The issue of extended deterrence has been in the news a lot in the past few weeks.  First, via GSN’s Martin Matishak, at last week’s STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, stated:

there will be an increased emphasis [in the Nuclear Posture Review] on extended deterrence and the assurance of allies….”The concern about tipping points is rising,” Roberts said, noting that the anxieties of partner nations in East Asia have “sharpened” as a result of North Korea’s two nuclear tests and the modernization of the Chinese military’s nuclear capabilities.

 And yesterday, on the 64th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bomb drop on Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso reiterated his nation’s commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and global nuclear disarmament, while at the same time warning that he considers nuclear abolition to be “unimaginable”.  Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of Japan’s primary opposition party took an even stronger pro-disarmament line, noting that “Realizing a nuclear-free world as called for by U.S. President [Barack] Obama is exactly the moral mission of our country as the only atomic-bombed state.”  Japan has long been considered to be the most important beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Those who are wary about reducing the role and size of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy are increasingly pointing to the challenges associated with protecting and reassuring allies in an age of Russian aggression, Chinese military modernization, and North Korean and Iranian provocation as a reason why we must be very cautious about further nuclear cuts with Russia, the CTBT, etc.

For example, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States raised a lot of eyebrows in the emphasis it placed on extended deterrence.  Take, for example, this graf from the executive summary:

For the deterrence of attacks by regional aggressors and even China, the force structure requirements are relatively modest. The focus on Russia is not because the United States and Russia are enemies; they are not. No one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia, however, are fearful of Russia and its tactical nuclear forces. The imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed. The need to reassure U.S. allies and also to hedge against a possible turn for the worse in Russia (or China) points to the fact that the U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to address a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the force is as important as ever.[emphasis mine].

Though it didn’t explicitly say so, the Commission implies that extended deterrence is one of the most important, if not the most important, factor driving the size and characteristics of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Below the jump I outline some reasons to avoid overstating the value of extended deterrence.  For more go read Jeffrey and Hans.

1. So long as U.S. allies could fall victim to nuclear attack, the U.S. should retain nuclear weapons to deter such an attack.  However, allied concerns about the state of the U.S. nuclear umbrella should not be taken to mean that they oppose any or even significant changes to U.S. nuclear posture.  Rather, key allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey don’t want to be surprised by changes to U.S. strategic posture.  They want to be consulted well ahead of time.

2. There is much more to assuring allies than the nuclear component of extended deterrence.  For example, a critical factor in an ally’s confidence in the credibility of extended deterrence is its confidence in the strength of its political relationship with the United States.  If political relations fray then the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent will be perceived to be weak, no matter what type of or how many nuclear weapons the United States possesses.  Nuclear weapons are often relied on as a crutch to avoid the hard choices and difficult negotiations with allies that changes in U.S. nuclear posture would require.

3. As the Carnegie Endowment’s George Perkovich has noted, there has never been a halcyon day of extended deterrence.  On the one hand, some U.S. allies have always feared that the U.S. might bungle its way into a nuclear war.  Conversely, there has always been a tension between U.S. alliance commitments and the fears on the part of allies that the U.S. might abandon them.  These tensions, however, have not become more pronounced than they were during the Cold War.

In my post last week on the Kyl Amendment, I noted that the Obama administration needs to more forcefully make the affirmative case for the START follow-on treaty, with particular emphasis on (1) why a new arms control treaty with Russia will increases U.S. security and (2) rebutting arguments made by skeptics of the START follow-on process.

As if right on cue, newly-appointed Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher did just that in her remarks at the STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium on July 30 in Omaha, Nebraska.  I’ve excerpted her comments on START from her full remarks below the jump.  My only (minor) qualm is that I would have led with how the new treaty “will enhance our national security and provide for an effective deterrent.”  Instead, Tauscher begins by stating that the new treaty ” is the beginning of a new narrative for the post-Cold War generation that need not be paralyzed by the threat of nuclear war and it is a down payment for deeper reductions in the future.”  But overall it was an excellent case for the START follow-on treaty.

Update 8/6: John argues that while Tauscher’s remarks were effective in rebutting criticisms of the START follow-on process, they were largely silent on why nuclear reductions are important and would benefit U.S. security. I think that’s a fair point, though given that this was the first real effort on the part of a high-ranking administration official to make the case for the agreement, this was still a strong initial step.

