Another test, another dollar spent (actually tens of millions), another long-range missile interceptor misses its target.  Following two failures of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle in January and December 2010, the Pentagon has directed Raytheon to cease delivery of this missile interceptor.  

The “kill vehicle” is an integral part of the ground-based mid-course system that the U.S. government has spent billions developing, despite its spotty track record.  The purpose of this device, an interceptor, is to take out long-range missiles, sent by hostile actors (cough, North Korea, cough, Iran), to prevent missiles coming anywhere near U.S. soil.  

Despite recently updating the kill-vehicle (making it Raytheon’s most advanced anti-missile device) it has only passed one out of three tests. The original and updated versions have failed seven out of fifteen tests.  I wouldn’t bet my security on a 53% success rate.  

While the launch and release segments of January’s test worked, in the last seconds the interceptor did not hit its target.  The kill-vehicle and the mobile radar system, the Sea-based X-band, were blamed for the failure, but in the December breakdown, only the interceptor failed.  An investigation of the malfunction is ongoing, but these tests spell major problems with the device.  

I’ll add that you and I contribute financially to each test, which run about $150 million an attempt.  Boeing (for whom Raytheon is working on this contract) spokesperson Jessica Carlton did not comment on whether Raytheon will face fines for the test failures/wasting my money.

The Government Accountability Office has called on the Missile Defense Agency to continue reforms in transparency and accountability in order to demonstrate system performance before the missile defense production and acquisition resumes.  That’s great, except you and I have already bought at least 52 of these kill-vehicles from Raytheon at $20-$25million a head.  Carlton also would not say how many more kill-vehicles the Missile Defense Agency contracted Raytheon to build.  

There is no set schedule for recommencing delivery of the kill-vehicle because it is contingent on the results of the December failed-test investigation.  However, the Missile Defense Agency doesn’t seem disheartened by the test failures and has allowed Raytheon to keep working on parts of the kill-vehicle that did not fail during the test. This way, Raytheon can restart production quickly as soon as the investigation is complete and the agency can start stocking up again.  Such confidence seems unfounded considering that the interceptor has not been able to even find an incoming test ballistic missile in the air, let alone disable it, which demands hitting an area, just a few centimeters wide.  

For similar overconfidence, see knee-jerk Republican endorsement of Missile Defense.

Update: The sea-based inter-ballistic missile component of this mid-course missile defense system successfully intercepted an intermediate-range missile for the first time during a test April 15,2011.

The drama and uncertainty surrounding the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget is finally over.  Late last week, the administration and Democrats and Republicans in Congress reached an 11th hour agreement on funding levels for the last six months of the fiscal year.  The agreement calls for $38 billion in cuts (many of which are phantom cuts) from the FY 2010 spending level and $78.5 billion from the Obama administration’s FY 2011 request.  The Senate and the House approved the compromise on April 14.  

Funding levels for nuclear material security programs are allocated as follows…

Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA))
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $2.321 billion (Note: This figure does not include an additional $45 million rescission of prior fiscal year 2010 unobligated balances. It does include an additional 0.2% rescission leveled against all discretionary accounts. For Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation this amounts to a $4.6 million cut.)

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $2.136 million

HR 1: $2.085 billion (Note: This figure does not include an additional $45 million rescission of prior year unobligated balances.)

FY2010 Appropriation: $2.131 billion

FY2011 Request: $2.687 billion

Department of State
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $738.5 million (Note: This figure includes an additional 0.2% rescission leveled against all discretionary accounts. For the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, this amounts to a $1.52 million cut.)

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $754 million

HR 1: $740 million

FY2010 Appropriation: $754 million

FY2011 Request: $757.6 million

Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction (aka Nunn-Lugar) Program

Final FY2011 CR (last six months of the year at annualized rate): $522.5 million

Short Term CRs (first six months of the year at annualized rate): $423.56

HR 1: $522.5 million

FY2010 Appropriation: $423.56 million

FY2011 Request: $522.5 million

The good news is that Congress rejected the House Republican leadership’s proposal to cut over $600 million from the President’s FY 2011 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account.  Congressional conferees agreed on a final number of $2.321 billion for this account, a 9% increase over the FY2010 appropriated level and $236 million above the House proposal in H.R. 1.  This number mirrors the funding level included in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s year-long continuing resolution proposed in early March, which was $2.327 billion.  Only four accounts in the entire Energy and Water portfolio received an increase over FY 2010, one of which was the Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation account.  

Congress also fully funded the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Given the current budget environment, these are important achievements.  

