Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

You are here: Home / Archives for Asia

India Moving Forward on Nuclear Energy

In early February, President Obama issued a memorandum certifying that India has placed its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, thereby bringing the Indian Safeguards Agreement into force and moving the two nations another step closer toward cooperation in the field of nuclear energy under the auspices of the landmark U.S.-India deal.

Yet while progress is being made toward implementing the agreement, a few steps remain before U.S. firms such as Westinghouse Electric and G.E. Hitachi can begin nuclear trade with India…

On September 6, 2008, India, with the strong support of the U.S., secured a rare exemption from the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allowing it to conduct civilian nuclear trade despite not being party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  A little over a month later, on October 6, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act.

Supporters of the cooperation agreement argue that U.S. backing for the exemption indicated “a new chapter of engagement with India.” During the Cold War the world’s two largest democracies were often at odds, as India was the leader of the non-aligned movement and at times sided with the Soviet Union.  President Obama has noted that the agreement “will increase American exports and create jobs in both countries.”

Another argument made in defense of the deal is that because India has limited domestic uranium reserves, it needed the ability to trade with other nations to ensure a steady supply.  Moreover, it requires India to place its civilian nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards for the first time.  The State Department argues that the initiative “will help meet India’s growing energy requirements and strengthen the non-proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.”

Critics of the agreement, however, note that by providing India with additional nuclear material, New Delhi could choose to divert more of its domestic supply of uranium toward its weapons program, thereby fueling a potential arms race not only with Pakistan, but with possibly China as well.  

They also cite concerns that it could do serious damage to international efforts to curb the spread of dangerous nuclear weapons technologies.  While Article IV of the NPT affirms that all state parties in good standing under the Treaty have a right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the deal allows India to reap rewards without being a signatory to the Treaty.  Moreover, India has not stopped producing nuclear weapons-usable fissile material or signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Critics fear that extending special rights to India without simultaneously requiring it to make meaningful commitments toward disarmament could undermine the shaky bargain upon which the NPT is based.    

India, for its part, continues to insist that all action, including application of IAEA safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities, is voluntary and that its military facilities will remain exempt from inspection.

A few obstacles remain before the U.S. and India can commence nuclear trade.  First, India is demanding that the two sides complete an agreement regarding a nuclear spent fuel reprocessing facility.  The terms of the U.S.-India deal grant India reprocessing rights under the condition that it establishes a facility to safeguard nuclear material monitored by the IAEA.  Indian officials have expressed concern that the U.S. is trying to re-open discussion on the conditions under which it can suspend reprocessing consent rights to India. Current estimates are that such an agreement will be finalized by August of this year.  

In addition, New Delhi must agree to join to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, lest U.S. firms balk at engaging in nuclear trade with India.  The Convention would shield U.S. and international suppliers from liability in the event of a nuclear accident and make plant operators responsible for damages from any accidents.  While the Indian cabinet has approved the necessary legislation, the national legislature has yet to consider the proposal.  Competitors to U.S. firms such as France’s Areva and Russia’s Rosatom are not similarly constrained because they are covered by liability protections from their home governments.

India is aggressively pursuing deals with other nations worldwide, especially those with large uranium reserves. Last week it was reported that Russia planned to follow-up the nuclear cooperation pact it already signed with India last December with a deal next month which would enable Moscow to construct additional power plants.  In addition to the U.S. and Russian deals, India has inked agreements with the UK, France, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Namibia, and Canada.

As nuclear trade between the U.S. and India comes closer to becoming a reality, the Obama administration should be concerned that the U.S.-India deal, as well as agreements between India and other nuclear suppliers, could weaken the nonproliferation and disarmament regime at a time when strengthening this regime is a top Obama administration priority.  

China Remains Torn on Iran

China remains hesitant to accept the U.S. bottom line on Iran. The two nations this week expressed goodwill and pledged general cooperation on nonproliferation, among other items, but failed to produce concrete plans of action and displayed subtle signs of divergence, as illustrated by today’s press briefing…

The Wall Street Journal described the briefing as an “awkward” affair in which President Obama and President Hu Jintao “exhibited body language that seemed to say they had been frustrated by the entire exercise.” The two presented different tones in their remarks on Iran. Obama’s remarks were forceful: “Our two nations and the rest of our P5-plus-1 partners are unified.  Iran has an opportunity to present and demonstrate its peaceful intentions, but if it fails to take this opportunity there will be consequences.” In contrast, Hu was more oblique: “We both stressed that to uphold the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and to appropriately resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations is very important to stability in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.”

Of the P5+1 countries, China has been the most resistant to ratcheting up pressure on Iran. This is no surprise given China’s dependence on Iran for 12 percent of its crude oil imports. When asked today about China’s plan to help deal with Iran, U.S. National Security Council official Jeffrey Bader replied, “I would not say that we got an answer today from the Chinese, nor did we expect one on the subject.”

Policy agenda aside, China made serious efforts to make Obama’s visit as enjoyable as possible. According to the Washington Post, China began last week to regulate its market for Obama souvenirs in an attempt to eliminate insulting images. For example, the wildly popular “Oba Mao” memorabilia got the axe while the Obama-Superman figurine made the cut. Superman beats Mao? That will probably not be a victory for the history books.

Obama did stir things up during a town-hall meeting with Chinese students yesterday by discussing the importance of open government and internet freedom.

The Chinese government responded by censoring the dialogue.

India Nuclear Debate Demands Watchful Eye

On August 26, senior Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam publicly questioned the success of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Calling the thermonuclear experiment a “fizzle,” he endorsed the need for new tests. It has been over a month, but the controversy surrounding his comments has yet to subside. The New York Times even published an editorial yesterday warning adamantly of the danger of new Indian tests. This raises an important question: just how deep are India’s pro-test roots?

