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You are here: Home / Archives for Treaties

July 1, 2013

The NPT Turns 45

Today, July 1, marks the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. With the treaty now fully in the midst of middle age (it should be dying its hair and buying a motorcycle any day now), Nukes of Hazard looks back on the history of the treaty, its key successes and continuing problems, and what lies in store for it in the future.

A Brief History

The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968, and entered into force in 1970. After the expiration of its initial 25-year term, the treaty was indefinitely extended at a 1995 Review Conference.  Over the course of its 45-year lifespan, the treaty has gained near-consensus approval from the international community — with 190 signatories, it is the most widely-adopted arms control treaty in history.

Successes

1.    It has prevented a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario: The NPT came about at a time when many policymakers were justifiably concerned about the possibility of nuclear weapons spreading around the globe. After all, less than twenty years after America’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan, four additional states had already detonated their own nuclear devices, and many feared that this was only the tip of the proliferation iceberg. As I mentioned in a post from last week, President Kennedy ominously intoned in 1963 that there may be as twenty nuclear weapons states by 1975. However, in the 45 years since the NPT’s signing, Kennedy’s vision has not become a reality. Though the NPT is not the sole reason for this, it certainly deserves a large portion of the credit.

2.    It has helped to establish nonproliferation as an international norm: Nowadays, we typically take the norm of nuclear nonproliferation for granted. States that acquire nuclear weapons are perceived by the international community as violating the rules of the international system. But it wasn’t always this way. In his landmark work on nuclear proliferation, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” Scott Sagan wrote that France, which tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960, did so primarily out of a desire to gain international prestige – a goal which, in the pre-NPT era, it was largely able to achieve, with few international repercussions. Compare this with the post-NPT era: states like North Korea and Iran are international pariahs, while some states, such as Ukraine and South Africa, decided to voluntarily relinquish their nuclear capabilities. In the NPT era, adherence to international norms about nonproliferation, rather than joining the “nuclear club,” has proven to be the most effective way for a state to enhance its international standing.

Problems

1.    It hasn’t completely halted nuclear proliferation: While the NPT has succeeded in preventing a nuclear proliferation worst-case scenario, it has not entirely halted the spread of nuclear weapons. Since the treaty was opened for signature in 1968, four additional states (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the nuclear club, and many are concerned that Iran could be heading down the same path.

2.    Article VI: One of the foundational trade-offs of the NPT is enshrined in Article VI of the treaty. Under the terms of Article VI,  the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) pledge to work towards the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament, in exchange for the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) pledging to not develop weapons of their own. However, NWS compliance with Article VI has been questionable — the US and Russia have made strides in reducing the size of their arsenals, but the other three NWS have given little indication that they intend to make similar cuts. Meanwhile, additional US-Russia reductions will need to overcome a range of hurdles before they can become a reality. Though the NWS’ apathy towards nuclear disarmament is hardly a recent development, continued disregard by the NWS for their Article VI obligations has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the treaty as a whole.

What’s Next?

The next major event on the horizon for the NPT is the 2015 NPT Review Conference. These conferences are held every five years, and provide signatory states with an opportunity “to review the implementation of the treaty…and to set a forward-looking agenda for its further operation.” In a June speech at the Elliot School of International Affairs, Thomas Countryman, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, highlighted two issues that have played a major role in the annual Preparatory Committee meetings ahead of the 2015 Review Conference, and will likely dominate the conference itself: namely, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and concerns from NNWS about the slow pace of NWS disarmament.

Posted in: Europe, France, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

December 6, 2012

Middle East Nuclear Weapons Conference Postponed

One of the major successes of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was the plan to convene a meeting of interested countries to discuss the prospects of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East. For the past few months there has been endless speculation as to whether states in the region would attend the conference. Israel has yet to make public its decision to attend, but they will have plenty of time to decide.

On November 23, the State Department released a statement announcing the conference had been postponed. The statement concluded that the turmoil in the Middle East was not conducive to a productive conference but once the circumstances improve, it will be rescheduled.  In a press briefing the following week, State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland clarified that all of the states involved in the conference agreed that it could not take place; this is not a unilateral move by the United States but a consensus of organizing parties.

From its inception, this conference was not intended to be a solution to problems in the Middle East. While it is an important step, its loftiest goals would be to open pathways for dialogue among countries in the region. The ideal outcome would be increased frequency and quality of diplomatic contact. These improved relations can lead to confidence-building measures which would in turn help to mitigate the current security challenges in the Middle East.

For the months leading up to this conference, skepticism steadily mounted because of  concerns over  revolutions in Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Syria’s civil war, Iran’s nuclear program and its conflict with Israel. In July 2012 the spokesperson of the Arab League announced full participation; however, as the civil war in Syria raged on, it was unclear how such a state would even send a representative. Syria’s chemical weapons program poses a threat to its people and the implications of Syrian attendance on regional peace and security would be reassuring to outside nations.  On the other hand, the longevity of the current regime is tenuous at best. This conference is the beginning of a sustained effort in which Syria must be actively involved throughout the process.  

Egypt first proposed the idea of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East over twenty years ago. Now, it is grappling with the effects of its own recent revolution. Although Cairo was instrumental in negotiating the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, it still faces severe domestic unrest. Egypt will not be able to fully participate in the conference until it at least establishes a formal constitution from which to work.

Moreover, Iran refuses to halt their nuclear program, much to the chagrin of the international community, especially the United States.

In order for the conference to take the first step toward a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, Iran and Israel need to be willing to come to the table and rationally discuss both of their nuclear programs. Israel and its allies worry that such a discussion would consist of finger pointing at the Jewish nation for being the only nation in the region to possess nuclear weapons, a fact which Israel has never formally admitted.

Besides the concern about the Iranian nuclear program, deemed an existential threat by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Tel Aviv is also troubled by the manner in which the conference began. Israel is one of four nuclear weapons states outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The plan made at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 for the WMD free zone meeting, while well-formulated, did not include one of the biggest players in the region. Israel therefore has reservations about signing on to something that they were not a part of in the first place.

It is hoped that there will be a renewed effort to hold this conference, and the world can progress towards a safer Middle East. This process will require commitment of all the parties involved to make a good faith effort in negotiations and start normalizing diplomatic relations.

Posted in: Middle East, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

November 29, 2012

Politifact Article on NPT Quotes Kingston Reif

Successful 2010 treaty review conference, Iran sanctions bolster promise   By Louis Jacobson Politifact During the 2008 presidential race, Barack Obama promised to “crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions.” Click here to […]

Posted in: Center in the News, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Press Room, Treaties

November 29, 2012

Center Quoted on Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Mother Jones

Canceled Nukes Meeting: A Setback for Obama? By Dana Liebelson The day after Thanksgiving, when Americans were still digesting on La-Z-Boys and watching football, the State Department quietly announced that the 2012 conference for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons had been canceled by the United States. It doesn’t quite qualify as inconvenient […]

Posted in: Center in the News, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Press Room

October 22, 2012

Fact Sheet: Fifteen Foreign-Policy Challenges For the Next President

By Usha Sahay, Rachel Murawski, and Eve Hunter The October 22 presidential debate on national security will cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israel and Iran, China, the Middle East, as well as the general issue of “America’s role in the world.” These issues have made headlines in 2012, and been prominent on the campaign trail. But, […]

Posted in: Asia, China, Factsheets & Analysis on Nuclear Weapons, India and Pakistan, Iran Diplomacy, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, New National Security, North Korea, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties, United States

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