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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

November 11, 2010

The Republican Policy Committee Memo on New START

Last Friday, the Senate Republican Policy Committee (RPC) sent a memo to Republican foreign and defense policy staff with the message that “it cannot be the case that the time is now for the Senate to vote on New START.”  The RPC’s latest stale offering is a response to the Obama administration’s drive to secure Senate approval of the treaty before the end of the year.

Kelsey Hartigan over at NSN has a nice takedown of the memo, as does Max Bergmann at the Wonk Room.  As Kelsey notes, the RPC conveniently ignores the enormous support for the treaty from our military and retired Republican officials.  Indeed, one has to wonder why the Republicans are acting so anti-military.

What’s also revealing is that the RPC concedes that the substantive case against New START is largely baseless.  For example, note the following statements from the memo:

“Although the treaty may very well preserve the ability of the United States to modernize its nuclear forces…”

“The [State Department’s] fact sheet then asserts that the treaty provides no constraints on deploying conventional prompt global strike capabilities. This does not answer the question of whether the Administration is committed to developing those capabilities.”

“[T]he [State Department’s] fact sheet asserts that the treaty provides no constraints on deploying the most effective missile defenses possible. Like other statements made in this section of the fact sheet, it may be a true statement…”

The only actual substantive concern the RPC can come up with is on the issue of verification.  The memo refers to classified objections raised by Intelligence Committee ranking member Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO), some of which the Senator articulated in a recent appearance on Frank Gaffney’s “Secure Freedom Radio.”  The concerns are nothing new: New START drops START I’s requirement that both the U.S. and Russia exchange telemetry data from long-range missile tests; New START drops onsite monitoring of Russian missiles “coming out of the gate” at the Votkinsk missile production plant; Russia has a history of cheating on past arms control agreements; etc.

Of course what the RPC memo doesn’t tell you is that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified that “a key contribution of this treaty [New START] is its provision for a strong verification regime.”  Gates also noted that “we don’t need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty.”  The same goes for Votkinsk.  The memo also fails to mention that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen declared that he is “very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now.” Mullen has also pointed out that under New START “there are almost twice as many inspections per facility, per year than under the previous treaty.”  Re: allegations of Russian cheating, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) noted last year: “Our experiences over many years have proven the effectiveness of the [START I] Treaty’s verification provisions and served to build a basis for confidence between the two countries when doubts arose.”

The reality is that New START contains an updated set of data exchange and monitoring provisions that are more than adequate to verify Russia’s compliance with the treaty.  And let’s not forget:  We’ve had no on-site monitoring presence in Russia since START I expired last December.  If New START is not ratified we will continue to lack an essential window into the size and makeup of Russia’s arsenal.  Critics would do well not to confuse a different verification regime for a weak verification regime.  

In sum, the RPC admits that the treaty does not limit our ability to modernize our forces, does not prohibit the U.S. from deploying conventional prompt global strike capabilities, and does not contain meaningful constraints on missile defense.  And it raises concerns about verification that have been debunked over and over again.  

All the more reason, then, for the RPC to dispense with its senseless and politically motivated calls for indefinite delay and further concessions on issues peripheral to the treaty. It’s long past time for Republican Senators to support New START.  Not only would doing so demonstrate responsible leadership, but further delay or defeat of the treaty could blow back up in the GOP’s face (see here, for example).  As Robert Kagan put it in an op-ed aimed at his fellow Republicans in yesterday’s Washington Post, the GOP has very little to lose if it supports the treaty, but very much to lose if it rejects the treaty. 

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

November 9, 2010

Add Another Name to the List

DoD Buzz reports today that Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz (the man in charge of protecting, arming and delivering the Air Force’s share of nuclear weapons) can be added to the large list of experts and military personnel who support the New START Treaty.

“My sense is that the START Treaty ought to be ratified and ought to be ratified as soon as possible,” Klotz told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast this morning.  

