military stalemate, as the panelists on the second panel discussed.  The only realistic next step for Afghanistan involves a political solution.  

Panelist Ambassador Thomas Pickering co-chaired the Century Foundation’s report, “Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace,” which proposed a negotiated a settlement with all interested Afghan parties, including the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, the Karzai government and civil society.  

Their proposal is controversial for several reasons. Previous negotiations with religious extremists have not gone well (Paul Bergen); the Taliban will be allowed to return to politics;  and a settlement could roll back human rights.   Additionally, if you believe, as Ambassador James Dobbins does, that the U.S. has improved the situation in Afghanistan and that the Karzai government and U.S. troops are popular, negotiations are unnecessary or at least premature.  Dobbins’ rosy view of Afghanistan comes from public surveys that may be questionable.

I have my own misgivings about a negotiated settlement.  I agree that negotiations with religious extremists historically do not go well.  But neither do wars of attrition.  

More worrisome to me is the likelihood that Afghan women will be excluded from these negotiations, judging by the track record of U.N. and U.S. negotiations and the role of women in Afghan society.  

Joshua Foust, also a member of the Century Foundation’s task force, did not ease my fears when he said that Afghans do not want the West dictating their values. This belittles and denies the work of many Afghan human rights advocates and ignores the fact that pre-Taliban, Afghan women were fully integrated into public society.  I worry that through negotiations, we might unintentionally perpetuate and codify the exclusion of women, who are victims in this war and deserve a seat at the table. (more on this here)

The real problem with ending this war is that the solutions are not perfect; all have political and social costs.  However, the current situation is untenable and unbearable. There may still time to promote  solutions and make a political settlement work.  The time for any military success though has run out, so let Obama bring the troops home as promised.

Panel 1 “The Afghanistan War: A-Cost benefit analysis” panelists:
•    Thomas R. Pickering, Co-Chair, Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State and former US Ambassador to the United Nations
•     James C. Clad, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South & Southeast Asian Affairs
•    Joshua Foust, Fellow, American Security Project
•    Richard Vague, Co-Founder, Afghanistan Study Group
•    Paul R. Pillar former National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, National Intelligence Council Member, Afghanistan Study Group

Panel 2 “Next Steps in Afghanistan: What are the Options?” panelists:

•    Matthew P. Hoh, Director, Afghanistan Study Group (Council for a Livable World board member)
•    James Dobbins, Director, International Security & Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation
•    Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation
•    Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
•    C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor, Center for Peace & Security Studies

You can watch it later this week here.

As has been rumored for some time now, President Obama is expected to announce this week his decision to appoint Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta to replace Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.  The move comes as part of a significant restructuring of the president’s security team.  General David Petraeus will reportedly replace Panetta at CIA, General John Allen will replace Petraeus, and Ryan Crocker will replace Karl Eikenberry as US Ambassador in Kabul.

Gates has been on his way out for some time now and will officially depart this summer, leaving behind some big shoes to fill, in more ways than one.  Above and beyond Gates’ admirable legacy, Panetta will face the issues left behind: Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya on top of a massive deficit and impending defense cuts.  The job won’t be an easy one.

Choosing Panetta, former head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), signals the president’s commitment to taking a hard look at the Pentagon budget at a time when few, certainly not the Republican leadership, are even willing to offer it up for discussion.

Panetta will be the first Democrat in the post since William J. Perry left at the end of Bill Clinton’s first term. Panetta’s long history as a Democratic congressman, impressive budget track record, and close connection with the ongoing wars make him uniquely suited to the job.  He was no doubt chosen for his close connections with both the White House and Capitol Hill.

But beyond the credentials, here’s my honest two cents: I’ve heard rumblings of discontent from those who fear Panetta may not take a big enough ax to the Pentagon’s budget.  There is not, in my honest opinion, a SecDef on earth that would cut Pentagon spending the way some would like… Panetta represents a choice who is highly informed on budget issues, coming into the position with a goal, clearly set out by the president, to cut the budget.  To me, that’s great news.

A bigger ax is not always better.  The Pentagon budget has grown without restraint, and as Gates said, the “gusher” has to be turned off.  But this isn’t just a spigot that can be quickly turned in the other direction.  What is needed now is someone to take a very close, responsible look at where the waste lies, conduct an audit, a comprehensive review, and make a well informed decision about the security of the United States.  This will, no doubt, involve cuts, but the strategy has to come before the math.  

Again, I don’t mean to use the phrase in the same way Gates did.  His comments during the ongoing budget debates in congress were directed at those who wanted to cut more than he did no matter the cut, something that is equally irresponsible.  Though Gates made great strides in cutting inefficient and wasteful programs, there are, no doubt, more than a few left over.  The new SecDef’s job is to find those programs, and if any realistic candidate for the job can and will, this is the one.

