Today’s New York Times includes an Op-Ed by John Bolton.  I know.  I get it.  I shouldn’t waste my time.  But this piece is littered with so many distortions (even by Bolton’s standards) that a brief response is absolutely necessary.  Frankly, the Times should be ashamed for printing it.

Bolton couldn’t even complete a full sentence before inking his first howler: “President Obama has called for a world without nuclear weapons, not as a distant goal, but as something imminently achievable.”  As The New Republic’s Peter Scoblic noted this morning, this is, well, an egregious lie.  Here’s what Obama actually said in his speech in Prague in April: “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.  I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly–perhaps not in my lifetime.”

Bolton’s second fabrication arrives a mere two sentences later: “Hurrying to negotiate a successor to the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by year’s end, which Secretary Clinton has committed to, reflects a “zeal for the deal” approach that benefits only Russia.”  Let’s see.  START I entered into force on December 5, 1994.  However, START II never entered into force.  And START III only existed on paper.  The Obama administration is in fact trying to negotiate a successor to START I.  So what is Bolton talking about?

A third outright whopper appears near the end of the piece: “Unhappily, the administration is pushing Israel to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a “non-nuclear-weapons state,” meaning Israel would have to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.”  

Bolton is most likely taking his cue here from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Goettemoeller’s recent appearance at the NPT PrepCom, where she stated: “Universal adherence to the NPT itself—including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea—also remains a fundamental objective of the United States.”  Naturally, what Bolton fails to point out is that this has been the policy of every U.S. president since the NPT entered into force in 1970.

Here’s to hoping the Times’ fact-checkers don’t take too many more days off.

Yesterday the EastWest Institute (EWI) released a U.S.-Russia joint threat assessment on Iran’s nuclear and missile potential.  

The report was produced by a team of Russian and American scientists and experts.  The American participants included Philip Coyle, Senior Advisor, Center for Defense Information; Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus, Thomas Watson Research Center; Ambassador James Goodby, Nonresident Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution; Siegfried S. Hecker, Co-Director of CISAC and Professor (Research), Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University; David Holloway, Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, Stanford University; Theodore A. Postol, Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The report’s central conclusion:

…there is at present no IRBM/ICBM threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent. Moreover, if such a threat were forthcoming, the proposed European missile defenses would not provide a dependable defense against it. It does not make sense, therefore, to proceed with deployment of the European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

But of course you already knew that.  

As I hinted at yesterday, Gen. Chilton’s performance at last week’s Defense Writers Group Breakfast was not only noteworthy for his outlandish statements on the relevance of nuclear weapons to deterring cyber attacks.   In response to a question …

Update: Apparently the issue of using nukes in response to cyber attacks is so outlandish that both Travis and I posted on it at the same time!

Gen. Chilton is at it again.  During a Defense Writers Group breakfast last Thursday (May 7) he told reporters that the U.S. should reserve the right to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a devastating cyber attack against U.S. computer networks.    

“I think you don’t take any response options off the table from an attack on the United States of America,” he proclaimed.  “And I don’t see any reason to treat cyber any differently. I mean, why would we tie the president’s hands? I can’t. It’s up to the president to decide.”  

There’s no nice way to say this so I’ll just say it: Threatening a nuclear response in the event of a cyber attack is bat-shit crazy.    

First, some background.  The idea of not taking any response off the table is known as “calculated ambiguity,” and it has become part of the taken-for-granted of post-Cold War U.S. nuclear policy.  Until recently, calculated ambiguity has almost always been discussed in the context of chemical and biological weapons, not cyber attacks.  However, the growth in the number of real and alleged cyber hacks, together with claims that the U.S. is vulnerable to attack from weapons designed to produce electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, have prompted some to reexamine what threats might merit a nuclear response.  

In addition to Chilton, James Schlesigner, former Secretary of Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, has also jumped on board the “you hack, we may nuke you” train.  

At last week’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Strategic Posture Commission’s final report Schlesinger stated:

The ambiguity to which you refer deals not with a nuclear attack on the United States but with other types of attacks. For example, the possibility, and I stress the possibility, of EMP attack. Cyber warfare, there is no defense against a sophisticated cyber warfare attack. And the Russians and the Chinese and perhaps others have developed cyber offensive capabilities. We may need to use a nuclear response to such things, biological warfare.

The Commission seemed to be of two minds on the issue of calculated ambiguity.  On the one hand, the report argued that the U.S. “should retain calculated ambiguity as an element of its nuclear declaratory policy,” presumably even against cyber threats.  On the other hand, the report recommends that “[t]he United States should underscore that it conceives of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for protection of itself and its allies in extreme circumstances.” At one point the report even states that nuclear weapons would only be used as a “last resort.”

In my view there is only one legitimate purpose for nuclear weapons: to deter, or perhaps respond to, the use of nuclear weapons by another country.

The idea that a U.S. president would even consider, let alone authorize, consigning millions of people to their deaths because hackers shut down the northeast is so ludicrous I have difficulty even writing it down.  Second, so long as the U.S. insists on maintaining a declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity, other nuclear armed nations may be prompted to adopt such a policy as well.  

Finally, and most importantly,  retaining the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical, biological, or cyber attack increases the likelihood that the U.S. would actually use nuclear weapons in response to such attacks.  As Scott Sagan has written:

The central argument is that the current nuclear doctrine creates a “commitment trap”: threats to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack are credible, because if CW or BW are used despite such threats, the U.S. president would feel compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons to maintain his or her international and domestic reputation for honoring commitments. (“The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks.” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring 2000, pp.85–115.)

P.S. Apparently Gen. Chilton commented on some other issues close to the heart of yours truly.  Stay tuned for more info.

As promised, below are some additional comments on the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which was released yesterday (May 6)

Missile Defense

According to the Commission, “ballistic missile defense capabilities can play a useful role in support of the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined, and damage limitation against limited threats.”  While I object to the Commission’s broad definition of deterrence, I think the report paints a fair and balanced picture of the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran and North Korea – much fairer than what one often sees from the Heritage Foundation and other right-wing outfits.  In addition, the report is clear that the deployment of long-range missile defenses should be contingent on their “demonstrated effectiveness and the projected threat from North Korea and Iran” and must take “into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability.”  Clearly the proposed European deployment, which the Commission does not address, does not pass any of these tests.

The report also states that “opportunities for missile defense cooperation with Russia should be further explored” and calls on the U.S. to “work with Russia and China to control advanced missile technology transfer.”  These are welcome suggestions.

However, the report should have been more explicit about what form this cooperation should take.  For example, it could have called on the U.S. and Russia to resume work on the Joint Date Exchange Center (JDEC), the facility built in Moscow as a center for the United States and Russia to share their global missile launch warning information in real time.  The report alludes to the Center, but not by name, and it does not describe it in any detail.

Moreover, it should have recommended full Russian and U.S. implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), which calls on its 128 participating states to “exercise maximum possible restraint” with respect to missiles capable of delivering biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.  

China’s No First Use Policy

The report states that China “continues to announce a policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. But some Chinese officials have made statements indicating that this commitment may be conditional.”  Um, not exactly.  These statements have mostly originated with Chinese academics, not Chinese military/government officials.  The U.S. intelligence community has for decades pointed to these statements to predict that China is rethinking its no-first-use policy.  However, advocates of these views are a minority (at best) within the Chinese leadership.  For more on this issue, see here.

Finally, be sure to check out the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability’s response to the report.  They rightly attack the Commission for giving NNSA a blank to check to pursue Complex Transformation and free itself from DoE regulation and management.