Norman Dicks (D-WA) has spent his entire career on Capitol Hill, having started out as a Senate staffer for Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, and since 1977, serving as a congressmen on the House Appropriations Committee.  In March 2010, he was named the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, replacing the late Rep. John Murtha (D-PA)….

Voting Information

•    Mr. Dicks has a liberal Congressional voting record.  He voted with a majority of his Democratic colleagues 99.3% of the time during the current Congress. This percentage does not include votes in which Dicks did not vote.

•    The differences usually occur on defense spending and foreign policy issues, where he is often more hawkish than the party norm.

•    On Council for a Livable World’s PeacePAC voting record, he scored:
50% in 2008
90% in 2007
41% in 2005-6
82% in 2003-4
44% in 2001-2
29% in 1999-2001
63% in1997-8

•    While he has supported higher military spending, he has also been a supporter of nuclear arms control measures and is a long-time skeptic of national missile defense.

On Defense / Military Affairs

•    Dicks was a key proponent for the ($2 billion per plane) B-2 bomber.  He successfully ensured money was set aside for the B-2 in the 1995 defense appropriations bill.

•    Dicks led select committee investigations into 1998 charges that China had been an illegal recipient of US satellite technology.  His report found China to be guilty, with a subsequent report authored by him also alleging that China had stolen significant America nuclear secrets over a 20 year period.

•    An early supporter of the Iraq War, by 2005 Dicks u-turned and claimed that he wouldn’t have supported the invasion had he not believed Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.  

•    In 2003, Dicks was a supporter of the sharply increased $379 billion defense budget – nearly $50 billion higher than that of 2002.  Despite the large increase, Dicks asserted that yet more money was needed urgently to modernize US military hardware.

•    Dicks was one of the most vocal critics of the U.S Air Force’s 2008 decision to purchase in-air refueling tankers produced by Northrop Grumman and EADS.  He was, and remains, a strong supporter of Boeing’s alternative model.  Boeing has a huge presence in Dick’s district.   After EADS won the contract, Dicks supported Boeing’s protest with the Government Accountability Office, which cited serious flaws in the acquisition process and called for a reversal of the decision.  As of March 2010, the deal remains unsettled.

•    Dicks is a strong supporter of funding for Boeing’s C-17 cargo aircraft produced by Boeing.

•    Dicks is also a congressional supporter for Boeing’s Airborne Laser Missile Defense program.  He signed a letter to Defense Secretary Gates in 2009 requesting a commitment to the program.  Congress appropriated roughly $400 million for the program in FY 2009.  Norman Dick’s support for Boeing related projects has not historically been as cast-iron as one might think.  He was neither supportive for the Army’s former ‘Future Combat Systems’ program or for ground-based missile defense.  Of the latter, he claimed that ‘the program has not yet met the criteria that Congress and the Administration established to demonstrate the technical capability of a system to defend the U.S. against incoming long-range ballistic missiles.”

•    In terms of industries, lobbyists have been Dick’s largest contributors.  Lawyers, defense aerospace, and defense electronics have ranked his second to fifth biggest financial donors.  

•    Defense contractors Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, SAIC Inc., Raytheon, and BAE Systems all are among his top defense contributors.

Earlier today Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) submitted a statement for the record on the START follow-on agreement (aka New START).  The full statement is posted below the jump.  Some highlights:

…

The United States and Russia maintain over ninety percent of the world’s approximately 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the capacity to destroy an entire city; collectively, they can destroy the world. The mere existence of these weapons creates the risk of a nuclear accident, unauthorized use, and theft by a terrorist group. The size and structure of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals reflect an antiquated Cold War mindset that we must move beyond.

…

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that “terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by a state.” Our priority, therefore, should be to work together with Russia to reduce the size and vulnerability of our nuclear arsenals, and ensure that proper security and surveillance safeguards are in place.

…

I am encouraged that efforts to negotiate a START follow-on agreement have bipartisan support among national security experts. Notably, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, headed by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger, endorsed a follow-on agreement to START. Similarly, Secretary Perry joined with former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz to pen an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for the extension of the key provisions of START and further reductions in our nuclear stockpile.

Statement for the Record in Support of a Follow-on Agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Senator Russ Feingold
March 9, 2010

Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to speak today in support of our administration’s efforts to negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Our negotiating team in Vienna is currently working with the Russian delegation to finalize this agreement, and I look forward to reviewing the treaty when it is submitted to the Senate.

