By Kirk Bansak and Andrew Riedy

Quibbling with the conventions of op-ed form and style aside, PONI’s critique of our article on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty makes a few points that merit a response.

Chess Not Checkers

Since 1998, no country except for North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, and other countries have continually reaffirmed their intention not to test. This 11 year period without nuclear weapons testing represents 17 percent of the entire Atomic Age. PONI may think this insignificant, but we believe it says something powerful about the non-testing status quo that exists today among responsible stakeholders in the international community.

We’d like to address the red herring advanced by PONI that ratification of the CTBT would require the United States to “lock itself into permanently forswearing nuclear tests,” as PONI writes. The text of the Treaty states explicitly that “Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

If a situation developed where national survival was at stake, the United States could give six months advance notice and withdraw from the CTBT. Of course, if a crisis erupted and the United States did not feel it had time to provide six months notice, it could withdraw immediately in violation of the Treaty and take whatever steps it deemed necessary to protect itself.

We do not mean to suggest that U.S. adherence to its CTBT obligations ought to be purely cosmetic. But there is no CTBT Police that is going to put the U.S. nuclear arsenal under lock and key if the Senate approves the pact. Since scientific experts have affirmed repeatedly that the nuclear arsenal can be reliably maintained for decades without testing, doesn’t it make sense for the United States to ratify the CTBT – thus gaining the political and security benefits therein – while remembering that if things get nasty, U.S. leaders are free to do what they need to do?

Bipartisan Consensus

Our op-ed states that there is a growing bipartisan consensus in support of the CTBT among “experts.” PONI contests this assertion by citing uncertainty within the Posture Commission and the U.S. Senate and goes on to state that the CTBT has become a “lightening rod internationally.” Senators are almost without exception not experts, so that rebuttal is off target. Apropos the international scene, the CTBT may be a litmus test by which non-nuclear weapons states judge the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation (discussed below), but that has nothing to do with the growing consensus amongst U.S. experts to which we were referring (which was clear from the context, we think).

So that leaves the Posture Commission, which did disagree on the Test Ban. Thank God the commissioners are not the only U.S. experts on the block. What about two-thirds of the former secretaries of state and defense and national security advisers? Check mark.

Entry into Force

PONI: “The problem, however, is that even if you get the U.S., China, and Indonesia on board , India and Pakistan will be tough although not impossible to get.  Even more difficult is the task of convincing Egypt, Iran, Israel, and North Korea all to ratify which is probably why the Strategic Posture Commission opponents of CTBT concluded there is a ‘near zero’ chance of entry into force.”

While we’d prefer to see entry into force, we still think there is value in having the United States, China, and possibly India and Pakistan ratify the Test Ban even if other holdouts like Iran and North Korea refuse and thus prevent entry into force. Such a result, while disappointing, would put the United States visibly in the nonproliferation camp and array even greater international political pressure against outlaw nations.

As Kingston explained recently, ratification by the United States and China, the only two hold-out nations on the UN Security Council, “would further strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, encourage other holdouts to ratify, and could activate a provisional entry into force of the treaty (along with the valuable verification and on-site inspection provisions that go with it).”

Horizontal Proliferation

PONI: “CTBT would, at most, only constitute an ‘effective freeze’ on some qualitative aspects of nuclear arsenals that could be upgraded via testing in countries that have ratified the treaty after it enters into force…the CTBT itself in no way prevents horizontal proliferation.”

Negotiation of the CTBT was a critical quid pro quo in getting non-nuclear weapons states to approve the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It is irrelevant for PONI to write that the CTBT “in and of itself in no way prevents horizontal proliferation” because the Test Ban does not operate as a single isolated mechanism. The Test Ban is part of the jumbled, beautiful political morass known as the international nonproliferation regime, which is anchored by the NPT.

Although CTBT ratification by each individual nation was not part of the 1995 quid pro quo, the importance of the Test Ban to non-nuclear weapons states suggests that the continued dormancy of the CTBT may reduce their confidence in both the NPT and the nonproliferation regime writ large. If nuclear weapons states build bigger and better nuclear arsenals (i.e. qualitative improvements), isn’t it clear that non-nuclear weapons states may lose confidence in the NPT and potentially seek to acquire nuclear weapons of their own?

There is a link between vertical and horizontal proliferation – it is the NPT’s grand bargain that nuclear weapons states will disarm in exchange for non-nuclear weapons states promising not to go nuclear. If you think the NPT has achieved even limited success in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, then you should consider supporting the CTBT, which enhances the nuclear weapons states’ performance of their NPT obligations and thus solidifies the political transaction that underpins the entire nonproliferation regime. There is no guarantee that non-nuclear weapons states will always hold up their end of the bargain, but the international community and individual nations have ways of dealing with that problem.