Every once in a while, a high-profile government official (or ex-official) will make a half-baked comment implicating his or her country in controversial activities or intentions. Such comments are generally rebuffed by national authorities who clarify the nation’s “official” position. Though attention grabbing, these comments must be taken with a dozen grains of the finest sea salt.  

For example, Brazil’s Vice President Jose Alencar told journalists on September 25 that Brazil should advance a nuclear weapon development program. Other officials quickly moved to dissociate Alencar’s personal view from governmental policy. Nothing has come of this impetuous statement, and we can reasonably expect that nothing will.

But not all provocative views are so easily quelled. This appears to be the case with K. Santhanam’s claims. His comments represent the first time a nuclear scientist involved in the 1998 Indian tests has denied the official government stance that the tests were sufficient. Though a wide range of high-ranking officials — including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar, Home Minister P. Chidambaram, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, and former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra — promptly repudiated Santhanam’s statement, the debate rages on, thanks in large part to “a powerful but small group of nuclear scientists, diplomats and military experts who wish to prevent Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from supporting Obama’s call [for the CTBT].”

In the immediate wake of the U.S.-drafted UNSC resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, India reiterated its opposition to both the NPT and CTBT. This gesture surely satisfied K. Santhanam and his gang, but their influence on India’s position was likely negligible. India has long opposed the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime, and it was fully expected to uphold its contrarian stance.

As the world gets closer to the possibility of an effective CTBT, Santhanam’s persistent voice is disquieting. India has articulated its continued resistance to the CTBT as a stance of principle, not of subversion. Santhanam’s claims, however, indicate that opposition to the CTBT may already be (or soon become) part of an actual desire for more tests. Even if Santhanam’s pronouncement does not ultimately prompt tests, his claims could fracture the domestic consensus required for CTBT ratification.

President Obama may be worried about U.S. domestic politics thwarting the CTBT, but he should pay attention to political challenges abroad as well. India is one of the nine CTBT hold-outs whose ratification is compulsory for the treaty to enter into force. Without exaggerating the dissent, Obama must work with the Indian government to repel the Santhanam position, lest it become the ultimate stonewall to the CTBT.

Smoke North Korea Out

On September 21, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak proposed a “grand bargain” with North Korea. Tired of counterproductive step-by-step negotiations with Pyongyang, Lee’s deal was a one-shot process: complete and irreversible denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid.

On September 30, the North responded to the offer, calling it “ridiculous.” Given this response, we should not expect a similar American proposal. Or should we?

The Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter believes we should, and his reasoning is clever. In a September 30 briefing, Carpenter and Doug Bandow argued that while there are no good options, the best chance of persuading North Korea to adopt policies acceptable to the United States (i.e. denuclearization) is through coordinated effort with China.  

Carpenter proposed that the United States offer its own one-shot grand bargain not as a diplomatic end-game with North Korea, but as a shrewd gambit to persuade Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang. (It’s worth noting that Carpenter is fond of the grand bargain concept; he has proposed a similar approach for dealing with Iran). Carpenter referred to the strategy as “smoking North Korea out,” by which he means forcing North Korea’s hand and making them reveal their true intentions to the United States and, more importantly, to China.  

It is unclear whether or not Pyongyang is truly considering denuclearization, though it has pledged to work for a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula. This uncertainty (or hope) is enough to prevent China from confronting North Korea; after all, China has some legitimate concerns that include North Korean destabilization leading to a chaotic refugee flow and the potential geopolitical threat from a united Korea. China also knows, however, that an established nuclear weapon power on the peninsula is not in its interests.  

Carpenter’s presentation suggested that he does not expect Pyongyang to accept the grand bargain, which would include a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for denuclearization. For Carpenter, Pyongyang’s rejection of the deal would clarify their intentions and reveal their determination to become an established nuclear weapon power. In such a situation, China would be left with no choice but to bring out its stick.

One problem, however, is that such diplomatic litmus tests tend to be of questionable utility, particularly when it comes to North Korea. Carpenter said that rejection of the grand bargain would mean North Korea had determined to go nuclear, but this assumes Pyongyang: a) knows what it wants; b) has decided upon a course of action that will get it what it wants; and c) attributes as much importance to the grand bargain offer as Carpenter does. As Travis ranted awhile ago, imperfect information makes conjectures about North Korean intentions suspect by default.

Another potential problem in Carpenter’s approach is that if the United States expects the grand bargain to fail, it might act accordingly. This pitfall has been prevalent in U.S. policy toward Iran. Skeptical that negotiations will bear fruit, a few Obama administration officials reportedly believe that direct talks with Iran are important mainly because they provide political cover for more coercive actions down the road. If articulated publicly – like when placating congressional hawks with tough talk on Iran, for example – such sentiments not only cause Iranian leaders to doubt American sincerity, but also assume future coercive steps to be a foregone conclusion. Such assumptions could quickly become self-fulfilling prophecies in both Iran and North Korea.  

Implementing Carpenter’s strategy becomes dangerous if it succeeds when we do not expect (or want) it to. Chester Crocker explained this type of scenario a few weeks ago in the New York Times: “If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own.” Carpenter’s strategy is crafty, but it would be imprudent unless we were actually serious about following through.

Carpenter also appraised U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s two nuclear tests. He concluded that it was a mistake by both the Bush and Obama administrations to issue immediate public statements after both tests pledging full nuclear umbrella protection for South Korea and Japan. If it were up to Carpenter, the United States would have issued private statements of assurance to South Korea and Japan but kept China guessing about the U.S. level of commitment to these two countries. If this had occurred, China might more earnestly fear the proliferation implications of Pyongyang’s tests, and the possibility of South Korea and Japan pursuing the bomb would have been an alarming consideration.  This could have been a critical impetus for China to get tough on North Korea.