Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

"3+2" for Freedom

A few weeks ago I wrote about the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), the agency’s 25-year blueprint to sustain and modernize US nuclear warheads and their supporting infrastructure.  In that initial post I focused on the astronomical cost of NNSA’s new proposal to consolidate the number of warhead variants from the current level of 12 down to 5 interoperable warheads and raised questions about the necessity and feasibility of this so-called “3+2” strategy.

Upon closer inspection, the SSMP is even more outlandish than I first described. 

All you really need to know about the “3+2” strategy is contained in the short, two-page conclusion to the 298-page document.  It starts by noting that the strategy “is absolutely essential and must be accomplished…”  

Then we get this paragraph:

Future planning will include a number of as yet unresolved issues. In the summer of 2013, NNSA and the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense anticipate completing a number of studies to inform NNSA planning. Two of these studies are intended to achieve savings by identifying management efficiencies and setting workforce priorities, which will require detailed plans and tradeoff analyses. In addition, many of the life extension programs and elements of the plutonium strategy are still in the early study phase and the cost estimates are not complete. Furthermore, the work planned for FY 2013 may not be completed because of mandatory funding reductions and may require adjustments to out-year plans and dates. Finally, unforeseen technical challenges in the stockpile or geopolitical events could change the priorities on which this SSMP has been built. Therefore, while some elements may require adjustment, this SSMP is an executable plan aligned with DoD requirements to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. [emphasis mine.]

Let’s unpack each of these astounding statements in turn.

First, NNSA is anticipating finding billions in efficiencies to help finance the “3+2” strategy, but it hasn’t finished the analysis to determine if these savings are actually achievable. NNSA’s FY 2014 budget request, for example, assumes efficiency savings of $320 million, but according to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the agency “has not completed any assessments to determine the reasonableness, feasibility, or source of those savings.” Meanwhile, NNSA’s management of the nuclear weapons complex has to date been the antithesis of efficient: all of NNSA’s major life extension and construction projects are behind schedule and over budget.

Second, even though the “3+2” strategy hasn’t advanced much beyond the PowerPoint slide stage (i.e. “early study phase”), NNSA has already determined that the strategy is “absolutely essential and must be accomplished.” But if NNSA has yet to fully flesh out the strategy, how can it conclude that the strategy is necessary? This concern is made even more acute by that fact that NNSA has a history of inflating requirements and ignoring cost-effective alternatives.

Third, given NNSA’s atrocious cost-estimating practices, the fact that the cost estimates for the “3+2” strategy are not complete should be a huge red flag. The approximately $300 billion estimated cost of the plan (which, by the way, doesn’t include an estimated cost to sustain US plutonium capabilities, which will be enormous!) is likely to be much, much higher.  

Fourth, due to Congressionally mandated budget cuts (i.e. sequestration) NNSA can’t even complete the work it hoped to do in FY 2013 because there’s not enough funding. But the SSMP assumes that unprecedented levels of funding will be available over the long-term.

Fifth, unanticipated technical obstacles could arise that could mess up NNSA’s plans. One can imagine, for example, that NNSA might encounter difficulties in implementing concepts that are orders of magnitude more complicated than anything it has ever attempted previously.

Despite admitting these weighty disclaimers (i.e. “unresolved issues”), NNSA confidently proclaims that “this SSMP is an executable plan.” All of which raises the question of whether there is anyone home at the White House, Office of Management and Budget, Pentagon, or Nuclear Weapons Council tasked with telling NNSA that it is generally bad practice to list the reasons why a plan is basically unexecutable but then say “Don’t worry, the plan is in fact executable”!? The answer appears to be a resounding no.

Oh, but there’s more.

As I noted in my first post on the SSMP, the conclusion also notes that “the “3+2” strategic vision will reduce stockpile maintenance costs while maintaining strategic flexibility and offering the potential to consider decreasing the size of the stockpile hedge without increasing the risk.” [emphasis mine.] In other words, even after spending approximately four decades and untold hundreds of billions to implement the “3+2” strategy, there’s no guarantee that the US reserve stockpile of approximately 2,500 warheads can be reduced. Again, has anyone in the White House considered what this might mean for the President’s objective to negotiate a treaty with Russia that covers not only deployed warheads, but non-deployed warheads as well? NNSA seems to be saying that there cannot be any significant reductions unless the SSMP is executed.

Furthermore, NNSA does not provide an explanation for how the “3+2” strategy would reduce stockpile maintenance costs, especially if no reductions are made to the hedge.  

