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Cartwright on New START Reductions

Regular readers of NoH know that I’ve been on a mini-crusade of sorts to push back against the argument that the launcher and deployed delivery vehicle limits in New START are based on a misguided ideological predilection for arms reduction rather than sound military and strategic analysis (see here, here, and here).  

One of the arguments made by critics such as Keith Payne and Sen. John Thune (R-SD) is that New START requires a lower limit on deployed U.S. delivery vehicles than was suggested last summer by some Department of Defense officials.  Specifically, Payne and Thune pointed to testimony from Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright in July 2009 that he would be “very concerned” if the number of strategic delivery vehicles dropped below 800 (note that the limit in New START is 700).

Thanks to the treasure trove of additional documents contained in the recently released Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the New START treaty, we now know that in early September Gen. Cartwright clarified his position in a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee.  The text of the letter can be read here.

In sum, Gen. Cartwright concludes that “the treaty limitation of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles imposed by New START provides a sound framework for maintaining stability and allows us to maintain a strong and credible deterrent that ensures our national security while moving to lower levels of strategic nuclear forces.”  Had he known the outcome of the New START negotiations at the time of his July 2009 statement, he would have sang a different tune.

P.S. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report on New START is an incredibly valuable and exhaustive document that should be required reading for both experts and novices alike, despite a stupefying minority view from Senators Barrasso, Wicker, Inhofe, Risch, and DeMint.

P.P.S.: Another noteworthy nugget from the report is a letter from Vice Presdient Biden to the Committee dated September 15 (the day before the Committee voted on the treaty) promising to update the administration’s 1251 report, which already provides for $80 billion dollars over ten years to sustain our weapons and their supporting infrastructure. Writes Biden:

Out-year budgets are, by definition, projections built on assumptions. NNSA has used the time since the Spring to – when the NPR and New START were concluded – to work on updating initial assumptions. We now have a more complete understanding of stockpile requirments, including the life extension program needs. Similarly, the designs of key facilities such as the Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemical and Mettalurgy Research Replacement Facility have progressed. Based on information learned since the submission of the President’s FY2011 budget and the report under Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010, we expect that funding requirements will increase in future budget years.

Later this fall, the administration will provide the Congress with information that updates the Section 1251 report. At that time, and in our future budgets, we will address any deficiencies in the Future Years Nuclear Security Program. We are also prepared to brief the oversight committies and interested Senators as these programs progress, so that Congress can have full visibility into the program and confidence into our processes.

In other words, even more money looks to be on the way; waaaaay more than enough money. Stay tuned. Clearly the administration’s commitment to maintaining our nuclear weapons isn’t in doubt. Unfortunately the same can’t yet be said of the GOP’s commitment to New START.

WV Candidate Channels Dr. Evil

West Virginia’s Republican nominee for Senate, John Raese, recommended Tuesday that the US put 1,000 lasers into space.  

We shall call it the “Alan Parsons Project”…

But seriously – according to Raese, “We are sitting with the only technology in the world that works and it’s laser technology. We need 1,000 laser systems put in the sky and we need it right now. That is [of] paramount importance.”

The only logical explanation anyone can come up with for Raese’s claim is that he could be talking about a program that is decades from development and a few major treaties down the road… and we all know how easy those are to get passed, right?

Riki Ellison, the chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said that Raese appeared to be referring to DPALs (diode pumped alkali lasers), which have shown great promise in the field of missile defense but – at least at current funding levels for the development of such programs – could take two decades to develop. He said that the development of DPAL technology would be accelerated by Raese’s proposed budget infusion (the Obama administration recently reduced funding for the Missile Defense Agency). But, he added, deploying that technology in space would require the negotiation of a treaty among world powers.

“That’s a significant policy challenge,” Ellison said.

The idea of space based missile defense is nothing new, but Raese’s understanding of the subject seems to be a little lacking – particularly his very specific pronouncement that the program he speaks of would cost only $20 billion.  With this project so  far from completion, nobody can know what price tag a system like DPALs could eventually rack up.

Speaking of DPALs, George Herbert Walker Bush promulgated a close relative of this program called GPALS, or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. It never was deployed.

Maybe Raese is confused with Bush the father’s 1,000 points of light program (don’t ask).

T-Sharp on Fiscal Mayhem

The mess that is the appropriations process in Congress right now has already been a topic of conversation here at NoH.  Bill Matthews has a nice summary of the situation and what it means in the Oct. 11 edition of Defense News.  I flag this piece for you because Travis makes an all-star appearance:

The same may be true if Republicans could win control of one or both houses of Congress. They may decide not to let legislation that the Democrats drafted pass this year because they will be in a position to rewrite in when the next Congress begins work in January, said Travis Sharp, a defense budget analyst at the Center for a New American Security.

In that case, the current continuing resolution would likely be extended.

Even if the Democrats retain control of the House and Senate, the Republicans have little incentive to yield to them on the defense bills.

“Presidential campaigning for 2012 begins in November, literally as soon as midterm elections are over,” Sharp said.

Republicans will be looking for issues they can use in the campaign, among them, maintaining the ban on gays in the military and blocking immigration reform.