Global Security Newswire’s all-world reporter Elaine Grossman has done some marvelous work over the past year on DoD’s plans to modernize and replace U.S. nuclear delivery systems.  Her latest reporting (see here, here, and here) documents how the administration and the Air Force have been unable to tell a consistent story about what they plan to spend on preparatory analysis for a possible replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM.

The hook here of course is that given the commitment the administration made to modernize and replace our delivery systems in the Section 1251 report last year in order to secure Republican support for the New START treaty, the failure to identify funds for a new ICBM could be viewed as evidence of backsliding on this commitment.  Indeed, that’s how Sen. Lindsay Graham is viewing the situation.

Bureaucratic fumbling makes for interesting reading.  But I think the spotlight should be less on whether a few million dollars may or may not be available in FY 2012 to study a new ICBM, and more on the necessity and feasibility of developing and deploying a new ICBM, to say nothing about replacements for the other two legs of the triad…

Background

The U.S. currently deploys 450 ICBMs at three locations: F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming, Minot AFB in North Dakota, and Malmstrom AFB in Montana. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States will “deMIRV” all deployed ICBMs, so that all missiles retain only one warhead.  In order to meet the limits in the New START treaty, the U.S. plans to deploy up to 420 ICBMs by the end of the decade.  It’s not clear at this point how the Air Force plans to implement this reduction.

For a look at the pros and cons of the ICBM-leg of the triad, see our fact sheet here.

The Minuteman III first entered service in the 1970s.  In the mid-1990s, the Air Force began a multi-year life extension program to extend the service life of the missile through 2020.  A few years ago the Air Force considered studying options for a follow-on to the Minuteman III but ultimately demurred in favor of sustaining the missile through 2030.  

Among other things, the life extension program has replaced the missile’s flight computer and guidance control system, re-poured its solid-fuel rocket motors, and modified its reentry system to allow for the deployment of the W87 warhead.  Thanks to these programs the Minuteman III is essentially a new missile.

From FY 2001-FY 2010, Congress appropriated $7.7 billion in constant FY 2010 dollars for procurement and research and development for the Minuteman III.  The Air Force asked for $379.36 million for the missile in FY 2011 and $454.6 million in FY 2012.

Plans for a New ICBM

In a November 2010 update to the May 2010 Section 1251 report, the Obama administration informed Congress that “while a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence.”  The update also stated that an Analysis of Alternatives on a new ICBM would begin in 2012 and that the Air Force is funding a Capabilities-Based Assessment for a follow-on missile at $26 million per year.

Thanks to Elaine’s reporting, we know that the Analysis of Alternatives will not begin until 2013 and that the Air Force will spend roughly $1 million in FY 2011 on the Capabilities-Based Assessment (not $26 million) and can’t say how much it will spend in FY 2012.  Despite delaying the start date for the Analysis of Alternatives, the Air Force still hopes to complete its analysis with recommendations for the President by 2014.

Questioning the Conventional Wisdom

According to the Nuclear Posture Review and the November update to the Section 1251 report, a decision on a new ICBM is not needed now.  That should provide time for a robust debate both inside and outside of government about the necessity and feasibility of a new ICBM.  Some questions we ought to be asking include:

• The Minuteman III is expected to go out of service in the late 2020s or early 2030s. No one can predict what the world will look like twenty years from now, but given that (1) changing geopolitical, economic, and technologic circumstances since the end of the Cold War have demanded significant reductions in the size of the U.S. and Russia nuclear arsenals and (2) New START will expire in 2021 (or 2026 if a five year extension is invoked), we should account for the fact that the process of mutual reductions are likely to continue.  This raises the question of whether a U.S. force of say, 1,000 deployed warheads, would alter U.S. requirements in terms of delivery vehicles?  Would it make sense to maintain all three legs of the triad at such levels?
• Under the New START treaty, the U.S. will be able to deploy 1,550 (New START accountable) warheads on 700 delivery vehicles.  Each one of these warheads is orders of magnitude more powerful than the two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II.  According to the latest estimates, the U.S. plans to spend well over $200 billion over the next decade to refurbish our warheads and modernize and replace our delivery systems.  If the SSBN(X) (Ohio-class replacement) program is completed as planned, by 2040 the U.S. could still be deploying nearly 800 warheads on just the sea-based leg of the triad.  What threats require such a bloated stockpile and expensive modernization program?  Could the U.S. guarantee its own security and that of its allies in a more fiscally sustainable manner with a smaller nuclear arsenal?  
• As James Acton has argued, if civilian and military leaders do chose to move ahead with the development and deployment of a new ICBM, considerable thought should be given to a smaller, perhaps mobile, fleet and a missile that can only carry a single warhead.  In light of the ongoing debate within Russia about whether to deploy a new heavily MIRV’ed ICBM to replace the SS-18, a single-warhead replacement for the Minuteman III might encourage Russia not build up its strategic forces, which would obviously benefit U.S. security.

