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Hearing Backfires for Iran Diplomacy Bulldozers Menendez and Corker

This was a bad week for adversaries of a comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear program.

During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Wednesday entitled “Dismantling Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Next Steps to Achieve a Comprehensive Deal,” Senators Bob Menendez and Bob Corker presented their respective legislative proposals in opposition to the P5+1 and Iran negotiations. Both bills threaten to undo any progress that’s been made in Vienna on a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program.  

Menendez and Corker had a hand in selecting expert witnesses for the hearing: Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute, Gary Samore, president of United Against Nuclear Iran and of Harvard’s Belfer Center, and David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Given past statements from all three, the deck should have been stacked in their favor. But things didn’t go according to plan.

Republican Senator Rand Paul expressed his optimism about the negotiations based off of Iran’s compliance with the interim deal to date.

“But to my mind [inspections of Iran’s nuclear program] would be better than no negotiations. It would be better than war with Iran. Once we have war with Iran there will be no more inspections. Once the first bomb drops, you’ll never have another inspection inside of Iran,” said Sen. Paul.

He also pressed Samore to concede that our allies would not support sanctions imposed unilaterally by Congress.

Panel

Menendez, for his part, would like to move “trigger sanctions” legislation that would automatically impose new sanctions on Iran in the event that the two sides can’t come to an agreement by March 2015. In the words of David Albright, however, this type of legislation is perceived “by the Iranians as putting a gun to their heads and leads them to put together I guess what I would call trigger advancements in their nuclear program…And so there’s worry about that, that the trigger sanctions could backfire.”

Albright suggests that if the U.S. plays its ace of harder economic sanctions, Iran will too. Smothering Iran with sanctions, then, could very well press it to renew its efforts to enrich uranium to a high enough level to build a bomb—the very last thing anyone interested in U.S. national security would want.

In July, Senators Corker and Graham sponsored a separate piece of legislation called the “Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014.” The bill, which would have forced the Senate to vote on a resolution of disapproval on any final deal with Iran, was ultimately scuttled by Congress. Responding to Corker’s bill, both Samore and Albright pointed to the disconnect between what the Administration and Congress view as the fundamentals of an acceptable deal.“As long as there’s such a divergence in terms of what would constitute an acceptable deal,” said Samore, “I think it’s difficult to come to an agreement on whether Congress should put itself in the position of approving an agreement.”

Of course Menendez, Corker and Graham aren’t the only ones on the Hill trying to derail nuclear negotiations.

At a roundtable discussion with reporters this week, Rep. Mike Pompeo belligerently said, “[in] an unclassified setting, it is under 2,000 sorties to destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task for the coalition forces.”

Senate-elect Tom Cotton added his own wild speculation to the mix, speaking on the possibility of Islamist extremists collaborating with Mexican drug cartels to cross the border. “They could collaborate on our southern border because it’s so porous and defenseless could easily be used by a terrorist to infiltrate and attack us,” he said.

Neither Pompeo nor Cotton backed their claims up with facts or rationale, but who needs those? Sen.-elect Cotton’s slippery attempt to tie in immigration to Islamic extremism speaks to a greater theme, a blatant Republican effort to stymie Obama’s potential foreign policy successes across the board. As James Carville points out in the The Hill this week, conservatives can’t stand the idea of a deal with Iran “because they know what Tessio says in ‘The Godfather’ is true, when he finds out Michael would be taking a different car: ‘Hell, he can’t do that; that screws up all my arrangements.’” If the Obama administration is able to strike a successful, verifiable deal (which is still no guarantee) the implications for 2016 could be huge.

A Congressional roadblock is not inevitable, however. Speaking at an event on the Iran negotiations at Brookings, Center advisory board member Ed Levine suggested Congress may be able to draft a sanctions bill tailored to the specifics of what the P5+1 is offering at the negotiating table. This would trigger sanctions only if Iran doesn’t sign on.  As it appears, Congress has room to redeem itself. But Ed points out, “That would be a very difficult piece of legislation for Congress because it would involve giving up on more maximalist goals.”

Ultimately, both sides of the debate want the same thing: to stop Iran from getting the bomb. Military action against Iran, as Sen.-elect Cotton suggests, is an irresponsible policy suggestion. Not only because the issue can (and hopefully will) be solved through diplomacy, but a unilateral attack would quickly snowball into yet another war in the Middle East. And additional sanctions, as evidenced by comments from both Samore and Albright, would likely not have the intended consequence of bettering our hand at the table. As much as Congress would like to intervene, or just hates the fact on its face, the most promise for success lies in ongoing negotiations.

Right now, it might be best for the rest of us to sit back and let the folks at the table do their jobs.

The Disillusioned Babysitters of America’s Nuclear Weapons

Ever wonder what it would be like to hold the key to America’s most lethal weapons in your hand? According to a recent expose by Mother Jones, the job is less exciting than one might think.

The U.S. currently maintains some 4,800 nuclear warheads and 454 Intercontinental ballistic missile silos across the country. Josh Harkinson of Mother Jones recently visited the 10th Missile Squadron, Alpha Missile Alert Facility in central Montana to catch a glimpse of the life of the men in charge of the nuclear launch keys.

