Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
As one of history’s most successful popularizers of astronomy and astrophysics, an award winning author, and an entrepreneur in the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, the late Carl Sagan is a true legend. Now, with the help of a passionate fan, Dr. Sagan has made a remarkable debut into the world of music video. Check it out (h/t Wired):
Sagan was an active board member of Council for a Livable World, our sister organization, for many years. Respect.
Over at the Plank, friend-of-NOH Barron Youngsmith takes Republicans to task for arguing that the START follow-on treaty is somehow going to drastically limit U.S. programs to place conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and bombers (i.e prompt global strike, etc.) As Barron notes, this is baloney…
In its unfortunate paper on the START follow-on agreement, the Senate Republican Policy Committee argued:
It seems, unfortunately, that…President Obama capitulated to the Russian view in the Joint Understanding, providing that the “legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty” should have provisions on….“the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.” Russia is likely to use this language in an attempt to have the START follow-on agreement limit…U.S. development of a prompt global strike capability.
At their July summit meeting in Moscow, President Obama and President Medvedev agreed that the START follow-on agreement will limit each side to no more than 1,500 to 1,675 warheads on no more than 500 to 1,100 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Republican’s have latched on to the lower bound of the delivery vehicle limit, arguing that the U.S. will be forced to eliminate essential nuclear and conventional systems in order to get down to 500.
Well, no. The range for delivery vehicles contained in the Joint Understanding is best viewed as the opening positions of the two countries. While we probably can’t go all the way down to 500 delivery vehicles, at least during this round, we should be able to go well below the upper bound of the proposed 500-1,100 limit without making any significant changes to our current force structure. Here’s how.
According to the latest START data exchange, the U.S. has 5,916 warheads attributed to 1,188 delivery vehicles. In reality the U.S. “actually” deploys approximately 2,200 warheads on approximately 850 delivery vehicles.
This discrepancy is attributable in part to the fact that while the U.S. has converted its B-1 bomber force and four (out of 18) Trident submarines to conventional-only roles, they still count against the START I limits because the Treaty counts force levels based on the total number of warheads each delivery vehicle could carry, not on how many warheads they actually do carry. For example, though the converted subs no longer carry nuclear-armed SLBMs, they still count under START I.
In order for these and other systems that no longer have a nuclear role not to count under the START follow-on limits, the U.S. will have to reassure Russia that they will not be refitted with nuclear warheads and Russia will have to agree to looser counting and elimination rules. This shouldn’t be too heavy of a lift. As the Brookings Institution’s Steven Pifer notes, START II, which was signed in 1993 but never entered into force, already provides a way to deal with conventional bombers. The U.S. and Russia should also be able to agree to measures that allow Moscow to verify that the converted Trident subs do not contain nuclear-armed SLBMs and could not be refitted with them quickly.
Though more complicated, U.S. plans for a conventional prompt global strike capability should also be able to be accommodated in the follow-on agreement. Given the difficulties associated with distinguishing between a nuclear and a conventional payload, Russia is likely to insist that strategic systems be counted whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. According to Pifer, “it would be far more straightforward to treat all warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs as nuclear and thus limited under the new treaty. As long as the number of conventional warheads is relatively small and the overall warhead limit is in the range of 1,500 to 1,675, this should have minimal impact on the U.S. strategic nuclear force.”
The bottom line is that assuming the U.S. and Russia can agree to new elimination, counting, and inspection rules, which should be doable, the U.S. can live with a delivery vehicle limit of around 800, which comports with the number of nuclear-armed systems it actually deploys and would not require it to eliminate bombers, missiles, and subs that have been converted to conventional roles (since they would not count against the limit under the new counting rules) or prevent it from deploying a limited prompt global strike capability. Imagine that: After a sustained and at times difficult dialogue, the two sides to a negotiation agree to an end result that is somewhere in the middle of their respective opening positions. Per Barron’s point, the U.S. could probably go even lower if it deactivated some of the 24 missile tubes on each of our ballistic missile subs, although that might be a bridge too far for this round of negotiations.