The United States and Russia maintain over ninety percent of the world’s approximately 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the capacity to destroy an entire city; collectively, they can destroy the world. The mere existence of these weapons creates the risk of a nuclear accident, unauthorized use, and theft by a terrorist group. The size and structure of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals reflect an antiquated Cold War mindset that we must move beyond.

It is in the national security interest of the United States to reach an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and ensure that strong verification and transparency measures remain in effect. This is the core purpose and focus of the START follow-on agreement.

The START follow-on agreement is an important component of our efforts to work with Russia and other international partners to collectively address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. These dangers include the vulnerability of nuclear material to theft by terrorists, as well as the risk of nuclear proliferation by other countries.

Ratification of a START follow-on agreement would also be a clear signal that the United States is upholding our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would reaffirm our leadership on nonproliferation issues and demonstrate, as the President has advocated, that we are serious about moving towards a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a reliable deterrent for so long as it is needed. We cannot afford to miss this opportunity; without a demonstrated effort to fulfilling our nonproliferation responsibilities through a new START agreement, it will be increasingly difficult for the U.S. to secure the international support needed to address the urgent security threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that “terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by a state.” Our priority, therefore, should be to work together with Russia to reduce the size and vulnerability of our nuclear arsenals, and ensure that proper security and surveillance safeguards are in place.

Unfortunately, today Russia continues to possess huge stores of nuclear materials that are inadequately secured and which, if stolen by terrorists, could be used to destroy an American city. The size of our own nuclear arsenal is also unsustainable, both from a security and cost perspective, and should be tailored to the new twenty-first century threats we face.

The reductions required by the START follow-on agreement will not adversely affect our national security. The United States could pursue much deeper reductions in the size of our arsenal and still have more weapons that we would ever need. In fact, it is precisely the size of our nuclear arsenal and complex that make them vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. There is no longer any compelling national security reason to maintain or expand the size of our nuclear stockpile.

Nor is there any reason to continue to develop new nuclear weapon technologies or warheads. Our brightest experts have concluded that we no longer need new nuclear weapons in order to maintain a credible deterrent. A recent report from the independent JASON Defense Advisory Group concluded that, as a result of our nuclear laboratories’ successful life-extension programs, the lifetimes of our nuclear warheads can be extended for decades.

I am encouraged that efforts to negotiate a START follow-on agreement have bipartisan support among national security experts. Notably, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, headed by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger, endorsed a follow-on agreement to START. Similarly, Secretary Perry joined with former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz to pen an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for the extension of the key provisions of START and further reductions in our nuclear stockpile.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to commend the administration for its efforts to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime by negotiating a follow-on to the START treaty. We must act now to address the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, which is one of the gravest dangers facing the United States. In a time of terrorism and of rising international concern about Iran’s nuclear program, international cooperation remains key to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The START follow-on agreement is an essential step towards that goal, and towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Part I of two posts on the Global Zero Movement
Click here for Part II

The congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which outlines U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, and readiness, has been delayed until, at the earliest, the second half of this month.  According to a senior administration official, the review will call for “dramatic reductions in the stockpile,” a “greater role for conventional weapons in deterrence” and ruling out the need for low-yield, bunker-busting nuclear weapons capable of penetrating underground targets.  

While this is very encouraging news, there is still some concern that the new NPR will not go far enough towards achieving President Obama’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.  Reports have indicated that early drafts of the Nuclear Posture Review fell short of the transformational vision put forth by the President in Prague.  Here’s to hoping that when he makes his final decisions on the review, President Obama will take his cues from the rapidly growing Global Zero movement rather than those who may be urging him not to stray too far from the status quo…

Global Zero was launched in Paris in December of 2008.  Its declaration states “that to protect our children, our grandchildren and our civilization from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, we must eliminate all nuclear weapons globally.”  The initial movement gathered 100 global leaders to establish a phased, verifiable plan to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide.  

Both President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have committed themselves to the movement.  President Medvedev made headlines last week when he announced that “Global zero is a beautiful idea but, as you’ll understand, this idea can only be reached as a result of concerted work by all nuclear states.”