By Kingston Reif and Jessica Estanislau

In a speech to Global Zero delegates in Washington last weekend, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher issued a stirring defense of the importance of nuclear transparency:

Undersecretary Tauscher is right: U.S. steps such as the declassification of the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile at last spring’s NPT Review Conference and the entry into force of the New START treaty and its new and improved data exchange, monitoring, and verification provisions are essential to progress on arms control and nonproliferation.  Why then is the Obama administration hesitant to make public information about U.S. nuclear forces that it has made publicly available in the past?…

A key pillar of the New START verification regime is regular exchanges of data between the U.S. and Russia on treaty limited items such as the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles and warheads and the number of warheads on each deployed missile.  The exchanges will also provide information on missile and bomber bases and the much touted unique identifies for delivery vehicles.  The first such exchange took place in March and they will occur about every six months during the 10-year life of the treaty.

Hans Kristensen recently asked the administration whether the content of the exchanges would be made public and received the following response:

How is this transparent? Under START I the U.S. and Russia publicized data on aggregate numbers twice a year.  

Better yet, how is this appropriate under the terms of New START?  At a minimum the treaty allows the release of information on aggregate numbers for each side.  The treaty requires agreement between the two sides to release more detailed information on the other’s forces, but as Pavel Podvig notes, there is nothing to prevent the U.S. from releasing detailed information about its own forces.

Historically Russia has not agreed to release such detailed information, but under START I the U.S. (upon request) released Memorandums of Understanding that contained additional information about each side’s arsenal.  According to Hans Kristensen, this information allowed outside observers to monitor U.S. and Russian compliance with the treaty.

We can all agree that Russia should be more transparent. For example, we know that during the New START negotiations Russia sought a weaker verification and transparency regime than what was ultimately included in the treaty. We can also agree that there is some information, such as the exact location of missile silos, that should remain classified. But that doesn’t excuse the unwillingness to release less sensitive information.  The U.S. isn’t obligated to follow in the footsteps of a country whose history is very much defined by a sense of suspicion and secrecy.

As Hans notes, “Each new step in the arms control process must increase transparency, not reduce it.”  Failure to release aggregate numbers or unclassified Memorandums of Understanding could breed the very misunderstandings and mistrust that Undersecretary Tauscher so eloquently warns us to avoid.

When the Obama Administration launched military operations against Libya, a number of Members of Congress griped about a usurpation of the congressional power to declare war.

Rather than denounce Obama – or Bush in Iraq or Reagan in Panama or Truman in Korea – they should in reality protest their own inaction.

For the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in the lap of Congress.

Or as Pogo said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”  

President Obama announced March 18 that the United States was prepared to use military force to establish a “no fly” zone and strike against Muarmmar Qaddafi’s forces.

While the President’s action was backed by a U.N. Security Council resolution, he declined to ask for a congressional authorization…  

Speaker John Boehner (R-OH), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon (R-CA) all questioned the duration, cost and goals of the U.S. mission in Libya.

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) went further to complain that “I think the extent to which Congress has been bypassed in this process has been breathtaking.” (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee similarly complained that Congress had not authorized the military action. (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich (D), as his is wont, went off the deep end by charging that Obama’s action was an “impeachable offense.”

It is not the President who should be impeached; the ones who should be impeached are Members of Congress for dereliction of duty.

Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution says Congress shall have power to declare War. The last time Congress used that power and passed a formal declaration was in 1941 when the U.S. began to fight against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Congress can also authorize the use of force through legislation without a formal declaration.

But when President Harry S Truman committed U.S. troops in 1950 to turn back a North Korean invasion of the South, Congress did nothing.

Congress had three years until the 1953 armistice to take action, and still did nothing.  

Almost 1.8 million Americans fought in Korea, with some 33,600 American deaths.

But there never was a congressional authorization, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to prosecute the war.

In response to the Vietnam War that President Lyndon Johnson controversially launched after securing congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Congress in 1973 adopted the War Powers Resolution to get Congress back in the game of declaring war.

(Note: yours truly was involved in passing the War Powers Resolution over the veto of President Richard Nixon by helping to convince liberal Members of Congress that the measure did not confer on the President more power than he already had.)

The concept behind the legislation was sound; if Congress had not authorized sending troops overseas within 60 – 90 days, the use of force must be terminated.

Except every President has deemed that core element of the law unconstitutional.

The executive branch submits reports on the military action in accordance with the law, but refuses to bring the troops home within 60 – 90 days.

And the Supreme Court will not intervene in such a high-stakes political conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

Congress has been deaf, dumb and blind to this lack of presidential compliance.

It does not want to be blamed if the actions turns sour, as in Somalia under President Bill Clinton.

So Presidents commit U.S. troops overseas; Members of Congress do a lot of speechifying; but Congress fails to utilize the power it has either to authorize force or cut off the use of funds to continue the war.

To paraphrase Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is Congress.”