For a job with such gravity, the day-to-day grind is exceptionally boring. Harkinson writes, “[the] worst part of the gig, the guys agreed, might be the stultifying tedium of being stuck in a tiny room all day and night waiting for an order you knew would never come.” Obsolescence and low morale run rampant among missileers.

This is why Secretary Hagel’s announcement today is welcome, but not a fix for the more important problem at hand. Yes much of the U.S. nuclear fleet is out of date, but so is its cause.

While the ICBM program ostensibly exists to deter our nuclear-armed adversaries abroad, according to Lt. General James Kowalski, the real nuclear threat for America today is not Russia or North Korea, but “an accident. The greatest risk to my force is doing something stupid.”

According to Eric Schlosser, author of Command and Control, “you can’t screw up once—and that’s the unique danger of these machines.” Having a flawless safety record is imperative; but “nuclear bases that were once the military’s crown jewels are now ‘little orphanages that get scraps for dinner”’.

Harkinson sheds light on the fact that the dangers of maintaining the ICBM program outweigh its purpose as a viable deterrent–not to mention how expensive it is: “ditching the ICBMs would save taxpayers $14 billion over the next 10 years.”

Ultimately, the fewer nuclear weapons we maintain, the less risk for nuclear disaster. Scrapping the ICBM program would be a good start.

Obama’s Mixed Bag on Nuclear Weapons

By Angela Canterbury and Sarah Tully

President Obama has long talked the talk of reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons, but the administration has been slow to walk the walk in terms of nuclear weapons reductions in recent years.

A recent study by Federation of American Scientists pointed out that in terms of number of stockpiled warheads and percentage of reduction, Obama has done less than all other post-cold war presidents.

President George W. Bush reduced the U.S. nuclear stockpile by 50% during his tenure in office, surprisingly, qualifying him for the prize of greatest nuclear disarmer by percentage since 1945. President Bush senior claims second prize with 41% reduction. President Eisenhower had the greatest escalation of all time with an increase of 2,117%, although the times were certainly different back then and the United States was starting from a small stockpile. Meanwhile, President Obama has retired 507 warheads or a 10% reduction of the total stockpile.

However, it’s important to put these numbers into context.

Throughout his presidency, Obama has reduced our nuclear weapons stockpile each year. While stockpile numbers diminished more drastically under President Clinton and President Bush, President Obama took on the job when the stockpile was the smallest in decades. For instance, President Bush reduced the nuclear weapons stockpile by 5,304; which is 654 more nukes than the total of 4,650 nuclear weapons the U.S. has today.

The Obama administration got a strong start on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. In his 2009 foreign policy address in Prague president Obama spoke of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” In 2011, he secured the historic New START Treaty with Russia which necessitates significant nuclear weapons stockpile reductions on both sides and calls for more rigorous verification and inspection protocols.

The three Nuclear Security Summits initiated by President Obama helped to focus world attention on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. According to a New York Times editorial, “[s]ince Mr. Obama took office, he has pushed the international community to improve nuclear security.  The result is that 14 countries have eliminated their nuclear materials stockpiles and 15 others removed or disposed of portions of theirs.”

It is also looking more and more (fingers crossed) like the U.S. and its negotiating partners, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Germany collectively known as P5+1, are close to a historic deal with Iran to prevent it from getting a nuclear bomb.

He’s certainly done well. Just not quite as well as advocates of reducing nuclear weapons stockpile size and importance would have hoped.

For one, Obama’s record on investing in nuclear non-proliferation programs hasn’t been great as of late. According to a July 2014 analysis of the Obama administration’s security spending out of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the administration chose to cut the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) non-proliferation programs by $399 million and increase spending for weapons activities by $534 million. This was the second straight year of reductions in the U.S. non-proliferation budget.

And this reduction in spending to rein-in nuclear weapons has been met by an increase in spending on nuclear weapons.

In order to get the go-ahead from opponents in Congress on the New START Treaty with Russia, Obama agreed to spend $84 billion in nuclear weapons modernization over the next decade, a number the Congressional Budget Office estimates will likely come in at $355 billion with others estimating $1 trillion over 30 years. This is unnecessary spending on modernization that isn’t needed to meet today’s threats.

Nevertheless, the President did try again for nuclear reduction in 2013. But Vladimir Putin, President of the only country besides the U.S. with thousands of nuclear weapons, rejected Obama’s 2013 proposal to cut Russian and U.S. deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the 1,550 agreed upon in New START, down to 1,000.

But the deal hasn’t been sealed yet. Ultimately, the President’s legacy on nuclear issues depends on what gets done over his last two years in office.

The President still has a chance to make strides on the nuclear front. Both Russia and the U.S. have to cut their deployed nukes stockpile to 1,550 by 2018 under the New START accord. Obama could accelerate those reductions in the next two years without waiting for 2018. He could also scrap some of the expensive and arguably unnecessary modernization plans like fitting the F-35 for a nuclear weapon and building a new generation of land-based missiles.  

