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You are here: Home / Archives for Security Spending

October 30, 2014

The Unaffordable Arsenal

 Top government officials are in agreement that current plans to rebuild our nuclear arsenal (to the price tag of at least $355 billion over the next decade and up to $1 trillion over the next 30 years) are overly ambitious and likely unaffordable. Add in a defense budget that’s already stretched thin, always-looming budget caps and sequestration, new international security challenges like Russian expansion in Ukraine, terrorist expansion in Iraq and Syria, and the Ebola virus in Africa, and it’s safe to say the US budget is burning its ‘defense candle’ at both ends.  

The Arms Control Association (ACA) has released a report on just this issue, urging the “executive branch, Congress, and the American public to rethink current plans to rebuild U.S. nuclear forces in the years ahead.”  The nuclear shopping list is a long one: new ballistic submarines, new nuclear-capable bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new air-launched cruise missile, and an upgrade to five nuclear warhead types. By paring down that list, ACA has highlighted some commonsense solutions to save roughly $70 billion dollars in the next decade. A summary of ACA’s recommendations follows.

Strategic Submarines – SSBN(X): Save $16 billion/10 years
A 2013 report by the CBO analyzed the option of reducing the SSBN(X) force to 8 boats. Under this scenario, the Navy would still have a robust deterrent and be able to deploy the maximum number of warheads at sea, consistent with the New START treaty.

Long-Range Bombers – LRSB: Save $32 billion/10 years
Because the current US bomber fleet will operate into the 2040s-50s, there is no urgency for a renovation. By delaying the LRSB until the mid-2020s, the USAF can free up $32 billion dollars for other projects that have more urgent funding needs.

Air-Launched Cruise Missile – ALCM: Save $3 billion/10 years  
The recently rebuilt gravity bomb (B61-12) gives our current bombing fleet the capability to drop nuclear weapons, drawing the need for a new air-launched cruise missile into question. Not only is this weapon unnecessary, as our submarines are capable of launching a nuclear ballistic missile, but it would serve as an effective bargaining chip on the international stage. Discontinuing our ALCMs as part of a global ban on nuclear-armed cruise missiles would eliminate the growing threat of a Chinese or Pakistani cruise missile while simultaneously saving at least $3 billion dollars in development and procurement costs.  

B61 Life Extension Program – LEP: Save $4 billion/10 years
The B61 Life Extension Program is designed to extend the lives of 400 gravity bombs for tactical (front lines) and strategic (reserves) purposes. The two most costly portions of the program are a consolidation plan of four versions of the bomb into one and the refurbishment of some of the nuclear components. This program has faced budget pressures in Congress and would be better served by scaling back the program to update our strategic reserve bombs while allowing our tactical bombs in Europe to age out gracefully.  This or other reductions to the program, such as discontinuing the 4-in-1 modification plans for the bomb, will allow for cost savings up to 4 billion dollars over the next decade.  

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles – ICBMS: $16 billion/10 years
The Air Force’s 450 ICBMs are scheduled for maintenance to ensure their reliability through 2030. The Air Force is expected to decide by 2016 whether they will employ incremental modernization of the missiles, or scrap the current design and create new ones. A 2014 RAND study sponsored by the Air Force to analyze options for the ICBM determined that incremental modernization would both meet the US’s nuclear deterrent needs and be the most cost-effective. The USAF would save at least $16 billion dollars by forgoing a new missile and an additional $84-$219 billion (not included in above projections) by forgoing potential mobile-basing options which have been considered ineffective since the 1980’s.

These options illustrate ways to safely trim the bloated nuclear budget while maintaining our nuclear deterrent. This creates a win-win scenario for the Department of Defense, which will preserve the nuclear arsenal from uncontrolled cuts as a result of an overly ambitious budget and secure funding for its conventional forces. In a world where nuclear exchanges are most commonly associated with global destruction, these nuclear exchanges to the budget are both sensible and necessary.

Greg Terryn is a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Posted in: Nukes of Hazard blog, Security Spending

October 29, 2014

Finalizing the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization (NDAA): Key Issues for Congress

For the third year in a row, the United States Senate is unlikely to approve its own version of the critically important Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). So much for being “the world’s greatest deliberative body.” After voting on September 18 on a bill to keep the government running through mid-December and […]

Posted in: Factsheets & Analysis on Nuclear Weapons Spending, Factsheets & Analysis on Pentagon Budget, Factsheets on Non-Proliferation, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Spending, Pentagon Budget, Security Spending

October 27, 2014

Front and Center

FRONT & CENTER

An update on arms control, national security & politics from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

October 11-October 26 WHAT’S NEW:

An Evening in Boston
Save the date: On the evening of November 6th, we’ll be in Boston for a night of expert analysis, substantive discussion, and fun! We’ve invited Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, among other notable speakers, to lead our Election Forum and Reception on the Future of National Security. Best part? It’s free! We hope you can join us. Space is limited, so RSVP today.

