“There is little connection between the fighting and dying being done by our young men and women in Afghanistan’s valleys, farmlands and cities and keeping our nation safe from a terrorist attack,”

-Rep. James McGovern (D- MA) and Matthew Hoh, “Change course in Afghanistan,” The Worcester Daily Gazette, 7/20/11

Rep. McGovern, a Massachusetts Representative, and Matthew Hoh, former Marine Corps Captain and State Department official in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a board member of the Council for a Livable World, describe President Obama’s strategy to withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by summer 2012 as “insufficient.”  The 18-month plan does not reflect the domestic debt crisis or U.S. goals and capabilities in Afghanistan.

McGovern and Hoh make the case that U.S. national security is intertwined with economic security, and, therefore, the strategy is not responsible or realistic.  Though Congress is embroiled in a battle over cutting spending, the government continues to borrow nearly $10 billion a month to pay for the war, adding to the debt.  “Where is the sense in borrowing money to build a bridge or school in Afghanistan that later gets blown up – while telling our cities and towns that we have no money to help them with their needs?”  Though development efforts in Afghanistan are worthy, at what cost to U.S. lives and economic or national security?

The U.S. invaded Afghanistan to ensure that the Taliban would no longer provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda.  Today, Al-Qaeda has been almost entirely uprooted from Afghanistan, and the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden proved that neither 100,000 nor 70,000 troops are necessary to weaken the organization.  After 2012, roughly 70,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan (with gradual withdrawal) and will continue to fight for a mission they have already completed.  

Beyond the original aim, the U.S. has undertaken social, political and economic development to attempt to leave Afghanistan with peace, a functional government and human rights protections.  However, many Afghanistan experts have argued that the only solution is political.  The President should be encouraging a negotiated settlement and bringing the troops home now, McGovern and Hoh write.  Despite high hopes, the U.S. military cannot “advance the cause of peace, protect the rights of women and ethnic minorities, or strengthen civil society,” and they will lose their lives trying.  

There is no space for compromise or a middle course, and no more time to debate this issue, the writers maintain. This spring was the deadliest spring in the ten years that the U.S. has been in Afghanistan.  “We don’t need to wait 18 more months to change course. We need to do it now.”

By John Isaacs and Matthew Reichert

Am I an isolationist if . . .

I support key international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank that facilitate international economic cooperation and engineer collective action?

I feel safer knowing that the bilateral New START treaty with Russia reduces the global threat of nuclear weapons, and I believe that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a key element in containing the spread of nuclear weapons?

I back the Asian security alliances with Japan and South Korea?

I believe in free-trade agreements that assist American prosperity?

I deem the U.S.-China trade relationship essential to American and worldwide economic stability?

I strongly endorse the democratic movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere?

I support a reset of relations with Russia to ensure cooperation on a number of issues?

I hope that the United States undergirds European Union efforts to solve the economic challenges of debt-laden countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal?

I back United States and international efforts to negotiate with Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear weapons programs?

I urgently endorse persistent American efforts to ensure a safe, secure Israel existing alongside a free and independent Palestine?

But . . .

I am unwilling to sacrifice American lives to spread freedom and engage in state-building in far away lands where American security is not clearly at stake.

The answer is a clear-cut no . . . but the neo-cons are manipulating the debate over U.S. troops in Afghanistan and around Libya.

Too many neo-conservative leaders, Republican candidates, and reporters are tossing around the epithet “isolationist” to falsely characterize those who do not continue to support the indefinite presence of tens of thousands of American troops in Afghanistan, or who question the application of U.S. military force in Libya.

Part of the debate among Republicans emanates from the G.O.P. nomination race that has revealed a deepening schism in the Republican Party over the direction of American foreign policy and our willingness to employ military power to shape world events. The old doctrine that American military superiority should be utilized proactively to prevent the rise of a regional competitor, to preemptively strike against potential threats, and to implant freedom and democracy around the globe, is fading from the Republican mainstream.

Unfortunately, the shrinking militant interventionist wing of the party, mostly comprised from the old guard of neo-conservatism and led by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), seeks to adulterate the new discussion of pragmatic military non-interventionism in the G.O.P. with the label of “isolationism.”

The term “isolationism” has historically described a doctrine that repudiates not only military intervention abroad but international alliances and institutions, and foreign economic commitments.

It is clear that the McCain-Graham characterization confuses a temperate perspective of pragmatic military non-interventionism with the radically inward-turning doctrine of isolationism that reached its high point between World Wars One and Two.

Unfortunately, this misrepresentation has entered the mainstream, where its careless use by reporters and candidates threatens to undermine a prudent and timely discussion of the limits of American power.

A more accurate understanding of the “isolationist” doctrine is necessary to prevent a narrow group of militant interventionists from falsely redefining the foreign policy conversation. The misused term “isolationism” should be relabeled as foreign policy pragmatism.

On the land-based deterrent, my sense right now, that’s the last one to be recapitalized. The challenge here is that we have to recapitalize all three legs and we don?t have the money to do it. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James C…

Center intern Emma Lecavalier and I took to the pages of the Bulletin last week to opine on the future of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The piece uses former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ recent speech in Brussels criticizing NATO members for not bearing a greater share of the Alliance defense burden as a pivot to question the logic and feasibility of continuing the European deployment.  

