When the Obama Administration launched military operations against Libya, a number of Members of Congress griped about a usurpation of the congressional power to declare war.

Rather than denounce Obama – or Bush in Iraq or Reagan in Panama or Truman in Korea – they should in reality protest their own inaction.

For the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in the lap of Congress.

Or as Pogo said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”  

President Obama announced March 18 that the United States was prepared to use military force to establish a “no fly” zone and strike against Muarmmar Qaddafi’s forces.

While the President’s action was backed by a U.N. Security Council resolution, he declined to ask for a congressional authorization…  

Speaker John Boehner (R-OH), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon (R-CA) all questioned the duration, cost and goals of the U.S. mission in Libya.

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) went further to complain that “I think the extent to which Congress has been bypassed in this process has been breathtaking.” (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee similarly complained that Congress had not authorized the military action. (CQ Today, March 30, 2011)

Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich (D), as his is wont, went off the deep end by charging that Obama’s action was an “impeachable offense.”

It is not the President who should be impeached; the ones who should be impeached are Members of Congress for dereliction of duty.

Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution says Congress shall have power to declare War. The last time Congress used that power and passed a formal declaration was in 1941 when the U.S. began to fight against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Congress can also authorize the use of force through legislation without a formal declaration.

But when President Harry S Truman committed U.S. troops in 1950 to turn back a North Korean invasion of the South, Congress did nothing.

Congress had three years until the 1953 armistice to take action, and still did nothing.  

Almost 1.8 million Americans fought in Korea, with some 33,600 American deaths.

But there never was a congressional authorization, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to prosecute the war.

In response to the Vietnam War that President Lyndon Johnson controversially launched after securing congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Congress in 1973 adopted the War Powers Resolution to get Congress back in the game of declaring war.

(Note: yours truly was involved in passing the War Powers Resolution over the veto of President Richard Nixon by helping to convince liberal Members of Congress that the measure did not confer on the President more power than he already had.)

The concept behind the legislation was sound; if Congress had not authorized sending troops overseas within 60 – 90 days, the use of force must be terminated.

Except every President has deemed that core element of the law unconstitutional.

The executive branch submits reports on the military action in accordance with the law, but refuses to bring the troops home within 60 – 90 days.

And the Supreme Court will not intervene in such a high-stakes political conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

Congress has been deaf, dumb and blind to this lack of presidential compliance.

It does not want to be blamed if the actions turns sour, as in Somalia under President Bill Clinton.

So Presidents commit U.S. troops overseas; Members of Congress do a lot of speechifying; but Congress fails to utilize the power it has either to authorize force or cut off the use of funds to continue the war.

To paraphrase Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is Congress.”  

Guest post by Greg McGowan

At $38 billion, last week’s budget deal marks the largest discretionary cut in our nation’s history – yet the shortsighted cuts to foreign aid may actually increase the debt over time by making future military operations more likely.  At a time of unparalleled demand for the knowledge and expertise of U.S. diplomats, Foreign Service officers, aid workers and administrators, and peacemakers, the budget deal blunts the very tools needed to prevent conflicts, and sets a dangerous precedent for future budget debates.  

By excluding entitlements and defense spending from serious debate, Congress focused solely on the remaining 12 percent of the national budget: non-military discretionary funding.  The $38 billion in cuts includes a whopping $8.4 billion at the expense of the State Department, which amounts to 17 percent of its already humble foreign operations budget.  Included in these reductions is a nearly $16 million cut to the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds vital efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  

The national debt, on the other hand, will shed a mere .058 percent.  In simple terms, this is like cutting toenails off an elephant.  As Joseph Nye points out, Congress played up the widespread public notion that foreign aid accounts for a large part of the budget.  In fact, it makes up only a speck, about 1 percent annually.  It is particularly outrageous that this very same budget deal gives the Department of Defense $5 billion more than it requested, giving lie to Congress’s calls for reductions in defense spending.  The $3.3 billion estimated increase in the outlays when emergency funds for Iraq and Afghanistan are included only underscores the enormous cost of war, offsetting nearly all the funds that the budget deal would save.