READ:

Growth in Pentagon Spending Since 2001
We’ll start with the good news: the overall trend for the U.S. defense budget is on a downward slope. That said, the U.S. is spending $7-10 million per day on its new war in the Middle East against the Islamic State, meaning Congress may decide to up the ante in Fiscal Year 2015. Check out our reporton the center site to learn more. [10/20]

2001-2015 budget

Window of Opportunity to Change US Nuclear Spending:
“Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget,” writes Katie McCarthy on the Nukes of Hazard blog. That’s why, rather than modernize the triad, the time is now to reassess exactly what we need and what we can afford. [10/24]

But What About Grandma?
It’s a well-known fact that Western sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran were key in bringing the Iranians to the negotiating table. What’s less well-known is exactly how these sanctions have impacted your everyday Iranian citizen. Sarah Tully provides a few personal accounts of the effects of these sanctions and the domestic pressure that has arisen. Rouhani may have no choice but to stay at the table until a deal is reached. [10/21]

BE SOCIAL:

Infographic: Not Getting a Deal Won’t Make Us Any Safer
Remember BiBi’s infamous “red line?” Well, this week, one former US official put the kibosh on Israel’s “no deal is better than a bad deal” rhetoric. The highly respected former Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat told the Jerusalem Post that failing to get an Iran deal should not be considered a success. We loved Eizenstat’s argument so much, we made an infographic. Don’t forget to share it on Facebook, Twitter, or by email! [10/24]

No Iran Deal Is Not a Success

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog, Pentagon Budget

October 24, 2014

Window of Opportunity to Change U.S. Nuclear Spending Trajectory

You might not have noticed, but the U.S.’ plans to replace our aging nuclear weapons triad have been in the news a lot lately. Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget. The issue has prompted a demand for Obama to explain his shift from the inspiring Prague speech in 2009 to a long list of expensive nuclear modernization plans.

And some major voices have gotten into the mix. Defense One published an article from the Council on Foreign Relations recently that offers a summary of the current modernization plans, the debate surrounding them, and the emerging solution suggested by a growing number of nonproliferation advocates.

Some key points:

•    Current plan could cost up to $1 trillion in the next three decades.
•    Deterrence does not require a constantly growing arsenal.
•    Unfortunately all three legs (Air, Land and Sea) are planned for modernization around the same time.
•    The Ohio-Class submarine replacement program is expected to soar to over 50% of the Navy’s total budget in the coming 30 years, edging out other programs.  
•    The Air Force foresaw the probable consequence of replacing the Minuteman III Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and opted to use existing technology to modernize the current fleet instead.
•    There are a growing number of calls from within and outside the government for a re-assessed plan that takes current budget constraints into account.
•    This is a window of opportunity for President Obama to redirect our nuclear spending.

More details

Feeling the pressure, the White House is reviewing the current approach. The plan below claims to reduce spending while maintaining the existing defense structure (previous suggestions included the elimination of one of the three legs).

The chart below summarizes the article’s discussion including the systems slated for modernization, the estimated year of retirement, the current plan, estimated cost, and the proposed solution.

some text

(Based on Defense One/ CFR article)

The above chart doesn’t include many of the other areas “up for modernization” including: nuclear warhead life-extension programs; the production of a warhead that would work for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles; and upgrading Energy and Defense Department systems that all add to growing costs.

While it seems difficult to implement change, the article highlights this information as a pivotal opportunity for the Obama administration. Making a responsible adjustment to current plans would allow the President to maintain the current structure, save money, and leave office with the legacy of moving towards a reduction in our reliance on nuclear weapons.

With important nonproliferation conferences ahead, including the 2015 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty in New York, these decisions hold extra weight; if my NPT simulation course at the Monterey Institute taught me anything, it’s that U.S. nonproliferation actions (positive or negative) will drive the direction of negotiations.

Posted in: Nuclear Weapons Spending, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 21, 2014

Update: Growth in U.S. Defense Spending Since 2001

We have an update to our budget charts over on the Center’s site today. See below for a preview, and click here for the rest. After adjusting for inflation, the overall trend in base U.S. defense spending has increased since 2001. Since the end o…

Posted in: Nukes of Hazard blog, Security Spending

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