by John Isaacs Prepared remarks delivered by John Isaacs to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs on December 1, 2009 I would like to talk about one of science’s greatest, and most deadly, inventions – the nuclear bomb. While interest in nuclear weapons issues has faded since the end of the Cold War […]
Playing Chess With Russia: An Update on the New START Agreement
by Kingston Reif Interview published on Daily Kos on November 22, 2009 Negotiators have been working tirelessly and continuously behind the scenes to meet the treaty deadline. Obama and Medvedev met in Singapore during Obama’s recent trip to Asia. Though the leaders downplayed any problems with the negotiations on “New START”, it has become clear […]
Strengthening U.S. Security Through Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Recommendations for the Obama Administration
by Robert G. Gard and Leonor Tomero In 2008, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation sought input from 60 scientists, academics, members of Congress, senior congressional staffers, and representatives from advocacy groups, think tanks, and foundations to assess the priorities for the next Administration on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. This report summarizes the consultations. […]
Not Another (Cold) War: The Importance of Maintaining Positive Engagement with Russia
by John Isaacs The conflict between Russia and Georgia has brought the diplomatic and political relationship between the United States and Russia to a standstill. The Bush Administration has chosen a foreign policy stance that unconditionally supports Georgia while simultaneously condemning Russia. This policy approach has been described as adhering to a long-standing U.S. policy […]
Fact Sheet on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonproliferation
by Kingston Reif In a welcome and much-needed shift from the policies of the Bush administration, both presumptive nominees for President in 2008 have stated that they intend to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and pursue further legally binding and verifiable reductions in the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. In order to achieve […]