Cutting foreign aid directly contradicts the goals reiterated by both Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton…

In a rare public demonstration of bureaucratic solidarity, they and other officials have increasingly emphasized America’s troubled military-heavy foreign policy, vocally supporting a comprehensive shift toward civilian-led diplomacy and away from use of force.  In the past year, strategy reviews by the State Department, Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all stressed lightening our military burden by committing more resources to development and diplomacy.  As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated last month, “Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for more funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them more.  Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time.”

It’s not often that the mindset of our civilian and military leaders is so closely aligned.  Unfortunately, Congress’s ears are deaf to those who directly control and execute the operations needed to advance U.S. security interests.  The value of soft power is invariably underestimated, since foreign operations generally focus on longer-term initiatives rather than immediate, easily-measurable results.  But diplomacy and development are far less expensive than combat operations.  By fostering strategic and economic partnerships and strengthening governance, the rule of law, and public health, foreign operations programs help preempt and mitigate the woes that cause violent conflict in the first place.  

That the budget cuts will likely cost us a great deal in the future is worrying. That the top decision-makers within State, Defense, and the military are being ignored is troubling.  But that Congress continues to spend billions of dollars on defense while severely cutting the civilian tools that are critical to advancing U.S. security is downright alarming. In an age where the greatest threats to our security are posed by shadowy networks of terrorist groups, weak and failing states, the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, and climate change, American leadership must wear more than a military uniform.  If Congress truly wants to reduce future costs and decrease the deficit, it must devote more resources to addressing these threats and preventing war.  It would be wise for our lawmakers to heed the advice of those they chose to represent America beyond Capitol Hill.

Greg McGowan is a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Intern at the Center for a New American Security.

Another test, another dollar spent (actually tens of millions), another long-range missile interceptor misses its target.  Following two failures of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle in January and December 2010, the Pentagon has directed Raytheon to cease delivery of this missile interceptor.  

The “kill vehicle” is an integral part of the ground-based mid-course system that the U.S. government has spent billions developing, despite its spotty track record.  The purpose of this device, an interceptor, is to take out long-range missiles, sent by hostile actors (cough, North Korea, cough, Iran), to prevent missiles coming anywhere near U.S. soil.  

Despite recently updating the kill-vehicle (making it Raytheon’s most advanced anti-missile device) it has only passed one out of three tests. The original and updated versions have failed seven out of fifteen tests.  I wouldn’t bet my security on a 53% success rate.  

While the launch and release segments of January’s test worked, in the last seconds the interceptor did not hit its target.  The kill-vehicle and the mobile radar system, the Sea-based X-band, were blamed for the failure, but in the December breakdown, only the interceptor failed.  An investigation of the malfunction is ongoing, but these tests spell major problems with the device.  

I’ll add that you and I contribute financially to each test, which run about $150 million an attempt.  Boeing (for whom Raytheon is working on this contract) spokesperson Jessica Carlton did not comment on whether Raytheon will face fines for the test failures/wasting my money.

The Government Accountability Office has called on the Missile Defense Agency to continue reforms in transparency and accountability in order to demonstrate system performance before the missile defense production and acquisition resumes.  That’s great, except you and I have already bought at least 52 of these kill-vehicles from Raytheon at $20-$25million a head.  Carlton also would not say how many more kill-vehicles the Missile Defense Agency contracted Raytheon to build.  

There is no set schedule for recommencing delivery of the kill-vehicle because it is contingent on the results of the December failed-test investigation.  However, the Missile Defense Agency doesn’t seem disheartened by the test failures and has allowed Raytheon to keep working on parts of the kill-vehicle that did not fail during the test. This way, Raytheon can restart production quickly as soon as the investigation is complete and the agency can start stocking up again.  Such confidence seems unfounded considering that the interceptor has not been able to even find an incoming test ballistic missile in the air, let alone disable it, which demands hitting an area, just a few centimeters wide.  

For similar overconfidence, see knee-jerk Republican endorsement of Missile Defense.

Update: The sea-based inter-ballistic missile component of this mid-course missile defense system successfully intercepted an intermediate-range missile for the first time during a test April 15,2011.