Fortunately, Congress is already balking at the stockpile management vision described in the SSMP.

Last month the Senate Appropriations Committee reduced the budget request for the B61 life extension program, the first in line of the five warheads slated to make up NNSA’s stockpile of the future, by approximately 30 percent. The Committee expressed concern “that NNSA’s proposed scope of work for extending the life of the B61 bomb is not the lowest cost, lowest risk option that meets military requirements and replaces aging components before they affect weapon performance.”

The Senate Appropriations Committee also expressed doubts about the combined life extension program for the W78 intercontinental ballistic missile warhead and the W88 submarine launched ballistic missile warhead, the first of three interoperable warheads slated for refurbishment as part of the “3+2” strategy. While the Committee did not cut funding for the program, it stated “that an integrated warhead may be unnecessarily complex and expensive, increase uncertainty about certification and meeting the full range of military characteristics and stockpile-to-target sequences needed for submarine and intercontinental ballistic missile systems, and fail to address aging issues in a timely manner.” According to the SSMP, the combined W78/W88 life extension program will cost at least $14 billion.

The House Appropriations Committee has raised similar alarms. The Committee declared that it “will not support dedicating significant funding for new stockpile transformation concepts unless the Administration can more clearly lay out its rationale and the NNSA can demonstrate that it is taking a conservative approach that accounts for all costs, is executable in the timeframe needed, is technically feasible, and has demonstrable benefits that justify such a large investment.” Though the House did not reduce appropriations for the B61 life extension program, it did cut the budget for the joint W78/W88 warhead by $23 million. The House funding level would permit consideration of an interoperable warhead, but only as part of a continued study of alternatives, including a separate life extension program for the W78.  

The Pentagon, NNSA, and the contractors they employ have often overreached in their pursuit of nuclear stockpile modernization. But this time, they have taken that overreach to a whole new level.

Another GMD Intercept Test Failure

As you may have heard, a July 5 flight intercept test of the ground based midcourse defense (GMD) system failed to hit its target. The Missile Defense Agency has yet to announce what caused the miss. The failed test has apparently not shaken the Penta…

Sen. Sessions Gives Away the Game on Nuclear Reductions

Last Spring, I wrote that one of the perks of being a Republican president in the United States is the freedom to make drastic changes to US nuclear force levels while Democratic presidents are forced to travel a much tougher political road, often in the pursuit of far less ambitious goals. Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL), the ranking Republican on the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, recently provided further evidence of this phenomenon.

In his June 19 speech in Berlin, President Obama proposed to reduce US deployed strategic nuclear warheads with Russia by up to one-third below the New START level of 1,550 warheads. Predictably, this drove the President’s critics crazy. In a well-coordinated series of press statements and op-eds in response to the speech, Republican members of Congress, former Bush administration officials, and the ICBM pork caucus trotted out the standard-issue talking points against changing our outdated nuclear strategy.

But in a fit of candor, Sen. Sessions strayed wildly off-message and revealed the pure, unadulterated partisanship animating his party’s attitude on nuclear weapons issues. The day after the President’s speech, Sessions told a gathering on Capitol Hill that:

If George Bush said I think we could get to 1000, 1100 nuclear weapons and I believe we can still defend America, that’s one thing.

In other words, reductions implemented by Republican Presidents are fine and dandy, but reductions implemented by Democrats are a threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

Sen. Sessions attempted to cover his tracks by arguing that Obama’s proposed reductions are dangerous because of the President’s support of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. But this protestation rings hollow given that President Ronald Reagan, the patron saint of Republican defense hawks, argued vehemently decades before for nuclear zero while the Cold War still raged.

While the GOP lambastes Obama for being open to a further incremental reduction in deployed forces with Russia, the truth is that since the end of the Cold War, Republicans Presidents have repeatedly slashed the size of the US nuclear arsenal, including significant reductions without reciprocity from any other nation. And as Sessions suggests, Republicans didn’t complain.

Take George W. Bush, for example. During a press conference at the National Press Club on May 23, 2000, then Governor Bush declared:

It should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than what has been already agreed to under START II without compromising our security in any way. We should not keep weapons that our military planners do not need. These unneeded weapons are the expensive relics of dead conflicts, and they do nothing to make us more secure.

Apparently taken aback by Bush’s sweeping statements, a reporter asked:

Question: I’m just trying to clarify. When you say that we should be prepared to lead by example, are you saying that you’d be prepared to reduce America’s nuclear arsenal whether or not the Russians follow suit?