And on the claim that the Warren Air Force base mishap marks “one of the most serious and sizable ruptures in nuclear command and control in history?”  Klotz essentially yelled “bullshit”:

Here is how Klotz described it.  He said the missile crews “…temporarily lost the ability to monitor the status of 50 missiles…” The problem was caused by an “equipment malfunction in one of the silos.” Once the crews had gone through their checklist and isolated the problem they were able to fix it. Klotz told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast today that this is not the first time such incidents had occurred. “I think it has absolutely no link at all to the START Treaty,” he said. Two “similar events” took place in 1998, he added. Senior Air Force leaders have been at pains to make clear that the US retained the ability to launch the missiles and never lost command and control between the silos and the national command authority.

Of course, you can bet that the Heritage Foundation will dismiss Klotz’ remarks as just another instance of a General toeing the Administration’s line.  Don’t listen to them.  As Travis noted a while back:

The fact is that numerous military leaders have affirmed that the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons initiatives were developed through close cooperation between civilian and military officials. Nothing was imposed on anyone….Military officials have endorsed New START because they were involved in its creation and believe in its substance. To assert otherwise is to question their integrity.

Update 11/10/10: That’s not all Klotz said. Cheryl Pellerin with the Armed Forces Press Service reports further:

“The secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of [U.S.] Strategic Command and virtually every former commander of Strategic Command have very cogent and compelling arguments in favor of ratifying the treaty,” he said.

Klotz, who has been working in arms control and arms control policy since the mid-1970s, said such a treaty facilitates important communication between the two largest nuclear powers.

“It’s critically important that the United States and Russia … have a continuous dialog on issues related to nuclear policy, including such areas as security, safety and command and control,” he said.

“This type of interaction in which the arms control treaties are the centerpiece, the nexus around which all that takes place, are critically important for understanding, for transparency and for openness between the two largest nuclear powers,” the general added.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

November 3, 2010

A new start for New START?

There’s been a lot of good opining around the blogosphere today about how it’s important for the Senate to get serious on New START now that the midterm elections are behind us.  Actually, it was important before the midterms too, but such is life – Senate life in 2010, that is.  Here’s a sampling:

Via the State Department: The New START Treaty: It’s Time for the Senate to Vote
Highlight: “Prepared and Ready. The Senate has been provided extensive information – 18 hearings, dozens of briefings and meetings, answers to over 900 questions for the
record, and hundreds of pages of reports, analysis and testimony.”

Via the Council for a Livable Word: Council for a Livable World’s 2010 Senate Election Analysis
Highlight: “We hope that in the next coming weeks, the Senate will give its advice and consent to the New START nuclear reductions treaty. That would be one way to advance American national security interests in what will be a significantly difficult political environment.”

Via the Union of Concerned Scientists: New Senate, New START on Track
Highlight: “Yesterday’s election results do not alter the chances for the Senate to provide its advice and consent to the New START arms control agreement. In fact, the treaty provides an excellent test case for whether the Senate will listen to the small minority of “anti-any treaty” arms control opponents, or to the overwhelming advice of the country’s military leadership and intelligence community in favor of New START. It should be a no-brainer.”

Via the Arms Control Association: New START After the Mid-Term Election
Highlight: “Senate leaders now need to put a tough campaign behind them and put U.S. national security first by acting to approve New START this year and not delaying it until next year.”

Via Laura Rozen: Kerry urges START ratification by end of year
Highlight: “It will take a week or so to sort out the pieces, but prospects for Senate approval of the New START treaty still look good,” said arms control proponent Joe Cirincione of the Plougshares Fund. “This could be the first real test of whether the Republican Party is willing to govern responsibly.”

So will it happen before the end of the year?  To borrow a famous phrase: It’s too soon to tell.  

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

November 2, 2010

Patience with Iran

As a part of their newest roundtable discussion, which happens to be on Iran, Gen. Gard and I have a piece in the latest edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  The piece addresses recent “rhetoric suggesting that the United States, Isr…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

November 1, 2010

Ted Sorensen and "A Strategy of Peace"

Ted Sorensen, aid and speechwriter to President John F. Kennedy and a powerful advocate of nuclear threat reduction, died yesterday.  I still recall the first time I read “A Strategy of Peace,” (I was a junior in college) which President Kennedy d…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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