The drama and uncertainty surrounding the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget is finally over.  Late last week, the administration and Democrats and Republicans in Congress reached an 11th hour agreement on funding levels for the last six months of the fiscal year.  The agreement calls for $38 billion in cuts (many of which are phantom cuts) from the FY 2010 spending level and $78.5 billion from the Obama administration’s FY 2011 request.  The Senate and the House approved the compromise on April 14.  

Funding levels for nuclear material security programs are allocated as follows…

Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA))
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $2.321 billion (Note: This figure does not include an additional $45 million rescission of prior fiscal year 2010 unobligated balances. It does include an additional 0.2% rescission leveled against all discretionary accounts. For Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation this amounts to a $4.6 million cut.)

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $2.136 million

HR 1: $2.085 billion (Note: This figure does not include an additional $45 million rescission of prior year unobligated balances.)

FY2010 Appropriation: $2.131 billion

FY2011 Request: $2.687 billion

Department of State
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $738.5 million (Note: This figure includes an additional 0.2% rescission leveled against all discretionary accounts. For the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, this amounts to a $1.52 million cut.)

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $754 million

HR 1: $740 million

FY2010 Appropriation: $754 million

FY2011 Request: $757.6 million

Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction (aka Nunn-Lugar) Program

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $522.5 million

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $423.56

HR 1: $522.5 million

FY2010 Appropriation: $423.56 million

FY2011 Request: $522.5 million

The good news is that Congress rejected the House Republican leadership’s proposal to cut over $600 million from the President’s FY 2011 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account.  Congressional conferees agreed on a final number of $2.321 billion for this account, a 9% increase over the FY2010 appropriated level and $236 million above the House proposal in H.R. 1.  This number mirrors the funding level included in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s year-long continuing resolution proposed in early March, which was $2.327 billion.  Only four accounts in the entire Energy and Water portfolio received an increase over FY 2010, one of which was the Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation account.  

Congress also fully funded the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Given the current budget environment, these are important achievements.  

In testimony to the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee earlier this month, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne Harrington expressed deep concern about the impact of funding nuclear security programs at or below FY 2010 appropriated levels:

We have tried our best to maintain an aggressive schedule for removing and protecting the vulnerable materials that have been identified around the world, but we are rapidly approaching the point where the tradeoffs for continuing that very forward-looking schedule will become more and more difficult to maintain.

Recall that as part of and in the aftermath of last year’s Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. secured commitments from Mexico, the Ukraine, and Belarus to remove all of their highly enriched uranium in time for the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 in Seoul.  These commitments were made in support of the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.  For example, Belarus still possesses more than 280 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough material to make 11 nuclear bombs.  NNSA also plans to assist other countries with the removal of their highly enriched uranium, including Poland and Vietnam.  These removal activities are being carried out by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account’s signature nuclear material security program.

It’s not entirely clear yet how NNSA plans to allocate the $2.321 billion across the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account’s different programs.  According to the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, this increase allows NNSA “to continue efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years.”  Keeping the commitments outlined above on track is vital to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and ensuring a successful Summit in the Republic of Korea next year.  

And now the bad news.

First, the fact that an account containing vital nuclear material security programs was cut by more than $600 million relative to the FY 2011 request in the first place (and subject to a cut of $366 million in the end) is difficult to comprehend.  These programs counter the most serious threat confronting our national security – the threat of nuclear terrorism – but were viewed as discretionary programs by Republican leaders (and thus subject to major cuts).

Second, a 9% increase over the FY 2010 level for the last six months of the year is less impressive given that the FY 2010 level was actually less than the amount Congress appropriated in FY 2009.  Moreover, some experts argued after the release of the FY 2011 budget that the increases for certain programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should have been even larger.

Third, depending on how scarce resources are allocated within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, the prioritization of highly enriched uranium removal programs could delay NNSA’s substantial domestic and international radiological protection and removal efforts.