By ratifying the CTBT, the United States potentially enhances horizontal nonproliferation in exchange for a vertical nonproliferation pledge that will not affect its fundamental ability to protect itself during a crisis. Sounds like a good deal to us.

While the United States has chastised both Iran and North Korea for their human rights abuses, it has typically kept the issue separate from denuclearization talks. Yet some experts recommend integrating human rights into broader discussions, as opposed to pursuing single-variable negotiations, in order to create valuable synergies within the diplomatic process.

At an event hosted by the National Iranian American Council on November 4, Ambassador Thomas Pickering emphasized the value of integrating human rights into current U.S. outreach to Iran. In his view, introducing more items for discussion broadens the range of diplomatic possibilities and increases chances for success. As opposed to a “grand bargain” with a rigid a priori formula, Pickering proposed a “grand agenda” with the goal of squeezing as many goodies as possible into the final package.

Ambassador John Limbert expounded upon this point, recommending a “firm but polite” approach with Iran. He explained that while “chest-bumping” moralistic statements by the West have proven unsuccessful, a calculated play of the human rights card could create a dilemma for the Iranian regime, which would run the risk of discrediting itself if it did not respond positively to ostensibly well-intentioned concern for its population. Nonproliferation and human rights might be simultaneously strengthened in this type of approach.

Similar reasoning has been applied to the standoff with North Korea. In a New York Times op-ed, Andrei Lankov recommended cultural and informational exchanges to plant seeds for the eventual emergence of North Korean civil society. Another recent report also recommended outreach, including academic and economic exchanges, in order to “spur better behavior by Pyongyang while helping its impoverished citizens.” Of course, the United States would have to reassure North Korea that these exchanges were not a backhanded attempt at regime change. Providing full transparency of all activities would help.

Lankov makes a strong case for the people-to-people strategy: “This is a well-tested approach: It is, essentially, the one that allowed liberal democracies to win the Cold War…it was the West’s economic prosperity and political freedom that irrevocably undermined popular support for Communism.” That may be true, but it is unclear whether or not sociopolitical reform will lead regular Iranians and North Koreans, let alone the ruling regimes, to support denuclearization or other policies more amenable to U.S. interests.

While the human rights-denuclearization link is compelling and policymakers should hope for its effectiveness, there are a few assumptions that are difficult to swallow. The first is that the American government and public will be patient enough to await the positive effects of the approach. The second is that the two regimes will be open to American engagement with their economies and populations. The latter assumption can more reasonably be made vis-à-vis Iran, which has, despite heinous crackdowns, shown concern about sustaining domestic popular support since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In contrast, North Korea is a totalitarian state with a constitution based on a “military first” (songun) ideology and a public both barred from electing their leaders and isolated from the outside world.

The love-hate triangle between the United States, North Korea, and South Korea continues.

Pyongyang has called its recent naval clash with the South the result of Seoul’s meddling in U.S.-North Korean reconciliation. Referring to the incident as “deliberate, planned provocation” by South Korea, one of Pyongyang’s state-run newspapers reported today, “It goes to show how recklessly crazy the South Korean government is in trying to put a brake on improving relations between North Korea and the U.S.”

This is not the first time Pyongyang has accused Seoul of playing saboteur…

In its rejection of President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal, Pyongyang explained that the real problem was Washington’s hostility and that Lee’s “ridiculous proposal” was nothing more than interference: “It is evident that [Lee] seeks to meddle and stand in the way of settling the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S.”

South Korean newspaper Donga Ilbo explained the predictability of Tuesday’s sudden clash: “The North uses the fears of its counterparts as a negotiating tactic.” According to Donga Ilbo, both the 1999 Yellow Sea clash and 2002 Yeonpyeong Island clash were prompted by North Korea amidst diplomatic activity so as to achieve leverage through tension. Similarly, Tuesday’s clash precedes a trip to Pyongyang next month by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth.

In each confrontation, the North blamed the South. “It’s a sly conspiracy,” said the DPRK state-run news agency of South Korea’s role during Tuesday’s naval clash. But documentation of each incident tells another story. In the most recent confrontation, a North Korean patrol boat charged through a disputed sea border, ignored several warning shots from South Korean vessels, and then fired directly upon a South Korea patrol boat. North Korean vessels were also first to fire in the other two conflicts.