Bush: Yes, I am, and I would work closely with the Russians to convince them to do the same.

After his election, President Bush continued to voice his preference for unilaterally reducing the US nuclear arsenal. In a November 2001 press conference with Vladimir Putin, Bush announced that pursuant to a recently completed nuclear posture review, the United States would reduce its arsenal of deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 (!) as a matter of national policy without a formal arms control agreement with Russia. “We don’t need arms control negotiations,” Bush said, “to reduce our weaponry in a significant way.”

The Russians, however, preferred to implement further cuts via a treaty with the United States. Ultimately, Bush was persuaded by Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to codify reductions in a treaty with Russia, which he did in 2002 in the form of the Moscow Treaty. But the Bush team remained unilateralists to the end. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate as it was considering the Moscow Treaty, “We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with its arsenal.”

Beyond the deployed arsenal, President Bush also authorized unilateral reductions in the arsenal of US non-deployed warheads and non-strategic warheads deployed in Europe. From 2001 to 2009, Bush cut the total nuclear stockpile by approximately 50%. No treaty governed these enormous reductions. And there was nary a peep from Senator Sessions or any other member of Congress.

Nor was the international strategic environment more stable then than it is now. While America was (unilaterally) cutting its arsenal, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, Iran made great progress on its nuclear program, and Pakistan continued to churn out fissile material.

So the next time you hear a Republican member of Congress attack President Obama for suggesting that the US and Russia continue to reduce the size of their still enormous nuclear arsenals, remember that for all the arguments  about global zero, nuclear modernization, the triad, the dangerous international environment, extended deterrence, Section 303(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and Russian cheating, the bottom line is that when it comes to nuclear reductions, Democratic presidents are held to a much different standard than their Republican counterparts.

Understanding the Russian Response to Obama’s Berlin Initiative

President Obama’s recent Berlin speech, during which he called for further US nuclear weapons reductions with Russia, was roundly criticized by Russian elites for its insensitivity to Russian concerns about American conventional weapons and missile defense cabilities, as well as for insisting that Moscow reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons.  The trajectory of Russian defense policy increasingly makes future bilateral nuclear arms cuts between Washington and Moscow difficult; however, it is too early to write off another round of arms control with Russia just yet.

The Kremlin practices a version of zero-sum realpolitik in international affairs antithetical to effectively confronting its own security challenges.  Moscow attempts to legitimize its “great power” status through a number of antiquated methods which make nuclear weapons reductions challenging, including the maintenance of the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet. Russia generally lacks soft power mechanisms to project power – remaining committed to its own “special path,” and possession of cumbersome, ill-equipped armed forces. The bases for Russian power in today’s world have more in common with North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan than those of great powers.  

The Kremlin’s misguided principals are codified in the 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (MDRF), which establishes deterrence as the primary goal of defense policy; standing in contrast to the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which puts nuclear proliferation and terrorism at the top of the policy agenda.  Conversely, these two issues are mentioned in the sixth, tenth, and eleventh places on the list of the “main external military dangers” in the Russian defense document.  

Southern Russia sits on the threshold of the Middle East, while the Russian North Caucasus region is a hotbed of Islamic radicalism.  The departure of forces from Afghanistan in 2014 as well as the ongoing Syrian conflict will also have a significant impact on stability in the Russian periphery. In addition, seven states other than the United States possess nuclear armed missiles capable of striking Russia.  However, the MDRF identifies NATO enlargement, Western interference in the affairs of Russia and the post-Soviet space, missile defense, the development of non-nuclear precision weapons, and the “militarization of outer space” as the main threats to Russia.  

In 2010, then-President Dmitry Medvedev told the Federal Assembly that strengthening air-space defense, integrating ballistic missile defense, air defense, early warning, and space control systems were “one of Russia’s highest priorities.”  It is no surprise then that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM, new ballistic missile submarines, and a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile.  

While Russian leaders justify these modernization programs as a necessary response to the perceived threat from the United States and NATO, this buildup is also driven by personal economic and power interests inside the Russian military industrial complex and the Kremlin.  As a result, the Russian military will likely look at the end of this project much like it does today – lacking strategic mobility and dependent on nuclear weapons for its first and last line of defense. This in turn will perpetuate Moscow’s seeking of conventional arms restrictions from nuclear weapons reduction negotiations.

