A 2006 MOD White Paper said that the UK’s current fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines would have to be retired in the early 2020s, estimating that it would take around 17 years to design, manufacture, and commission the replacement boomers.  After a controversial vote in the House of Commons in 2007, it looked certain that the UK would replace its Vanguard class submarines as a key part of an extension plan to its at-sea ‘Trident’ nuclear deterrent.  

Having devoted £7.7 billion in October 2007 for research and design in the initial ‘Concept Phase’ of the replacement program, the UK Government was scheduled to make ‘Initial Gate’ decisions as early as September 2009.  These decisions would have kicked off a series of technical assessments and design work, committing Prime Minister Gordon Brown to pay out some 15% of the estimated £15-20 billion procurement costs for the new submarine.  

In July 2009, the Government decided to delay the design contract until 2010.  In January 2010, it was reported that the Government had postponed making its ‘Initial Gate’ decisions indefinitely, allegedly due to difficulties in agreeing on the type of nuclear reactors needed to power the future submarines.  However, the timing of the announcement casts doubt on the claim that the delay is purely technical in nature.  And as the Vanguard retirement clock continues to tick, suggestions of ‘indefinite’ delays call into question the Government’s commitment to the ‘urgent’ nature of the replacement program, as depicted in the White Paper timetable…

However long or short the ‘indefinite’ delays eventually turn out to be, utterances from the government imply that the ‘Initial Gate’ decision  probably won’t be made until after the UK’s anticipated May 2010 General Election.  Political calculation is no doubt playing a role here: Gordon Brown is likely well aware that the astronomical cost of Trident replacement (plausibly up to £130 billion) won’t go down well with the electorate when combined with the UK’s record budget deficit.  He may have even seen a recent poll that suggests 58 % of the general public – including 61% of Labour voters – want the project panned completely.   The fact that Labour makes no mention of (let alone commitment to) the Trident system on their website illustrates how much the party has soured on the project.  In omitting Trident from their public agenda, Labour are leaving the door open for a future u-turn in policy.  

There are also signs of increased doubts on the need for a Trident replacement among the other mainstream political parties.  While the Conservatives stipulate that they are committed to maintaining the UK nuclear deterrent and the ‘replacement’ of Trident, they fail to mention by which type of system it ought to be replaced.  Some sources suggest that the Conservatives could even avoid any decisions on the UK nuclear deterrent for as much as five years, in an effort to raise much needed funds.  The Liberal Democrats say they are happy to maintain British nuclear weapons in the future but are very clear about their opposition to a like-for-like replacement, citing its sheer cost and the rapidly deteriorating state of public finances.

Aside from domestic political and economic arguments, increasing criticism levied by both retired and serving military officials may also be behind eroding support for the once-popular program.  In January one former leader of the British armed forces urged the Government to delay replacement for as long as possible, noting the increased flexibility the UK could have in disarmament negotiations and the irrelevance of nuclear weapons in dealing with likely future threats.  

An ex-army chief who advises the Conservative Party on defense issues recently went as far as saying that the UK might not even need a nuclear deterrent in five or ten years.  Other voices have advocated looking into cheaper delivery systems such as nuclear cruise missiles.  They argue that decisions regarding the appropriate means to deliver nuclear warheads should be taken by the military and not politicians.

Finally, one has to consider the forthcoming 2010 NPT review conference and Obama’s speech in Prague last April.  Britain’s proposal to replace its Trident submarines doesn’t exactly sit easily with either the spirit or substance of these events.  It also seems to contradict Gordon Brown’s 2009 assertion that the UK would ‘lead’ global efforts for a successful 2010 NPT review conference.  

As the Foreign Affairs Committee notes in its report ‘Global Security: Non-Proliferation’, ‘the decision to renew the UK’s Trident system is perceived by some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing to contradict the Government’s declared commitment to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.’  Many backbenchers in Parliament highlighted this discrepancy in the 2007 debate over Trident replacement, but were ignored.  It seems that this issue is increasingly affecting the submarine replacement proposals, with Gordon Brown stating in September 2009 that he would potentially reduce the UK’s order of new vessels by one, presumably in an attempt to maintain some sort of credibility on the non-proliferation front.