Those of us who are working to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons are eager to see Obama do more and fulfill his Prague promise.

Window of Opportunity to Change U.S. Nuclear Spending Trajectory

You might not have noticed, but the U.S.’ plans to replace our aging nuclear weapons triad have been in the news a lot lately. Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget. The issue has prompted a demand for Obama to explain his shift from the inspiring Prague speech in 2009 to a long list of expensive nuclear modernization plans.

And some major voices have gotten into the mix. Defense One published an article from the Council on Foreign Relations recently that offers a summary of the current modernization plans, the debate surrounding them, and the emerging solution suggested by a growing number of nonproliferation advocates.

Some key points:

•    Current plan could cost up to $1 trillion in the next three decades.
•    Deterrence does not require a constantly growing arsenal.
•    Unfortunately all three legs (Air, Land and Sea) are planned for modernization around the same time.
•    The Ohio-Class submarine replacement program is expected to soar to over 50% of the Navy’s total budget in the coming 30 years, edging out other programs.  
•    The Air Force foresaw the probable consequence of replacing the Minuteman III Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and opted to use existing technology to modernize the current fleet instead.
•    There are a growing number of calls from within and outside the government for a re-assessed plan that takes current budget constraints into account.
•    This is a window of opportunity for President Obama to redirect our nuclear spending.

More details

Feeling the pressure, the White House is reviewing the current approach. The plan below claims to reduce spending while maintaining the existing defense structure (previous suggestions included the elimination of one of the three legs).

The chart below summarizes the article’s discussion including the systems slated for modernization, the estimated year of retirement, the current plan, estimated cost, and the proposed solution.

some text

(Based on Defense One/ CFR article)

The above chart doesn’t include many of the other areas “up for modernization” including: nuclear warhead life-extension programs; the production of a warhead that would work for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles; and upgrading Energy and Defense Department systems that all add to growing costs.

While it seems difficult to implement change, the article highlights this information as a pivotal opportunity for the Obama administration. Making a responsible adjustment to current plans would allow the President to maintain the current structure, save money, and leave office with the legacy of moving towards a reduction in our reliance on nuclear weapons.

With important nonproliferation conferences ahead, including the 2015 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty in New York, these decisions hold extra weight; if my NPT simulation course at the Monterey Institute taught me anything, it’s that U.S. nonproliferation actions (positive or negative) will drive the direction of negotiations.

Panetta’s Loose Words Warrant Washing His Mouth Out With Soap

This month, former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta – he of minimal loyalty to his bosses — published his memoir “Worthy Fights,” in which he criticizes Obama’s national security strategies and in particular how the administration has dealt with Iraq and Syria.  

In his book, Panetta decries the “Red line” debacle of 2012 when President Obama said that the use of chemical weapons in Syria was a “red line for us.” Panetta suggests that Obama’s failure to enforce the red line, when chemical weapons really were used a year later, undermined U.S. credibility amongst Syrians and the rest of the world.

Ironically, Panetta’s book makes a serious semantic blunder of its own when Northeast Asian news outlets took a keen interest in this sentence:

“If North Korea moved across the border, our war plans called for the senior American general on the peninsula to take command of all U.S. and South Korean forces and defend south Korea – including by the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary.”

The sentence garnered attention from South Korean media and even prompted a response from Pyongyang, which promised to bolster their nuclear deterrent to counter the U.S. policies toward North Korea.

World order hanging in the balance of your every word is pretty difficult, isn’t it, Mr. Panetta?

The importance of rhetoric cannot be overplayed. Need you be reminded of the infamous “16 words” (“the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”) spoken by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address that were used to justify war in Iraq.

Or Ronald Reagan’s joke before a Saturday radio address: “My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

Panetta’s words are alarmist. Threatening the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack only heightens the importance of these weapons that should only serve as a nuclear deterrent.  

If there is a North Korean conventional attack on South Korea, the United States has ample non-nuclear means at its disposal to respond. According to Lt. General (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Chair of the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, U.S. conventional weapons would be sufficient to defend South Korea from North Korean forces.

Gard writes, “Stopping the attack of poorly trained and ill-equipped North Korean forces does not require the use of nuclear weapons.”

He goes on to say, “Should North Korea be able to bypass the demilitarized zone by moving some troops by air or through tunnels into South Korea, an option that has been threatened, they obviously would have to be killed or captured by conventional means. Employing nuclear weapons in densely populated South Korea brings to memory the parallel concept of destroying a city in order to save it. And since the war plan for defense of South Korea envisions invading North Korea and seizing Pyongyang, the capitol, attacking the North with nuclear weapons would endanger our own troops, as well as causing massive casualties on the long-suffering North Korean population.

“There is no justification for threatening to break the generally accepted barrier between the use of conventional high explosive munitions and nuclear weapons in the defense of South Korea. The only practical utility of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter their use by other nations against our vital national interests and, by extension, against our allies,” concluded Gard.

Perhaps Panetta’s ill-considered words deserve the old bar of soap to the mouth treatment a la Ralphie in “A Christmas Story.”