By Laicie Heeley Over the past few weeks, pronouncements and threats concerning Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly worrisome. Inflammatory remarks by the US and Israel have elicited an equally inflammatory response from Iran, and the end result is anyone’s guess. The tension has been building for months, and recently some top American officials have […]
On CNN’s "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer"
Last night, I appeared on “The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer” in a segment with Pentagon Correspondent Chris Lawrence on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The piece covers recent remarks by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague that Iran has been carrying out covert tests of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload, as well as the YouTube “unveiling” of a secret Iranian missile silo.
Watch the piece here or on Wolf’s blog:
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions
A few big things have come out recently with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. While some were long awaited and highly anticipated, such as the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), none turned out to be particularly earth shattering.
A new NIE on Iran’s nuclear program will remain classified, but reportedly walks back the conclusions of the controversial 2007 NIE, which stated that Iran had ceased its nuclear weapons activities in 2003. Reports indicate that while Iran may not have made the ultimate decision to build a nuclear weapon, due to internal politics and external pressure, it is likely working on the components of such a device.
“We believe Iran is moving to the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability,” Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s senior adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, said at a briefing today. Due to the inefficient nature of Iran’s uranium enrichment technology, though, Einhorn says that “it would make no sense” for Iran to make the decision to build a nuclear weapon at this point.
Likewise, the most recent report (GOV/2011/7) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to express concern over the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, noting that some of these activities may have continued past 2004. According to the IAEA, Iran continues to deny a number of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including implementation of the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment and heavy water related activities; and “clarification of the remaining outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.”
Additionally, IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano reported Monday that Iran may have engaged in nuclear weaponization studies more recently than previously thought.
“Unfortunately, I cannot say a lot on this issue. But I can tell you that we have received information…” since the last board meeting in December, Amano said, “we have received some information raising further concerns.”
Tomorrow, Army Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee to deliver his assessment of world threats facing the US. His prepared statement, released today, suggests that any new news from the US is likely to be equally optimistic.
Iran’s Ex-Negotiator Presents Plan to Resolve US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate
Guest post by Alex Bollfrass
Below is a summary of remarks made on 2/24 at Princeton University by Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.
Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead negotiator from 2003 to 2005, presented his vision for a resolution to the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. In his first public statement since his 2007 arrest, Ambassador Mousavian laid out a plan for political and diplomatic engagement with Iran.
The ex-negotiator described a space for mutual agreement that would respect the US redline of Iranian nuclear weapons and Iran’s non-negotiable right to uranium enrichment.
Without straying far from the official Iranian position, he argued for direct bilateral and comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, while recommending the continued pursuit of P5+1 negotiations. The proper institutional setting, in his view, is the IAEA. The UN Security Council’s involvement and its punitive resolutions should be ended.
Mousavian emphasized that any solution would require the international recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment. Iran would also need the provision of security assurances not only from the United States, but regional countries, as well…
Inside Iranian decision-making
In his rhetorical warm-up, he hypothesized that if the shah had remained in power, Iran would today have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his view, the West “owes a debt of gratitude to the Islamic Republic” for its restraint on the nuclear front over the past 30 years.
He mourned the lost opportunity for an agreement during President Khatamei’s presidency, which the former negotiator blamed on the Bush administration’s hard line and the West’s misreading of Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment as a sign that it could be pushed to surrender its right to enrichments.
Mousavian identified Ayatollah Khomenei as the ultimate decision-maker on Iranian national security questions, and as having driven the harder line in Iran’s confrontation with the international community upon Ahmedinejad’s election. In a glimpse into the mode of operation in Iran’s government, the ambassador confessed that he had only learned of the Qom uranium enrichment when President Obama revealed it in September 2009 at the G8 meeting in Pittsburgh.
Mousavian’s Plan
In a review of the P5+1’s options, he described the counterproductive effects of military strikes for the entire region. Sanctions have also failed to prevent Iran from developing missile and nuclear technology, while serving the interests of Iranian hardliners. He also argued that the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facility and assassination of nuclear scientists only raised distrust among Iranians and strengthening the arguments for the development of a nuclear deterrent.
Only diplomacy, in his view, holds promise for a resolution. However, so far the Obama and Ahmedinejad administrations diplomatic attempts have yielded no results because neither has proposed a comprehensive solution.
Mousavian argued that the US should engage Iran directly beyond the nuclear issue and build trust through cooperation on Afghanistan. He saw the UN Security Council’s involvement as counterproductive, in particular its use of sanctions, and as an obstacle to resolution. Therefore, the Iranian issue should be taken off the Security Council’s agenda and placed within the IAEA.
The NPT would serve as the basic framework to guarantee Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons should be taken as an assurance. However, he underlined that Iran would accept no inspections or restrictions that went beyond what is required of other NPT signatories.