In testimony to the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee earlier this month, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne Harrington expressed deep concern about the impact of funding nuclear security programs at or below FY 2010 appropriated levels:

We have tried our best to maintain an aggressive schedule for removing and protecting the vulnerable materials that have been identified around the world, but we are rapidly approaching the point where the tradeoffs for continuing that very forward-looking schedule will become more and more difficult to maintain.

Recall that as part of and in the aftermath of last year’s Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. secured commitments from Mexico, the Ukraine, and Belarus to remove all of their highly enriched uranium in time for the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 in Seoul.  These commitments were made in support of the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.  For example, Belarus still possesses more than 280 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough material to make 11 nuclear bombs.  NNSA also plans to assist other countries with the removal of their highly enriched uranium, including Poland and Vietnam.  These removal activities are being carried out by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account’s signature nuclear material security program.

It’s not entirely clear yet how NNSA plans to allocate the $2.321 billion across the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account’s different programs.  According to the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, this increase allows NNSA “to continue efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years.”  Keeping the commitments outlined above on track is vital to reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and ensuring a successful Summit in the Republic of Korea next year.  

And now the bad news.

First, the fact that an account containing vital nuclear material security programs was cut by more than $600 million relative to the FY 2011 request in the first place (and subject to a cut of $366 million in the end) is difficult to comprehend.  These programs counter the most serious threat confronting our national security – the threat of nuclear terrorism – but were viewed as discretionary programs by Republican leaders (and thus subject to major cuts).

Second, a 9% increase over the FY 2010 level for the last six months of the year is less impressive given that the FY 2010 level was actually less than the amount Congress appropriated in FY 2009.  Moreover, some experts argued after the release of the FY 2011 budget that the increases for certain programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should have been even larger.

Third, depending on how scarce resources are allocated within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, the prioritization of highly enriched uranium removal programs could delay NNSA’s substantial domestic and international radiological protection and removal efforts.

A fourth concern is the pressure exerted on vital nonproliferation programs by nuclear modernization activities and the MOX program.   In the final continuing resolution, NNSA’s Weapons Activities account was funded at nearly the full FY 2011 request, whereas it had been subjected to a cut of $312 million by H.R. 1 and $185 million by the March Senate Appropriations Committee continuing resolution.   In addition, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) FY 2012 budget resolution proposes to fully fund the FY 2012 request for Weapons Activities, which is $600 million more than the FY 2011 request. If NNSA’s nuclear material security programs are not similarly viewed as defense spending, the big increases for nuclear modernization will eat into the budgets of other programs at NNSA, including Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

The MOX program accounted for a third of the FY 2011 request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  The program is plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays, and NNSA has yet to receive a commitment from any utility to use the fuel.  The reduced funding level for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the final continuing resolution is likely to set back aspects of the MOX program.  In the fight for scarce dollars within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, effective first line of defense programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should take precedent over ineffective programs such as MOX.        

Now that the FY 2011 budget is settled, the fight over the FY 2012 budget is already underway.  An adequately funded FY 2012 budget is necessary to see vital nuclear material removal commitments through to completion and keep others on schedule.  But Republican leaders in Congress are aiming for far greater budget cuts to non-defense programs than those they achieved in FY 2011, and its not clear that they have internalized the fact that nuclear material security programs are defense programs. For its part the Obama administration needs to play a much more vocal and proactive role in making the case for why these programs are so vital.     

Moreover, the nuclear material security effort will not end when all of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit commitments are met and the four year goal reaches its endpoint.  With the 2012 Summit in Seoul rapidly approaching, the U.S. and its international partners should be looking to stand up new initiatives and programs to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and secure nuclear materials wherever they exist.  These efforts will cost money (as U.S. leadership so often does), and it’s essential that Congress be willing to foot America’s share of the bill.  

Friday was the one-year anniversary of the signature of the New START treaty.  I didn’t have any vodka around to celebrate with so I drank some Scotch instead.

If you’ve already forgotten the treaty’s tumultuous yet momentous path through the U.S. Senate, you can (re)read my take here.  

Since the treaty entered into force in early February, the two sides have made their first data exchange and began exhibitions (the Russians had a look at a U.S. B-1 bomber, and U.S. had a look at the Russian RS-24 ICBM).  And as of April 5, each side is now allowed to begin on-site inspections.  

The implementation of the treaty seems to be moving ahead smoothly, but for some reason the U.S. and Russia think it’s an awesome idea not to release either aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles or a much more detailed Memorandum of Understanding, both of which were available under START I.  That makes about as much sense as counting on Brett Favre to lead your team to the Super Bowl (see for here for examples). Look for more on this from NoH soon.