A fourth concern is the pressure exerted on vital nonproliferation programs by nuclear modernization activities and the MOX program.   In the final continuing resolution, NNSA’s Weapons Activities account was funded at nearly the full FY 2011 request, whereas it had been subjected to a cut of $312 million by H.R. 1 and $185 million by the March Senate Appropriations Committee continuing resolution.   In addition, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) FY 2012 budget resolution proposes to fully fund the FY 2012 request for Weapons Activities, which is $600 million more than the FY 2011 request. If NNSA’s nuclear material security programs are not similarly viewed as defense spending, the big increases for nuclear modernization will eat into the budgets of other programs at NNSA, including Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

The MOX program accounted for a third of the FY 2011 request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  The program is plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays, and NNSA has yet to receive a commitment from any utility to use the fuel.  The reduced funding level for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the final continuing resolution is likely to set back aspects of the MOX program.  In the fight for scarce dollars within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, effective first line of defense programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should take precedent over ineffective programs such as MOX.        

Now that the FY 2011 budget is settled, the fight over the FY 2012 budget is already underway.  An adequately funded FY 2012 budget is necessary to see vital nuclear material removal commitments through to completion and keep others on schedule.  But Republican leaders in Congress are aiming for far greater budget cuts to non-defense programs than those they achieved in FY 2011, and its not clear that they have internalized the fact that nuclear material security programs are defense programs. For its part the Obama administration needs to play a much more vocal and proactive role in making the case for why these programs are so vital.     

Moreover, the nuclear material security effort will not end when all of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit commitments are met and the four year goal reaches its endpoint.  With the 2012 Summit in Seoul rapidly approaching, the U.S. and its international partners should be looking to stand up new initiatives and programs to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and secure nuclear materials wherever they exist.  These efforts will cost money (as U.S. leadership so often does), and it’s essential that Congress be willing to foot America’s share of the bill.  

Friday was the one-year anniversary of the signature of the New START treaty.  I didn’t have any vodka around to celebrate with so I drank some Scotch instead.

If you’ve already forgotten the treaty’s tumultuous yet momentous path through the U.S. Senate, you can (re)read my take here.  

Since the treaty entered into force in early February, the two sides have made their first data exchange and began exhibitions (the Russians had a look at a U.S. B-1 bomber, and U.S. had a look at the Russian RS-24 ICBM).  And as of April 5, each side is now allowed to begin on-site inspections.  

The implementation of the treaty seems to be moving ahead smoothly, but for some reason the U.S. and Russia think it’s an awesome idea not to release either aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles or a much more detailed Memorandum of Understanding, both of which were available under START I.  That makes about as much sense as counting on Brett Favre to lead your team to the Super Bowl (see for here for examples). Look for more on this from NoH soon.

Last week in the International Herald Tribune, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called on Washington and Moscow to build on the momentum created by New START “and take new actions to reduce nuclear risk and shape a safer world.”  

They propose four next steps, the first being the initiation of early negotiations to further reduce each sides arsenal of deployed strategic warheads to 1,000 apiece.  While these negotiations proceed, Albright and Ivanov suggest that the U.S. and Russia reach the treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed (New START accountable) warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles by 2014 or 2015, well before the implementation deadline of 2018.  They also note that since the number of Russia’s deployed nuclear forces is expected to fall well below the 1,550 deployed delivery vehicle limit, the U.S. should reduce to 1,300 deployed warheads, so long as Russia does not build up above that number.

These are all very sensible steps that in principle the U.S. shouldn’t think twice about taking.  But expect Republicans in Congress to throw up every roadblock possible to prevent this from happening.  Moreover, the military will also have to be brought on board.  As of now they don’t appear to be planning for early implementation of New START – to say nothing about reducing below New START levels.

For example, last week Rear Admiral Terry Benedict told the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee that the Navy is planning to reduce the number of New START accountable SLBM tubes on Ohio-class SSBNs from 24 to 20 beginning in FY 2015, and that they expect this process to take about two years.   FY 2015 plus two years gets you pretty close to the implementation deadline of 2018. It’s understandable that the military wouldn’t be pushing an accelerated schedule on its own.

But does this schedule have to be set in stone?  It will take direction from the President and support from the Pentagon in response to that direction to reach the New START limits ahead of schedule. The Pentagon’s support will be easier to come by if early implementation saves money.