In what seems to be an effort to undercut Pyongyang’s rhetoric, both the United States and South Korea have attempted to downplay the event, noting that it would have no bearing on diplomatic plans. Within hours of the clash, South Korea’s government declared that inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges would be unaffected, while Secretary Clinton yesterday “urged calm” and noted that plans for Bosworth’s trip remain unchanged.

South Korean troops are now on high alert, anticipating possible retaliation after the superior South Korean navy sent Pyongyang’s patrol boat limping away in flames.

Behold the latest anti-“New START” talking point: the Russians are cheaters!  So alleged NoH BFF Sen. Jon Kyl in an October 19 speech on the Senate floor:

Finally, I will refer again to the issue of Russia’s multiple-warhead RS-24. In this case, it appears the Russians have cheated–if not in the letter of the START agreement, at least in its spirit–by converting one of their existing missiles, the TOPOL-M, to this new multiple-warhead variant.

However, if you look at the 2005 Section 403 Report, which is also known as the Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report, prepared by the State Department’s VCI Bureau, there are a litany of other outstanding issues regarding Russia’s failure to comply with START.

Let’s start with the RS-24.  

Russia has tested and developed a new, multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27 (known as the RS-24). However, START I would prohibit the RS-24 because it does not conform to the Treaty’s definition of a new type of missile. Since START I limits the SS-27 to a single warhead, a multiple-warhead version would violate the Treaty. Russia plans to begin deploying the missile in December 2009 to coincide with the expiration of START I. Russian officials argue that the RS-24 is central to maintaining the credibility of the Russia deterrent, in part because it will be able to penetrate U.S. ballistic missiles defenses.

First, provided that Russia does not deploy the RS-24 while START I is still in force, it is not technically a violation.  Kyl does have a point, however, in noting that Russia’s pursuit of the RS-24 may contravene the spirit of START I. According to Pavel Podvig, though Russia has tested the RS-24 with more than one warhead, it has been exploiting a technicality whereby it can declare the missile a “prototype” until it has been flight tested 20 times.  So long as the missile remains a prototype, Russia does not have to attribute any warheads to it.  In any event, New START is likely to amend START I to allow for the deployment of the RS-24.  

Second, the Bush administration did not make an issue out of Russia’s development of the RS-24, perhaps because it never really had any desire to extend START I in the first place.  As former Bush administration official Ambassador Linton Brooks noted recently, “The fact that the Secretary of Defense in the last administration said both publically and privately that we didn’t care [about the RS-24] may have suggested to them [the Russians] that it was ok….We had a long time…to call them on that and we as a government chose not to.”

Regarding alleged Russian compliance violations, the 2005 report cited by Kyl states that “a significant number of longstanding compliance issues that have been raised in the START Treaty’s Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) remain unresolved.”    

While Congress is supposed to receive a compliance report every year, VCI, which during the Bush administration was led by Paula DeSutter, completed only two from 2001-2009, the first in June 2003 and the second (and last) in August 2005.  The 2005 report contained far more detail about Russian implementation of START I than previous reports, claiming, among other things, that Russia was not allowing the U.S. to effectively monitor and verify some Russian warheads and missiles.  

Yet Russia has also raised unresolved issues pertaining to its inability to verify the number of warheads on U.S. Trident II missiles.  Compliance concerns on both sides have existed for some time, which is precisely why the JCIC exists.

As Arms Control Today observed at the time, the 2005 report “contrasts sharply with the Bush administration’s casual verification approach to its May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. The administration did not negotiate any verification measures for the treaty because it claimed to have confidence that Moscow would limit its warheads by the treaty’s terms.”  It’s telling that some of the same conservatives who supported the SORT approach are now accusing the Obama administration of being weak on verification.

Fortunately, there is at least one Republican Senator who understands that some relatively minor questions – in the grand scheme of things – about compliance with START I should not be used as a cudgel with which to beat the Russians (and the Obama administration).  In a Senate floor speech delivered yesterday, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) had this to say about alleged Russian cheating:

Some skeptics have pointed out that Russia may not be in total compliance with its obligations under START.  Others have expressed opposition to the START Treaty on the basis that no arms control agreement is 100-percent verifiable.  But such concerns fail to appreciate how much information is provided through the exchange of data mandated by the Treaty, on-site inspections, and national technical means.  Our experiences over many years have proven the effectiveness of the Treaty’s verification provisions and served to build a basis for confidence between the two countries when doubts arose.  The bottom line is that the United States is far safer as a result of those 600 START inspections than we would be without them.

Right on!