In sum, there appears to be more to the Trident replacement delays than just technical issues.  In particular, the outcome of the NPT Review Conference and General Election could have a significant impact on a program that looked to be a foregone conclusion in 2007.  

I’ve been thinking a lot about the “inevitability assumption” lately.  There is a fundamental problem associated with the assumption that Iran is inevitably going to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Back in December, Jim Walsh, Thomas Pickering, and William Luers hit the problem on the head:

This “inevitability assumption” has been a common belief in the nuclear age, and yet, it has repeatedly turned out to be wrong. The examples include Egypt, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The assumption is tantamount to relying on a worst-case scenario, which in turn has the effect of truncating the list of potential policy options. Worse yet, an assumption that Iran is going nuclear can lead decision-makers to miss the signals and signs when a negotiated settlement is actually possible.

Today, U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Glyn Davies told Christiane Amanpour that “the world’s patience with Iran is running out. ‘It’s becoming quite clear that they’re preserving at least the option of developing a nuclear program. And we want all nations of the world to take note of this and draw the right conclusion.’”

I can only assume the conclusion he speaks of is that Iran is working to build, and will one day acquire, a nuclear weapon. As a result of this conclusion, the U.S. is once again focusing narrowly on sanctions, while others push for more decisive action. Ultimately, though, any and all of these tactics are aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Not the option of a weapon; not the desire for a weapon; but a fully capable nuclear arsenal able to wipe out… well, anyone at all.

Iran does not currently have this ability…

Today, Zbigniew Brzezinski offered his own policy recommendation to the Wall Street Journal:

Try to stop Iran’s nuclear program, and make Tehran pay a price if it keeps pursuing it, but don’t count too much on sanctions; offer a robust American defense umbrella to protect friends in the region if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold; give rhetorical support to Iran’s opposition while accepting America’s limited ability to help it; eschew thought of a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities; and keep talking to Tehran.

Above all: Play the long game, because time, demographics and generational change aren’t on the side of the current regime.

Yes, the current regime is, quite clearly, antagonistic – but there is a small possibility that it does not seek a nuclear weapon. Regardless, there is a very real possibility that the current regime’s goals will not matter.

“This is a country with a growing urban middle class, a country with fairly high access to higher education, a country where women play a great role in the professions,” says Brzezinski, “So it is a country which I think, basically, objectively is capable of moving the way Turkey has moved.”

Any sanctions imposed on Iran must be very carefully constructed, so as not to undermine any progress that might be made by the Iranian opposition, a force that has the ability to shape Iran’s future. Further, any argument for the use of force in Iran is premature. To focus myopically on the inevitability of an Iranian nuclear weapon is a mistake, and will only lead to disaster.

The Senate Democratic Policy Committee today released three excellent policy reports on nuclear weapons issues: 1. The Follow-on START Agreement: Responding to False Claims (3/3/10) 2. A New START Treaty Is Critical to U.S. National Security (3/3/10) 3…

Despite repeated assertions from both U.S. and Russian officials since December that the New START agreement is on the verge of completion, we’re still waiting for the new treaty.  U.S. and Russian negotiators returned home last weekend, and are expected back in Geneva to resume negotiations on either March 8 or March 15.

So what’s the hold up?  I’ve run across a few reasons:

• It takes time to turn agreements reached in principle into treaty text.  It also takes time to hash out the various annexes, the Memorandum of Understanding, and other associated and supplemental documents that will come with the treaty.

• Russia is not in a hurry to sign a new agreement.  According to a former senior U.S. official who spoke to Laura Rozen, the Russians “are haggling, fighting internally, and trying to figure out how to get more water out of a stone.”  They’re also worried that the U.S. Senate could fail to ratify the agreement.

• Verification.  A senior U.S. official stated in an interview with CNN that “some niggling technical details,” perhaps regarding how to verify actual warhead loadings, are still being worked out.

• Missile defense.  According to a number of different reports, including this one by McClatchy’s Johnathan Landay, missile defense has emerged as an issue.  If Russia is in fact in no hurry to sign an agreement, missile defense could be their chosen means of obstruction.