Perhaps the most optimistic outcome would be “a more closely divided House and Senate,” Sharp said. “The impact for defense legislation is that you would see much cleaner authorization and appropriations bills.”

The reason: Members in both houses generally support the military and are generous about spending money on it. But the defense bills attract controversial and not necessarily germane amendments because the bills are considered “must pass” legislation. So measures that can’t pass on their own sometimes slip through as amendments to defense bills.

With more equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans, particularly in the Senate, there would be less chance of getting enough votes to pass controversial amendments, so fewer would be attached to the defense bills, Sharp said.

CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 182 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation benefits of the CTBT, it should come as no surprise that state parties to the NPT reaffirmed the vital importance of the treaty’s entry into force at the recent May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. But after fourteen years, how much longer will the world have to wait?

For the CTBT to enter into force, 44 “Annex 2” states are required to ratify it (i.e the states that participated in CTBT negotiations from 1994-1996 that possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time). After Indonesia recently announced its intention to ratify the CTBT soon, there remain just eight “Annex 2” states left to ratify the treaty before it can enter into force: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States of America. With some states linking their ratification process to that of the U.S and others hindered for alleged geopolitical reasons, achieving entry into force is a daunting challenge – a challenge that Jeffrey Lewis investigated recently for Vertic. The following state-by-state analysis of the main dynamics influencing ratification in the “Annex 2” explains why:

USA: The U.S. Senate took up the CTBT in 1999, where it was defeated by a wide margin. Opponents suggested the treaty is unverifiable and the U.S. nuclear deterrent cannot be maintained without testing. The George W. Bush administration made little effort to promote CTBT ratification, so it was good to hear Obama state in Prague that “my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”. Nevertheless, U.S ratification of the CTBT will not happen this year. This is because in May the Obama administration made it clear that it would hold off on pushing the CTBT until it secured START follow on ratification, which has yet to occur. In any event, securing the necessary 67 votes for CTBT ratification in the U.S. Senate will be difficult, but the case for the treaty has never been stronger. For those of you interested, Jeffrey Lewis has written an excellent summary of the challenges facing the Obama administration.in ratifying CTBT available here.

China: China is very likely to ratify the CTBT after the U.S does. Consequently, the prospects for any prompt Chinese ratification are directly tied to progress on the U.S front.

India and Pakistan: Both states need to sign the CTBT before they can consider it for ratification. The failure of the U.S ratification process in 1999 has given both countries justification for not signing the treaty to date. However, at the end of 2009 Indian president Manmohan Singh stated that U.S ratification of the CTBT would likely get the gears turning on a subsequent Indian ratification. Other observers have suggested that Chinese ratification of the CTBT would also enable India to fulfill a pledge it made to the United Nations 11 years ago- namely, that it would not be one of a handful of states to stand in the way of final entry into force. Pakistan has already said that it will sign the treaty once India does.

Egypt and Israel: Like Israel, Egypt has linked its approval of CTBT to securing a comprehensive Mideast peace, but as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement — the members of which have overwhelmingly approved the treaty — it could face it pressure to ratify soon. U.S ratification would also increase pressure on Egypt to ratify, given Egyptian reliance on U.S economic aid. While Egyptian and Israeli ratification is unlikely in the near term, the progress made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East was a necessary perquisite.

Iran: While Iran did sign the treaty in September 1996, it has outlined its objection to ratification as being based on the fact that it “considers that the Treaty does not meet nuclear disarmament criteria as originally intended.” As is the case with Egypt and Israel, Iran’s ratification will largely be determined by the security situation in the Middle East.

DPRK: With the DPRK pulling out of the NPT in 2003, testing nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, and quitting the Six Party Talks in 2009, it is hard to see when or even if the country is likely to sign and ratify the CTBT. A comprehensive peace treaty with the U.S and South Korea would likely contribute towards the impetus for DPRK ratification, but this seems a long way off.

In sum, it seems clear that U.S ratification of the CTBT could spur other states to sign and ratify the treaty. As such it should be pursued with great vigor by the Obama administration after New START is finally ratified. At the same time, there is no excuse for states like China and India to wait for U.S ratification. CTBT should be judged and ratified by each state on its merits. Indeed, it is in the interests of all states to ensure CTBT comes into force sooner rather than later, especially given the boost it would give to the NPT’s credibility and the non-proliferation regime in general. Furthermore, as has been pointed out by Acronym.org, the more states that ratify it now (both inside and outside of the Annex 2 list), the easier it will be to secure U.S. ratification when the treaty finally comes up again for Senate approval.

Although it seems unlikely that states such as Iran and North Korea will ratify the treaty any time soon, their incalcitrance should not prevent the U.S. from moving forward, particularly since it is already U.S. policy not to conduct nuclear explosive tests. As Kingston noted last year, “if nothing else, China is likely to ratify if the United States does, a development that would result in all five original nuclear powers becoming parties to the test ban. This would further strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, encourage other holdouts to ratify, and could activate a provisional entry into force of the treaty (along with the valuable verification and on-site inspection provisions that go with it).”

In short, it is critical that the CTBT enter into force – and soon.