Under Mousavian’s plan, there would be two steps of the regional component of engagement. The first would be engagement with the Persian Gulf states. This framework would later be expanded to the broader Middle East in an effort to establish an OSCE-type regional organization. In a veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapon, Mousavian called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as part of this regional integration.
In response to a question about Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment despite its lack of reactors that could put this fuel to use, Mousavian cited Western and Russian abrogation of past agreements for the provision of nuclear technology and fuel.
Persona non grata in Iran
Following Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Mousavian was removed from his position on Iran’s negotiating team with the P5+1 and the IAEA. Two years later, the Iranian government arrested Mousavian on espionage charges. Despite most charges having been dropped, he received a commuted sentence and barred from serving in the diplomatic corps. Mousavian then left the country for the West.
He has been a fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security for a year and a half. In poor standing with the Iranian regime, he would likely face arrest if he returned.
Alex Bollfrass is the NoH Senior New Jersey correspondent and a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.
Experts Reject Zero Enrichment Push Ahead of Talks in Istanbul
As a new round of P5+1 talks with Iran are just getting underway in Istanbul, the following letter has been released by a group of experts including Columbia professor and former National Security Council staffer Gary Sick, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador John Limbert, and former British Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton. The letter urges the US to “reinvigorate diplomacy” by engaging with Iran more persistently, broadening the US-Iranian dialogue, and above all, setting realistic objectives. The group advocates that the US be prepared to recognize a peaceful Iranian enrichment program following the establishment of more effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, including the Additional Protocol.
Text is below and after the jump:
As the United States prepares for the upcoming round of multilateral talks with Iran, it is imperative that the Obama Administration reinvigorate its diplomacy by pursuing engagement with Tehran more persistently, setting realistic objectives, and broadening the US-Iranian dialogue. Diplomacy is the only sustainable means of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, avoiding the dangerous folly of military confrontation in the Middle East, and enabling progress in other critical areas of US interest, such as Afghanistan and the human rights situation within Iran.
Reinvigorating diplomacy means seeking to engage Iran more persistently. The upcoming Istanbul meeting is only the fourth meeting on the nuclear issue involving both the United States and Iran, and no breakthrough can be expected without additional talks. Fortunately, time exists to pursue a diplomatic solution. Both US and Israeli officials have made public statements recently acknowledging that Iran remains years away from having the capability to construct a nuclear weapon.
Reinvigorating diplomacy also means pursuing realistic objectives. Unrealistic outcomes, such as insisting that Iran cease uranium enrichment entirely, however desirable, must be set aside. Focus should instead be placed on establishing monitoring and verification mechanisms that can ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, indeed, used solely for peaceful purposes. Secretary Clinton stated in December that the United States would be prepared to recognize a peaceful enrichment program on Iranian soil. This is a productive step to achieve a satisfactory compromise for which the Administration should be commended.
Finally, reinvigorating diplomacy means addressing issues with Iran beyond the nuclear file. Tehran presents challenges and opportunities in many other areas of importance to US national security, including the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq, drug trafficking, and the human rights situation in Iran itself. The US should seek common ground in all areas of interest and not hold progress in one area hostage to resolution of others. Indeed, progress on human rights or Afghanistan may create a better climate for progress on the nuclear issue. The US engagement agenda must be expanded to reflect this.
Diplomacy with Iran will not be easy and no quick fixes should be expected. Iran must also negotiate in earnest and make the serious compromises necessary for resolution of the nuclear issue. The concerns of the IAEA, the P5+1, and the international community more broadly must be addressed by Iran on the basis of transparency and cooperation. Resolving decades of enmity between the US and Iran will require that both sides work to create openings for successful engagement.
Only reinvigorated diplomacy holds the promise of bridging the many divides between the US and Iran and achieving a sustainable solution that prevents a disastrous military confrontation, prevents an Iranian bomb and the additional proliferation that would follow, and protects the human rights of the Iranian people.
Barry Blechman, co-founder, the Stimson Center?
Professor Juan Cole, University of Michigan ?
Sir Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Former British Ambassador to Iran ?
Debra DeLee, President and CEO, Americans for Peace Now?
Jonathan W. Evans, Legislative Representative for Foreign Policy, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Professor Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii ?
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and President, Middle East Policy Council
Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (USA, Ret.) Chairman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Col. Sam Gardiner (USA, Ret.)?
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association ?
Amb. John Limbert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Firuzeh Mahmoudi, Executive Director, United4Iran?
Paul Kawika Martin, Policy Director, Peace Action ?
Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy?
Robert Naiman, Executive Director, Just Foreign Policy?
Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council?
Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Professor Paul Pillar, Georgetown University?
Jon Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West?
Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, Director, Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington Office?
Professor Gary Sick, Columbia University?
Professor John Tirman, Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for International Studies