Recent rumors about Iran’s “close ties” with Latin America have caused Washington to shake in its alarmist boots. In January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of Iranian “subversive activity”  in the region. “The Iranians are building a huge embassy in Managua,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added in May. “And you can only imagine what that’s for.”

To date, there is still no sign of the embassy in Nicaragua despite Clinton’s breathless warning. But additional warnings have come from elsewhere.

In May, a secret Israeli government report was leaked that implicated Venezuela and Bolivia in the sale of uranium to Iran. Hugo Chavez has not found time in his weekly 12-hour broadcast “Alo Presidente” to refute the accusation. The Evo Morales camp in Bolivia denied it, though Morales did raise eyebrows after announcing a pending low-interest $280 million loan offer from Iran.

In July, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman visited Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina to address Israeli concerns over uranium sales and terrorist activities throughout the continent. His concerns were not reciprocated in Brazil or Colombia. Brazilian President Lula said little about Iran’s program, noting only that he hoped for “every state to sign the NPT” and for the Middle East to be a region “free of nuclear weapons.”

Though it severely undercuts the international non-proliferation regime to play fast and loose with the nuclear fuel cycle, the NPT is not entirely proliferation-proof. It is an imperfect document that is only as strong as the collective will of its signatories. The NPT has been circumvented and ignored before. In 1980, France aided Iraq’s nuclear program by selling it a research reactor and 165 lbs of highly enriched uranium.

Many non-nuclear weapons states resent that they must accept far tougher restrictions on their civilian nuclear activities than the nuclear weapons states. Arguably, Venezuela and Bolivia are acting within the bounds of the treaty, and Iran is just cashing in on its sovereign right to pursue “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” as guaranteed in Article IV of the NPT.

Links between Iran and alienated, leftist South American regimes no doubt leave U.S. officials with images of Contras and coups dancing in their heads. Yet if the United States wants to maintain control over proliferation not curtailed by the NPT, it should address the root causes through sustained dialog with Iran and its alleged suppliers in both bilateral and multilateral settings. Ominous public warnings by American policymakers will do little to bring the truth to light or resolve the situation diplomatically.

FOGBANK just won’tgo away.  Writing in today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus revisits the now well-known difficulties NNSA has had in reproducing the classified substance as part of the refurbishment of the W76 warhead.   According to Pincu…

In the latest Arms Control Today, an interesting news piece examines U.S. and Russian obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which requires its 188 ratifying members to destroy their stockpiles of chemical agents and delivery vehicles by April 2012. While both the United States and Russia have made progress, it is unlikely at this juncture that either will meet the deadline.

Though not intentionally flouting an international agreement, the United States could face a diplomatic problem by not meeting its CWC deadline obligation.

Though unlikely, the United States could face sanctions and the stripping of voting rights in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the CWC’s monitoring and membership body. The United States should at the very least expect to face a blast of rhetoric, according to Jonathan Tucker at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Besides the CWC deadline, the United States also faces a 2017 deadline mandated by Congress. This is likely to be missed, too. The United States’ two remaining chemical weapons depots at Blue Grass, KY and Pueblo, CO are expected to have barely commenced destruction by 2017. Complete destruction of their stockpiles is even further off, with current estimates standing at 2020 and 2023, respectively.

Increased funding could help address the problem. The DOD’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program is in line to receive $550 million in fiscal year 2010, an increase of $5 million above the Pentagon’s request. This would be a total increase of almost a third from last year’s budget of $427 million. Global Security Newswire recently reported that the ACWA “could collect $1.2 billion in extra funding over several upcoming budgets.”

Russia’s situation poses a more serious challenge to the CWC. About 28,000 metric tons remain in its chemical stockpile, and there are concerns over Russian disposal methods. In some facilities, destruction of the stockpile has slowed after the first phase (when the toxic chemicals are drained from their munitions and neutralized but before the munitions casings and the remaining chemicals are incinerated). Until the weapons casings are destroyed, the risk exists that they could be appropriated and refilled.

Another risk lies in allowing standards to slide on what counts as disarmament. In order to meet the 2012 deadline, Russia already has negotiated with the OPCW to set modified procedures for disarmament that credit Russia short of full destruction. This half-step to chemical disarmament could provide a dangerous precedent in the nonproliferation regime. If a non-signatory country were to accede to the CWC, what would stop them from following Russia’s example and retaining munitions or chemical agents?