I want to focus on the missile defense angle for the time being, specifically the Landay piece.  Not only does the article contain a few mix-ups, but I think the impasse is being blown out of proportion, especially since a way forward seems readily apparent.  (Note: this post turned into something much longer than I had hoped so if you have better things to do, I’d suggest doing them; if only I could spin succinct beats like Travis)…  

For starters, Landay gets some pretty basic facts wrong.  For example, the article completely mischaracterizes the Bush administration’s European missile defense plan.  Landay states that the configuration would have put “a tracking radar in Poland and 20 interceptors in the Czech Republic.”  In fact, the plan would have placed the radar in the Czech Republic and 10 – not 20 – interceptors in Poland.

More seriously, Landay conflates unilateral statements with a “supreme interests” withdrawal clause.  In a meeting on June 13, 1991, U.S. Ambassador Linton Brooks and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Obukhov exchanged unilateral statements on the relationship between the START I treaty, which was signed a month later on July 31, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (more on these below).  The statements clarified how the two sides viewed and interpreted the treaty.

According to Landay, the Bush administration invoked a similar unilateral statement to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2002.  Not exactly.  The Bush administration invoked the ABM Treaty’s supreme interests withdrawal clause, which allows the parties to the treaty to withdraw if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”   Most international treaties contain such a provision, and New START will most assuredly contain one as well.

These errors aside, Landay highlights two points of contention on missile defense.  

First, Russia is irked about U.S. plans to place land-based SM-3 interceptors in Romania.  
Russian officials have expressed surprise about the move, which was announced in early February.  Apparently the Romanians revealed the agreement before the U.S. had time to privately notify the Russians about it.  However, Russian complaints ring somewhat hollow in light of the fact that the Obama administration announced in September 2009 that Phase II of its new configuration for missile defense in Europe would entail placing land-based SM-3s in northern and southern Europe.

While the Romania deal may be making the negotiations more difficult, it’s not going to be a deal breaker.  Despite Russia’s initial positive reaction to the Obama administration’s new approach to missile defense in Europe, it remains deeply concerned about long-term U.S. missile defense plans on the continent.  For its part, the U.S. has repeatedly made it clear that the new treaty must not limit U.S. missile defenses.  The Russians know this.  Indeed, presidents Obama and Medvedev have stated that New START will deal only with strategic offensive arms.

The second contentious issue relates to Russia’s insistence that it be able to withdraw from the new treaty if it deems that U.S. missile defense programs upset strategic stability.  The Russians do not appear to be asserting that such a formulation be included in the text of the treaty, but rather in a unilateral statement to be issued alongside the agreement.

As noted above, the Soviet’s attached a similar unilateral statement to START I.  The U.S. responded with its own unilateral statement, proclaiming that the substance of the statement was “without legal or military foundation.”  So why the freak-out now?  

One explanation is that the Russians are insisting that the U.S. endorse their unilateral view that changes in missile defense levels would constitute grounds for withdrawal.  Again, Moscow undoubtedly understands that this is an absolute non-starter for the U.S.  While Moscow might be driving a hard bargain for the time being as a bargaining tactic (either because this is a deliberate strategy of delay or they simply can’t get their act together), I can’t see how they won’t eventually move off of this position.

Meanwhile, according to Landay, the U.S. appears to be trying to encourage the Russians not to issue any unilateral statement period.  I find this hard to believe, but as has been the case with telemetry, the U.S. may feel constrained by the need to accommodate domestic political concerns.  On February 17, Senators Jon Kyl, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman sent a letter to National Security Advisor James Jones, claiming that

it would be very troubling…if the [new] treaty included a provision that would allow Russia to withdraw from the treaty if it felt threatened by U.S. missile defense capabilities….Even as a unilateral declaration, a provision like this would put pressure on the United States to limit its systems or their deployment because of Russian threats of withdrawal from the treaty.