Of course, all of these issues will become much more difficult as the U.S. and Russia begin to entertain reductions below the limits outlined in the Joint Understanding. But for now, the goal is to (1) ensure that limits and verification measures are placed on the two largest nuclear arsenals on the planet by far and (2) make an initial, modest down payment on even deeper nuclear reductions in the future.
On August 26, senior Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam publicly questioned the success of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Calling the thermonuclear experiment a “fizzle,” he endorsed the need for new tests. It has been over a month, but the controversy surrounding his comments has yet to subside. The New York Times even published an editorial yesterday warning adamantly of the danger of new Indian tests. This raises an important question: just how deep are India’s pro-test roots?
Every once in a while, a high-profile government official (or ex-official) will make a half-baked comment implicating his or her country in controversial activities or intentions. Such comments are generally rebuffed by national authorities who clarify the nation’s “official” position. Though attention grabbing, these comments must be taken with a dozen grains of the finest sea salt.
For example, Brazil’s Vice President Jose Alencar told journalists on September 25 that Brazil should advance a nuclear weapon development program. Other officials quickly moved to dissociate Alencar’s personal view from governmental policy. Nothing has come of this impetuous statement, and we can reasonably expect that nothing will.
But not all provocative views are so easily quelled. This appears to be the case with K. Santhanam’s claims. His comments represent the first time a nuclear scientist involved in the 1998 Indian tests has denied the official government stance that the tests were sufficient. Though a wide range of high-ranking officials — including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar, Home Minister P. Chidambaram, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, and former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra — promptly repudiated Santhanam’s statement, the debate rages on, thanks in large part to “a powerful but small group of nuclear scientists, diplomats and military experts who wish to prevent Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from supporting Obama’s call [for the CTBT].”
In the immediate wake of the U.S.-drafted UNSC resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, India reiterated its opposition to both the NPT and CTBT. This gesture surely satisfied K. Santhanam and his gang, but their influence on India’s position was likely negligible. India has long opposed the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime, and it was fully expected to uphold its contrarian stance.
As the world gets closer to the possibility of an effective CTBT, Santhanam’s persistent voice is disquieting. India has articulated its continued resistance to the CTBT as a stance of principle, not of subversion. Santhanam’s claims, however, indicate that opposition to the CTBT may already be (or soon become) part of an actual desire for more tests. Even if Santhanam’s pronouncement does not ultimately prompt tests, his claims could fracture the domestic consensus required for CTBT ratification.
President Obama may be worried about U.S. domestic politics thwarting the CTBT, but he should pay attention to political challenges abroad as well. India is one of the nine CTBT hold-outs whose ratification is compulsory for the treaty to enter into force. Without exaggerating the dissent, Obama must work with the Indian government to repel the Santhanam position, lest it become the ultimate stonewall to the CTBT.
In an Op-Ed in the October 5th edition of Defense News, Keith Payne writes “that global nuclear disarmament is infeasible in the world as we now know it.” According to Payne, the main reason this goal is unattainable is the fact that “more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe seek protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter emerging weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) threats in their region.”
Which got me to thinking: Who are these anonymous “more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe”? It turns out that not even nuclear umbrella-philes seem to know:
“Our ‘extended deterrence’ umbrella, initially formalized with NATO in the 1950s, has subsequently expanded to cover 30-plus nations.”
—Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, chaired by James Schlesinger (December 2008)
“More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn echoed that sentiment in The Wall Street Journal, but all have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”
—Robert Gates (October 28, 2008)
“That’s simply unacceptable for a nation whose nuclear protective umbrella covers some 40 nations.”
–Defense News Editorial (August 17, 2009)
“…the United States must be prepared to defend both itself and over a dozen other countries from nuclear attack.”
—Andrew Krepinevich (October 2, 2009)
To recap, the U.S. extends deterrence to more than 30 U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. Except when it extends deterrence to 30-plus nations. Or maybe it’s over two dozen allies and partners? Some 40 nations? What’s this I hear about over a dozen other countries?