In addition to Obama and Medvedev, Queen Noor of Jordan, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and Ambassador Richard Burt have emerged as leading advocates of the Global Zero movement.  Queen Noor was bold enough to make an appearance on the “Colbert Report” in support of Global Zero.  

At Global Zero’s February 2010 Paris Summit, participants ranged from Michael Douglas to Hans Blix.  U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher delivered remarks.  Opening day statements were made by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and Ban Ki-moon.

While the Global Zero declaration boasts a score of high profile signatories from all corners of the globe and all ranges of the political spectrum, their philosophy also depends on strong grassroots support. A recent poll of 21 countries found that global public opinion strongly favors the elimination of all nuclear weapons according to a timetable: 76 percent of respondents across all countries polled favor such an agreement. In an effort to capitalize on this support, Global Zero is seeking to open chapters at universities across the planet and is actively trying to reach out to new supporters via new media mediums such as Twitter and Facebook.

Despite the broad base of support for a world without nuclear weapons, recent leaks of the potential contents of the new NPR suggest that a meaningful shift from Cold War thinking could be unlikely in some areas.  Jeffrey Lewis blogged on Arms Control Wonk that the review will likely “fall far short of the President’s rhetoric in Prague,” resulting in a “very conventional document.”  Several leading Democrats fear the review could retain ambiguous wording regarding the purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  Global Security Newswire recently published an article under the headline “U.S. Seen Ruling Out ‘No First Use’ Nuke Policy,” citing internal divisions within the administration.

President Obama should not be timid in crafting a meaningful overhaul of nuclear thinking, especially given the support from and strength of the Global Zero movement.  77 percent of Americans have voiced their support for the phased, verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, and our country’s nuclear posture should establish a platform upon which this vision can begin to be realized.  

A 2006 MOD White Paper said that the UK’s current fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines would have to be retired in the early 2020s, estimating that it would take around 17 years to design, manufacture, and commission the replacement boomers.  After a controversial vote in the House of Commons in 2007, it looked certain that the UK would replace its Vanguard class submarines as a key part of an extension plan to its at-sea ‘Trident’ nuclear deterrent.  

Having devoted £7.7 billion in October 2007 for research and design in the initial ‘Concept Phase’ of the replacement program, the UK Government was scheduled to make ‘Initial Gate’ decisions as early as September 2009.  These decisions would have kicked off a series of technical assessments and design work, committing Prime Minister Gordon Brown to pay out some 15% of the estimated £15-20 billion procurement costs for the new submarine.  

In July 2009, the Government decided to delay the design contract until 2010.  In January 2010, it was reported that the Government had postponed making its ‘Initial Gate’ decisions indefinitely, allegedly due to difficulties in agreeing on the type of nuclear reactors needed to power the future submarines.  However, the timing of the announcement casts doubt on the claim that the delay is purely technical in nature.  And as the Vanguard retirement clock continues to tick, suggestions of ‘indefinite’ delays call into question the Government’s commitment to the ‘urgent’ nature of the replacement program, as depicted in the White Paper timetable…

However long or short the ‘indefinite’ delays eventually turn out to be, utterances from the government imply that the ‘Initial Gate’ decision  probably won’t be made until after the UK’s anticipated May 2010 General Election.  Political calculation is no doubt playing a role here: Gordon Brown is likely well aware that the astronomical cost of Trident replacement (plausibly up to £130 billion) won’t go down well with the electorate when combined with the UK’s record budget deficit.  He may have even seen a recent poll that suggests 58 % of the general public – including 61% of Labour voters – want the project panned completely.   The fact that Labour makes no mention of (let alone commitment to) the Trident system on their website illustrates how much the party has soured on the project.  In omitting Trident from their public agenda, Labour are leaving the door open for a future u-turn in policy.  

There are also signs of increased doubts on the need for a Trident replacement among the other mainstream political parties.  While the Conservatives stipulate that they are committed to maintaining the UK nuclear deterrent and the ‘replacement’ of Trident, they fail to mention by which type of system it ought to be replaced.  Some sources suggest that the Conservatives could even avoid any decisions on the UK nuclear deterrent for as much as five years, in an effort to raise much needed funds.  The Liberal Democrats say they are happy to maintain British nuclear weapons in the future but are very clear about their opposition to a like-for-like replacement, citing its sheer cost and the rapidly deteriorating state of public finances.