This is a really stunning argument.  As Max Bergmann points out, “if the Russians feel that strongly about the threat of US missile defense they could still withdraw from the next START treaty [via the treaty’s supreme interests provision] whether that language is in the [sic] [Russian unilateral statement] or not. In other words, the additional language changes nothing.”

The reality is that the U.S. can’t stop the Russians from issuing a unilateral statement on missile defense.  But neither can the Russians stop the U.S. from issuing a unilateral statement noting that Moscow’s view has no foundation, just as it did in response to the Soviet unilateral statement before START I was signed.  Senators Lieberman and McCain had no problem with this arrangement in October 1992, when they joined 91 other Senators in voting to ratify START I.    

Most people I’ve talked to seem to think that when it’s all said and done, New START will note an interrelationship between offensive and defensive forces somewhere in the preamble, but the text of the agreement will not contain any formal or legal limitations on missile defenses.  The U.S. and Russia will then settle on an understanding regarding unilateral statements similar to what was worked out for START I.

Assuming these particulars, I’d be shocked if missile defense derails the treaty in the Senate.  The Obama administration has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to pursue reductions in the U.S. arsenal without trading away missile defense, as should be evident by the fact that it did not rush to sign an agreement before the end of last year.

How much longer the administration will be able to walk this “mutual reductions without limits on missile defense” tightrope, however, remains to be seen.  The Russian interest in concluding a follow-on agreement to START will likely outweigh their concerns about missile defense this time around – even if they do continue to hold out for a little while longer – but that’s not likely to be the case for the next round of much deeper arms reduction talks.

Yesterday, U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley announced a probable cost overrun and major delay in the tri-service, nine-nation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Under the Nunn-McCurdy statute, this would trigger an extensive, mandatory review of alternatives.

The outcome of any upcoming review, however, appears to already be determined. “This is a fifth-generation fighter/attack capability,” Donley told reporters, “There are no alternatives to that in our system. Yes, you can build the 4.5 generation, enhanced capability F-15 kind of capability. But, really there are no good alternatives to F-35 at this point. This is a program to which we are deeply committed.”

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget bases its revised program strategy for the F-35 on the Joint Estimating Team II report (JET II), prepared last fall. Based on this analysis, the Pentagon chose to extend development by 13 months, reduce production by 122 aircraft and add an additional low-rate initial production lot, LRIP 9, to the program. It also adds a single carrier variant to the development program and pulls three LRIP aircraft into developmental testing to add to the 19 flight test assets already in the program.

Overall, the FY 2011 budget request contains $11.4 billion for the F-35, including $8.7 billion in procurement funding, $2.3 billion for continued research and development and $535 million for spare parts.

Since the budget was announced in February, however, problems with the F-35 have continued to mount…

Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced last month that at least one senior manager would be fired from the program and $614 million in performance bonuses would be withheld from its main contractor, Lockheed Martin.  At the time, Gates cited his concerns, but also noted that, “… there are no insurmountable problems, technological or otherwise, with the F-35… We are in a position to move forward with this program in a realistic way.”

Since that time, monthly reports from the Defense Contract Management Agency have come to light, detailing long delays, cost overruns and the “cannibalizing” of parts from fuselages being built by Northrop Grumman to repair aircraft on the assembly line and in preflight testing.

Though the jets were originally expected to be available to the Air Force in 2013, Donley told reporters Tuesday that the planes would probably not be ready until 2015.  The Pentagon declined to say whether there might also be delays in the F-35 program for the Marine Corp and Navy, though both branches have expressed their optimism.

Still, Donley appears hopeful that Lockheed will be able to produce some aircraft below prices cited by independent estimates. This could allow the Pentagon to buy more aircraft per year than planned, but Donley declined to say how many aircraft could be bought above the planned numbers.

In a Feb. 24 acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) on the F-35, Ashton Carter states that the Pentagon is making preparations to buy long-lead items for 48 aircraft in FY 2011, five above the official request.

As for continued delays, Donley noted that the Air Force was considering funding a service life extension program for the Lockheed F-16 fighter planes, given the expected delays in fielding of the F-35, but stated that it was not yet clear if any funding for such a program would be added to the fiscal 2011 budget or later budget years.