Last week in the International Herald Tribune, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called on Washington and Moscow to build on the momentum created by New START “and take new actions to reduce nuclear risk and shape a safer world.”  

They propose four next steps, the first being the initiation of early negotiations to further reduce each sides arsenal of deployed strategic warheads to 1,000 apiece.  While these negotiations proceed, Albright and Ivanov suggest that the U.S. and Russia reach the treaty’s limits of 1,550 deployed (New START accountable) warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles by 2014 or 2015, well before the implementation deadline of 2018.  They also note that since the number of Russia’s deployed nuclear forces is expected to fall well below the 1,550 deployed delivery vehicle limit, the U.S. should reduce to 1,300 deployed warheads, so long as Russia does not build up above that number.

These are all very sensible steps that in principle the U.S. shouldn’t think twice about taking.  But expect Republicans in Congress to throw up every roadblock possible to prevent this from happening.  Moreover, the military will also have to be brought on board.  As of now they don’t appear to be planning for early implementation of New START – to say nothing about reducing below New START levels.

For example, last week Rear Admiral Terry Benedict told the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee that the Navy is planning to reduce the number of New START accountable SLBM tubes on Ohio-class SSBNs from 24 to 20 beginning in FY 2015, and that they expect this process to take about two years.   FY 2015 plus two years gets you pretty close to the implementation deadline of 2018. It’s understandable that the military wouldn’t be pushing an accelerated schedule on its own.

But does this schedule have to be set in stone?  It will take direction from the President and support from the Pentagon in response to that direction to reach the New START limits ahead of schedule. The Pentagon’s support will be easier to come by if early implementation saves money. 

This is not a way to run a government… We don’t have time for games.

President Barack Obama, warning that he will not sign another Continuing Resolution (CR) this week without an agreement on the fiscal 2011 budget.

House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers introduced another temporary funding measure today that would fund the government for an additional week while lawmakers continue to debate the subject. The measure would provide funding for one additional week and cut $12 billion in discretionary spending. It also contains the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for fiscal 2011.

In his remarks to the White House press corps., Obama added that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker John Boehner plan to meet this evening. If they can’t reach an agreement, they are expected to return to the White House on Wednesday for further talks.

Last Thursday I spoke at a conference on nuclear weapons hosted by the State Department titled “Generation Prague”.  As the title suggests, the conference was aimed at young people and looked at the challenges and opportunities facing the “Post Cold War Generation” working in arms control and nonproliferation.

I spoke on the afternoon panel titled “Intergenerational Perspectives” with former NNSA Director Linton Brooks and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose.  Our panel prompted a spirited discussion and seemed to generate a lot of interest from the audience.  Below are my opening remarks.

The Prague Generation and Nuclear Weapons

Thanks Jonathon.  It’s a pleasure to be here.  I want to thank the State Department for inviting me to participate on this panel, and for hosting today’s conference.  In all honesty, I feel out of place given Linton and Frank’s long experience in and enormous contributions to our profession both inside and outside of government.

But someone has to represent the so-called “Prague Generation,” and the reality is that we haven’t been around that long.  Then again, looks can be deceiving.  I’m 28 years old, but I’m pretty sure Amb. Brooks still has more hair than I do.

I thought I’d use my opening statement to share some thoughts on what drew me to this field and what I think nuclear weapons mean to our generation.

I think the best way to do that is to start by describing two events in particular that have largely defined the way in which I think about nuclear weapons, and I believe they shed a lot of light on the challenges and opportunities that our generation faces…

The first event is the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Now you might be asking yourself how someone that didn’t live through that event could be so influenced by it.  You might also be asking why I’m fixating on an event that occurred during the Cold War.

Well, let me explain.

During my Junior year at Brown University, I enrolled in a seminar on the Cuban Missile Crisis and Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The instructors of the course, Professors James Blight and janet Lang, were the principal organizers of two conferences which occurred on the 30th and 40th anniversaries of the crisis and brought together newly declassified documents and participants in the events of October 1962 from the U.S., Soviet Union, and Cuba (including then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Fidel Castro).  Thanks to these conferences and additional revelations, we now know that the Crisis was far more dangerous than any of the participants at the time could have possibly imagined.  Or as McNamara put it some years later, in the end it was largely luck that prevented a nuclear war.