You can read the full piece at the Bulletin’s website.  Here’s a teaser:

US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe provide a capability for a threat that no longer exists at a financial and opportunity cost that can no longer be justified.

The original rationale for deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. This threat disappeared when the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s. In fact, the continued storage of tactical nuclear weapons at multiple bases in Europe increases the risk that they could be targeted for theft or sabotage by terrorists. The presence of these weapons also provides Russia with a convenient excuse to refuse to talk about its enormous non-strategic arsenal.

…

The longer NATO puts off a collective decision about removing tactical nuclear weapons, the greater the odds that financial and political realities in Europe could force changes to alliance nuclear policy under circumstances not of its own choosing. For example, if the German parliament decides not to fund a nuclear capability for the Eurofighter — a distinct possibility given the current economic climate — the other host nations will find it difficult to pursue their own modernization programs. This could lead to a situation where the weapons are removed in a disorganized fashion, undermining alliance cohesion and effectiveness.

As is often the case with op-eds/articles a few things got left on the cutting room floor. Expect two areas in particular to receive future attention on the blog…

The Baltic States. A colleague recently pointed out to me that while the new members of NATO (in particular the Baltic states) are the strongest defenders of NATO’s nuclear status quo and claim to feel the most threatened by the Russians, they all spend less than the Alliance’s recommended level of 2% of GDP spending on defense.  These states are some of the worst examples of the phenomenon Gates was railing against, as the Economist recently highlighted.  Talk about burden sharing being out of whack.  

This isn’t to say the concerns raised by new members are all unfounded.  As one senior Alliance official put it last year to Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn:

It is not that we think the Baltic concerns are unreasonable. It’s that we think there are better ways of dealing with them than the deployment of gravity bombs on short range aircraft – ways that will leave us all feeling more secure.

Russian Reciprocity. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept document states:

In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

Whether one views this as a recipe for inaction or a potential blueprint for the ultimate removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe depends in large part on how one defines “our aim” and “take into account”.  I tend to view it as a recipe for inaction.  I hope I’m wrong.

Including Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons in the next round of arms control negotiations with Moscow is a good goal, but the U.S. weapons deployed in Europe are a useless bargaining chip, since Russia retains tactical nuclear weapons primarily to make up for its conventional weakness.  

In other words, when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. and NATO shouldn’t make changes to Alliance nuclear posture contingent on reciprocity from Moscow, which is unlikely to be forthcoming.  

Doing so would legitimize Russian concerns about NATO and give Russia undue influence over NATO’s decisionmaking.  Instead the Alliance should make a collective decision based on its own security needs, as was the case in 1991 when President George H.W. Bush unilaterally reduced the number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which led the Soviet Union to take similar steps, dramatically increasing U.S. security.  

And as Emma and I write, this would also ensure that the host nations for U.S. nuclear weapons will not have to make costly and politically divisive decisions about upgrading their dual-capable nuclear aircraft, which could force the weapons out of Europe in a manner that undermines alliance cohesion and unity.

Despite the blistering heat, Leon Panetta was jovial and informal as he addressed troops, U.S. officials and reporters in Afghanistan in his first trip as Secretary of Defense. He was too casual, immediately sending his spokesperson, Doug Wilson, into clean-up mode.

Panetta announced to reporters that the U.S. would keep 70,000 troops in Afghanistan until the end of 2014 .  “And obviously, as we get to 2014, we’ll develop a plan as to how we reduce that force at that time. For at least the next two years, we’re going to have a pretty significant force in place to try to deal with the challenges we face,” he said.  

However, President Obama said in his speech on July 22, 2011 that after recalling 33,000 troops by summer 2012, “our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead.  By 2014, this process of transition will be complete…”  Though the President did not define “steady pace,” Panetta clearly contradicted the President by saying that troops would be there until the end of 2014.  When reporters questioned him, he repeated his timeline, not understanding their confusion.

Spokesman Wilson sprang into action, to explain that Panetta misspoke and was “not here making new policy.”  However, Wilson and aides might also have been quick to correct Panetta because he exposed the Pentagon’s continued preference for high troop levels in Afghanistan.  

Deciding when and how many troops to recall was a significant debate between the Pentagon-White House.  Before the decision, General David Petraeus, until recently the top commander in Afghanistan, urged the President to limit withdrawal to no more than 3,000 to 5,000 troops over the next eighteen months. After the decision, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, told the House Armed Services Committee that the proposed pace and number were “more aggressive and incur more risk than [he] was originally prepared to accept.”  According to an unnamed U.S. official, Secretary Gates had to broker the agreement between the military leadership and the President.  

Perhaps Panetta’s mistake was that unlike Gates, he was too open.  Panetta revealed that the Pentagon was still challenging the President’s policy.

Intent is hard to discern, but the U.S. cannot afford to have the Pentagon and military leadership undermine the drawdown effort.  To paraphrase Council for a Livable World board member, former Senior Civil Officer in Afghanistan and Marine in Iraq, Matthew Hoh, the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is fueling the insurgency and Americans are dying in another’s civil war.  

70,000 men and women holding on until 2014 is simply not tenable.