Clearly I wouldn’t want to accuse the above of being flippant in highlighting the importance of the assurance (or is it reassurance?) function of U.S. nuclear weapons, but, well, you get the point.
For some additional thoughts on this issue, see here and here.
On September 21, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak proposed a “grand bargain” with North Korea. Tired of counterproductive step-by-step negotiations with Pyongyang, Lee’s deal was a one-shot process: complete and irreversible denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid.
On September 30, the North responded to the offer, calling it “ridiculous.” Given this response, we should not expect a similar American proposal. Or should we?
The Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter believes we should, and his reasoning is clever. In a September 30 briefing, Carpenter and Doug Bandow argued that while there are no good options, the best chance of persuading North Korea to adopt policies acceptable to the United States (i.e. denuclearization) is through coordinated effort with China.
Carpenter proposed that the United States offer its own one-shot grand bargain not as a diplomatic end-game with North Korea, but as a shrewd gambit to persuade Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang. (It’s worth noting that Carpenter is fond of the grand bargain concept; he has proposed a similar approach for dealing with Iran). Carpenter referred to the strategy as “smoking North Korea out,” by which he means forcing North Korea’s hand and making them reveal their true intentions to the United States and, more importantly, to China.
It is unclear whether or not Pyongyang is truly considering denuclearization, though it has pledged to work for a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula. This uncertainty (or hope) is enough to prevent China from confronting North Korea; after all, China has some legitimate concerns that include North Korean destabilization leading to a chaotic refugee flow and the potential geopolitical threat from a united Korea. China also knows, however, that an established nuclear weapon power on the peninsula is not in its interests.
Carpenter’s presentation suggested that he does not expect Pyongyang to accept the grand bargain, which would include a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for denuclearization. For Carpenter, Pyongyang’s rejection of the deal would clarify their intentions and reveal their determination to become an established nuclear weapon power. In such a situation, China would be left with no choice but to bring out its stick.
One problem, however, is that such diplomatic litmus tests tend to be of questionable utility, particularly when it comes to North Korea. Carpenter said that rejection of the grand bargain would mean North Korea had determined to go nuclear, but this assumes Pyongyang: a) knows what it wants; b) has decided upon a course of action that will get it what it wants; and c) attributes as much importance to the grand bargain offer as Carpenter does. As Travis ranted awhile ago, imperfect information makes conjectures about North Korean intentions suspect by default.
Another potential problem in Carpenter’s approach is that if the United States expects the grand bargain to fail, it might act accordingly. This pitfall has been prevalent in U.S. policy toward Iran. Skeptical that negotiations will bear fruit, a few Obama administration officials reportedly believe that direct talks with Iran are important mainly because they provide political cover for more coercive actions down the road. If articulated publicly – like when placating congressional hawks with tough talk on Iran, for example – such sentiments not only cause Iranian leaders to doubt American sincerity, but also assume future coercive steps to be a foregone conclusion. Such assumptions could quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies in both Iran and North Korea.
Implementing Carpenter’s strategy becomes dangerous if it succeeds when we do not expect (or want) it to. Chester Crocker explained this type of scenario a few weeks ago in the New York Times: “If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own.” Carpenter’s strategy is crafty, but it would be imprudent unless we were actually serious about following through.
Carpenter also appraised U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests. He concluded that it was a mistake by both the Bush and Obama administrations to issue immediate public statements after both tests pledging full nuclear umbrella protection for South Korea and Japan. If it were up to Carpenter, the United States would have issued private statements of assurance to South Korea and Japan but kept China guessing about the U.S. level of commitment to these two countries. If this had occurred, China might more earnestly fear the proliferation implications of Pyongyang’s tests, and the possibility of South Korea and Japan pursuing the bomb would have been an alarming consideration. This could have been a critical impetus for China to get tough on North Korea.
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