In response to Obama’s Berlin speech, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov stated that U.S. missile defense and the participation of other nuclear powers (i.e. China) in future arms control are concerns of Moscow.  However, Russian experts have stated that no current or near-future American missile defense system will be capable of having “any significant impact” on the Russian nuclear deterrent potential.  In addition, while Russia shares a 5,000-kilometer border with China, Russia has the capability to effectively deter any Chinese nuclear first-strike.  Meanwhile, the Kremlin has bungled attempts to address the root cause of its fears of China’s rise, namely, Russia’s shrinking population in Siberia.  This has locked in Russian reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to deter Chinese aggression.

And yet, the New START negotiations almost broke down over Russian demands for meaningful limits on U.S. missile defense programs. The latest round of Russian hostility to further nuclear arms cuts could also represent a negotiating tactic ahead of the September meeting between Obama and Putin.  Furthermore, Russia does have incentives to engage the United States on further nuclear arms cuts, as Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon have pointed out, such as saving money from not having to build up to New START limits as well as constraining U.S. reserve strategic warheads, where America has a “significant numerical advantage.”  

While the road to a new round of nuclear arms reductions will be bumpy given the distance between the defense priorities of the United States and Russia, it is not yet impassable and certainly worth pursuing.

The NPT Turns 45

Today, July 1, marks the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. With the treaty now fully in the midst of middle age (it should be dying its hair and buying a motorcycle any day now), Nukes of Hazard looks back on the history of the treaty, its key successes and continuing problems, and what lies in store for it in the future.

A Brief History

The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968, and entered into force in 1970. After the expiration of its initial 25-year term, the treaty was indefinitely extended at a 1995 Review Conference.  Over the course of its 45-year lifespan, the treaty has gained near-consensus approval from the international community — with 190 signatories, it is the most widely-adopted arms control treaty in history.

Successes

1.    It has prevented a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario: The NPT came about at a time when many policymakers were justifiably concerned about the possibility of nuclear weapons spreading around the globe. After all, less than twenty years after America’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan, four additional states had already detonated their own nuclear devices, and many feared that this was only the tip of the proliferation iceberg. As I mentioned in a post from last week, President Kennedy ominously intoned in 1963 that there may be as twenty nuclear weapons states by 1975. However, in the 45 years since the NPT’s signing, Kennedy’s vision has not become a reality. Though the NPT is not the sole reason for this, it certainly deserves a large portion of the credit.

2.    It has helped to establish nonproliferation as an international norm: Nowadays, we typically take the norm of nuclear nonproliferation for granted. States that acquire nuclear weapons are perceived by the international community as violating the rules of the international system. But it wasn’t always this way. In his landmark work on nuclear proliferation, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” Scott Sagan wrote that France, which tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960, did so primarily out of a desire to gain international prestige – a goal which, in the pre-NPT era, it was largely able to achieve, with few international repercussions. Compare this with the post-NPT era: states like North Korea and Iran are international pariahs, while some states, such as Ukraine and South Africa, decided to voluntarily relinquish their nuclear capabilities. In the NPT era, adherence to international norms about nonproliferation, rather than joining the “nuclear club,” has proven to be the most effective way for a state to enhance its international standing.

Problems

1.    It hasn’t completely halted nuclear proliferation: While the NPT has succeeded in preventing a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario, it has not entirely halted the spread of nuclear weapons. Since the treaty was opened for signature in 1968, four additional states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the nuclear club, and many are concerned that Iran could be heading down the same path.

2.    Article VI: One of the foundational trade-offs of the NPT is enshrined in Article VI of the treaty. Under the terms of Article VI,  the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) pledge to work towards the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament, in exchange for the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) pledging to not develop weapons of their own. However, NWS compliance with Article VI has been questionable — the US and Russia have made strides in reducing the size of their arsenals, but the other three NWS have given little indication that they intend to make similar cuts. Meanwhile, additional US-Russia reductions will need to overcome a range of hurdles before they can become a reality. Though the NWS’ apathy towards nuclear disarmament is hardly a recent development, continued disregard by the NWS for their Article VI obligations has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the treaty as a whole.

What’s Next?

The next major event on the horizon for the NPT is the 2015 NPT Review Conference. These conferences are held every five years, and provide signatory states with an opportunity “to review the implementation of the treaty…and to set a forward-looking agenda for its further operation.” In a June speech at the Elliot School of International Affairs, Thomas Countryman, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, highlighted two issues that have played a major role in the annual Preparatory Committee meetings ahead of the 2015 Review Conference, and will likely dominate the conference itself: namely, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and concerns from NNWS about the slow pace of NWS disarmament.