Aside from domestic political and economic arguments, increasing criticism levied by both retired and serving military officials may also be behind eroding support for the once-popular program.  In January one former leader of the British armed forces urged the Government to delay replacement for as long as possible, noting the increased flexibility the UK could have in disarmament negotiations and the irrelevance of nuclear weapons in dealing with likely future threats.  

An ex-army chief who advises the Conservative Party on defense issues recently went as far as saying that the UK might not even need a nuclear deterrent in five or ten years.  Other voices have advocated looking into cheaper delivery systems such as nuclear cruise missiles.  They argue that decisions regarding the appropriate means to deliver nuclear warheads should be taken by the military and not politicians.

Finally, one has to consider the forthcoming 2010 NPT review conference and Obama’s speech in Prague last April.  Britain’s proposal to replace its Trident submarines doesn’t exactly sit easily with either the spirit or substance of these events.  It also seems to contradict Gordon Brown’s 2009 assertion that the UK would ‘lead’ global efforts for a successful 2010 NPT review conference.  

As the Foreign Affairs Committee notes in its report ‘Global Security: Non-Proliferation’, ‘the decision to renew the UK’s Trident system is perceived by some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing to contradict the Government’s declared commitment to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.’  Many backbenchers in Parliament highlighted this discrepancy in the 2007 debate over Trident replacement, but were ignored.  It seems that this issue is increasingly affecting the submarine replacement proposals, with Gordon Brown stating in September 2009 that he would potentially reduce the UK’s order of new vessels by one, presumably in an attempt to maintain some sort of credibility on the non-proliferation front.

In sum, there appears to be more to the Trident replacement delays than just technical issues.  In particular, the outcome of the NPT Review Conference and General Election could have a significant impact on a program that looked to be a foregone conclusion in 2007.  

I’ve been thinking a lot about the “inevitability assumption” lately.  There is a fundamental problem associated with the assumption that Iran is inevitably going to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Back in December, Jim Walsh, Thomas Pickering, and William Luers hit the problem on the head:

This “inevitability assumption” has been a common belief in the nuclear age, and yet, it has repeatedly turned out to be wrong. The examples include Egypt, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The assumption is tantamount to relying on a worst-case scenario, which in turn has the effect of truncating the list of potential policy options. Worse yet, an assumption that Iran is going nuclear can lead decision-makers to miss the signals and signs when a negotiated settlement is actually possible.

Today, U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Glyn Davies told Christiane Amanpour that “the world’s patience with Iran is running out. ‘It’s becoming quite clear that they’re preserving at least the option of developing a nuclear program. And we want all nations of the world to take note of this and draw the right conclusion.’”

I can only assume the conclusion he speaks of is that Iran is working to build, and will one day acquire, a nuclear weapon. As a result of this conclusion, the U.S. is once again focusing narrowly on sanctions, while others push for more decisive action. Ultimately, though, any and all of these tactics are aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Not the option of a weapon; not the desire for a weapon; but a fully capable nuclear arsenal able to wipe out… well, anyone at all.

Iran does not currently have this ability…

Today, Zbigniew Brzezinski offered his own policy recommendation to the Wall Street Journal:

Try to stop Iran’s nuclear program, and make Tehran pay a price if it keeps pursuing it, but don’t count too much on sanctions; offer a robust American defense umbrella to protect friends in the region if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold; give rhetorical support to Iran’s opposition while accepting America’s limited ability to help it; eschew thought of a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities; and keep talking to Tehran.

Above all: Play the long game, because time, demographics and generational change aren’t on the side of the current regime.

Yes, the current regime is, quite clearly, antagonistic – but there is a small possibility that it does not seek a nuclear weapon. Regardless, there is a very real possibility that the current regime’s goals will not matter.

“This is a country with a growing urban middle class, a country with fairly high access to higher education, a country where women play a great role in the professions,” says Brzezinski, “So it is a country which I think, basically, objectively is capable of moving the way Turkey has moved.”

Any sanctions imposed on Iran must be very carefully constructed, so as not to undermine any progress that might be made by the Iranian opposition, a force that has the ability to shape Iran’s future. Further, any argument for the use of force in Iran is premature. To focus myopically on the inevitability of an Iranian nuclear weapon is a mistake, and will only lead to disaster.