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You are here: Home / Archives for Iran Diplomacy

November 26, 2012

Are Iran Sanctions Becoming a Runaway Train?

With Congress back in session, two US senators are planning to propose a new round of sanctions on Iran. The sanctions, the collective brainchild of Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) would  “restrict nearly all forms of international trade and transactions,” moving closer to an effective total embargo on Iran.

But at this crucial stage, new and tougher sanctions may actually undermine the prospects for a negotiated solution to Iranian nuclear aspirations.

The new sanctions would expand existing restrictions on Iran, widening the net of current sanctions to include not only Iran’s oil markets, but also agricultural, industrial, and consumer goods. In this way, they would get at the heart of the “basic functioning of [Iran’s] economy.”  The new measures would also demand that foreign countries freeze Iran’s access to its overseas currency reserves. Kirk and Menendez are working on this proposal amidst widespread agreement that the administration’s existing sanctions are having the desired economic effect – something that even Israel’s foreign ministry has acknowledged.

So do we need a new round of sanctions right now? To answer that question, it’s important to keep the end goal in mind: the intention of any sanctions against Iran is to persuade the regime to accept international limits on its nuclear program. And there are already some indications that  Iran is inching toward more productive negotiations with the P5+1 on this matter.

Our friends at the National Security Network reported on November 13 a number of promising signs that Iranian officials are not only ready to start a new round of negotiations, but they’re in fact willing to consider direct bilateral talks with the U.S., a negotiation format that has long eluded both sides, and that analysts agree have a greater chance of success.

With existing multilateral sanctions apparently having the desired effect, and Iran quite possibly on the verge of taking crucial steps toward negotiations, it is precisely the wrong time to impose new sanctions. What makes sanctions effective at the negotiating table is the prospect of having them lifted, which theoretically gives Iran an incentive to agree to what we’re asking for in return. As Iran expert Trita Parsi put it back in January: “… right before [sanctions’] imposition — at the moment where they remain a withdrawable threat — their effectiveness is at their height.”

Therefore, Iran needs to be confident that the easing of sanctions is a real possibility, in order for any talks to be effective. But if we go through the process of debating, passing, and implementing a new and more draconian round of sanctions, Iran is likely to receive the opposite message – that we have no intention of making concessions, and that we seek not a deal, but outright regime change.

Like trouble, a sanctions regime is much easier to get into than to get out of. In particular, U.S.-specific sanctions are difficult to reverse, because they require an act of Congress rather than a decision by the President. Moreover, as anyone familiar with the U.S. legislative process knows, a new round of sanctions will require a significant investment of energy, time, and resources, one that lawmakers and administration officials will be reluctant to unravel once the sanctions go into effect.

This wouldn’t be the first time that the chance for progress with Iran has been derailed by a “runaway train” of sanctions policy, driven by  overzealous advocates. Parsi believes that, in May 2010, Washington was unable to accept a promising nuclear deal with Iran – the “fuel swap” agreement brokered by Turkey and Brazil –  because the United States  had just negotiated a tough new round of sanctions, making its commitment to the sanctions policy “irreversible.”

Now, as before, policymakers intent on tightening sanctions are forgetting that there’s a next step: to demonstrate that, as part of a negotiated deal, we’ll indeed be willing to lift those sanctions. As author Christopher de Bellaigue warned in a recent piece in The New Republic, “the danger is that sanctions will have ceased to serve as an instrument of policy, and simply become the policy itself.”

Similarly, Gary Sick, who worked on Iranian affairs in the White House during the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, worried in a CNN op-ed that “[s]anctions have assumed a life of their own and are gradually becoming politically untouchable.”

The Obama administration has pursued a sanctions policy with broad international support that has put enormous pressure on Iran.  But by adding to this pressure, the United States risks becoming further committed to a policy of more and more sanctions, while making it difficult to attain its ultimate goal:  a mutually acceptable diplomatic solution.  

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 22, 2012

Fact Sheet: Fifteen Foreign-Policy Challenges For the Next President

By Usha Sahay, Rachel Murawski, and Eve Hunter The October 22 presidential debate on national security will cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israel and Iran, China, the Middle East, as well as the general issue of “America’s role in the world.” These issues have made headlines in 2012, and been prominent on the campaign trail. But, […]

Posted in: Asia, China, Factsheets & Analysis on Nuclear Weapons, India and Pakistan, Iran Diplomacy, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, New National Security, North Korea, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties, United States

October 12, 2012

The Presidential Candidates and Iran: 4 Things to Know

Happy Friday, all! Over on the Center’s website, I’ve got a primer on the candidates and Iran. The piece places the candidates’ positions on Iran in context, discussing Romney’s shifting red lines, Obama’s nonproliferation policy, the two candidates’ f…

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Middle East, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 10, 2012

Quote of the Day: Unintended Consequences Edition

“[A]n attack would make a nuclear-armed Iran inevitable. They would just bury the program deeper and make it more covert…The results of an American or Israeli military strike on Iran could, in my view, prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world.”

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking about Iran at the Norfolk Forum, October 3, 2012. Gates was Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2011, serving in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations.

He went on to add that sanctions on Iran are “our best chance going forward, to ratchet up the economic pressure and diplomatic isolation to the point where the Iranian leadership concludes that it actually hurts Iranian security and, above all, the security of the regime itself, to continue to pursue nuclear weapons.”

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Middle East, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 4, 2012

Fact Sheet: Statements Against a Military Attack on Iran

Updated by Usha Sahay U.S. Military Officials “The current U.S.-led push to force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions through steadily increasing economic and diplomatic pressure is beginning to show results and it would be “premature” to resort to military force.” -Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 26, 2012 “After […]

Posted in: Factsheets on Iran Diplomacy, Iran Diplomacy

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