Simply put, I was terrified by what I learned in the seminar.  For me the lessons of the crisis are chillingly clear.  Kennedy was rational, Khrushchev was rational, even Castro was rational.  Yet nuclear war almost occurred anyway.  As McNamara stated in the Academy Award winning documentary The Fog of War, the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.

The second event is 9/11.  Like the Missile Crisis, I think this event is noteworthy as much for what didn’t happen as it is for what happened.

For me 9/11 illustrated the damage that could have been done by a terrorist group armed with weapons of mass destruction.  9/11 – and the discovery of A.Q. Kahn’s nuclear Walmart a few years later – seemed to encapsulate the erratic and unpredictable world in which we now live; a world in which our enormous nuclear arsenal of over 5,000 weapons seems powerless to keep us safe.

From the perspective of our generation then, the world seems to have changed in fundamental ways.  The world is more chaotic and unpredictable.  Because of this the nuclear status quo no longer seems tenable.  

But there is a tendency to view the challenges and problems of ones own generation as new or unique when they are not.  The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, but the age-old questions about deterrence and the role and purpose of nuclear weapons are still with us today.  And as the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates, despite the seemingly halcyon stability of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, the risk of catastrophe has always been real.

In effect, we’ve been fighting the same battles for decades.  

Witness, for example, the recently concluded New START debate.  The debate over the treaty in the Senate occurred largely within a Cold War frame.  The strongest argument deployed by proponents of the treaty was that treaty is necessary to monitor and verify the size and location of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  This argument may have been good enough to ensure 67 votes for New START, but we’re in need of a much larger fundamental reframing of the nuclear danger if we’re to make progress on the rest of the agenda – to say nothing about the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Which begs the question: How can the danger be reframed?  Can it be reframed?  Either way, it will be up to the Prague generation to move the Prague agenda forward.  

Let me end with a few thoughts on the challenges and opportunities our generation faces as we seek to move that agenda forward.

First the good news.

First, opinion research shows that our generation in particular is open to the narrative that nuclear weapons are a liability rather than an asset.  For example, an April 2010 poll showed that 66% of American’s between the age of 18 and 34 approve of reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, versus 53% between the age of 35 and 54 and 49% over the age of 55.

Second, based on conversations I’ve had with colleagues who study the impact of generational attitudes on foreign policy, preceding generations underestimate how cosmopolitan our generation is.  “Foreign” is not necessarily unknown or unknowable (or even scary) to us in a way that it was to earlier generations.  This is important because we are unlikely to make meaningful progress on disarmament unless we identify ourselves as being part of something much larger, dare I say something global.  The danger posed by nuclear weapons is a shared danger, and reducing and ultimately eliminating that danger will require a cooperative global effort.

Third, younger generations are by nature far less cynical about the limits of the possible than older generations.  We don’t have scars from past battles.  As President Obama stated in his Prague Speech “fatalism is a deadly adversary.”

Fourth, our generation is already making its mark on moving the Prague agenda forward.  We’re already represented here at the State Department and elsewhere in the administration.  Outside of government, a coalition of young people working throughout the arms control and disarmament community has formed a group called “the Prague Project.”  The Project is raising awareness about the nuclear threat and providing opportunities for communication, collaboration, and action.  Meanwhile, the Global Zero movement has established chapters on college campuses all across the country.

Yet while I’m hopeful about all that we can achieve, we should all be mindful of the enormous challenges we face.

First, I think the predominant attitude that defines our generation’s attitude toward nuclear weapons is, not surprisingly, apathy.  Obviously I’m not speaking about anyone in this room.  But I think there is a general attitude that nuclear weapons are a problem of the past.  Put in another way the threat seems entirely abstract.

Previous generations have at times awakened to the nuclear danger, which has prompted a meaningful sense of urgency about doing something about it.  Such moments occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and during and after the Reagan administration when the Freeze Movement developed.  But these moments didn’t last.

In order to permit real progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, our generation must sense that a HUGE problem exists, a problem that could end all life as we know it. As a former professor once put it to me: We must somehow create a sacred space of virtual horror.

Second, a broad-based disarmament movement will need leaders, but too few job opportunities exist for young people in the arms control field.  

In addition to the lack of opportunities, a career in arms control may be less appealing than other issues competing for our generation’s attention because young people don’t want to fight the same battles that arms controllers have been fighting for the past 50 years.  This isn’t to say these debates weren’t important.  Our generation would do well to appreciate and learn from what Linton’s generation did to keep us safe during and after the Cold War.  But as one colleague my age put it to me, we want to learn from the past, but not feel doomed to repeat it.