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Iran’s ‘S-300’ – More than just mock up?

Iran last week paraded a range of new military equipment on Army Day, including a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system that has been likened to the Russian S-300 PMU-1.   If the system actually represented the PMU-1, it would imply that manufacturers Almaz had finally made good on their December 2005 contractual (and controversial) obligation to deliver.  Upon closer look at the Army Day photos, however, some key differences suggest that this was unlikely the case.  Interestingly though, these same differences may also signify the reality of an indigenously produced Iranian variant – something Tehran has repeatedly alleged is in development…

According to a number of experts (see here and here), whatever was on display on April 18 was likely a mockup.  But that should not come as too much of a surprise, since most of the other hardware on display at the parade was mocked up – either for safety / security reasons or as a result of still being in the concept stage of design.  Consequently, this factor does not necessarily imply that the Iranian SAM equipment on display is not based on real technology, as is clearly the case in this example.

A typical S-300 PMU launch complex consists of a number of transporter erector vehicles complete with four launching canisters (holding the missiles), a 30N6E Flap Lid phased-array illumination and guidance radar (also known as Tomb Stone), a 76N6 Clam Shell low-altitude early warning radar (for intercepting low altitude cruise missiles), and a command post infrastructure that incorporates a Big Bird early warning radar.

The pictures of Iran’s system illustrate two transporter erector launcher vehicles, something that looks like a Tomb Stone radar, and a surveillance radar that appears to be part of the Russian made Nebo family (designed for long range air surveillance).  While the Iranians did not field any of the elements associated with the command post infrastructure, this may have been because it was deemed inappropriate for parade purposes.  As such, we shouldn’t necessarily read too much into this point.

Iran SAM / S-300 PMU1 Complex Comparison

From the above photos, the Iranian system appears to be different to the S-300 PMU-1 in three ways.  Firstly, the transporter vehicles of both the missile launchers and ‘Tomb Stone’ radar appear to be indigenously produced Iranian variants, of a slightly different design.  Secondly, the missile canisters themselves appear to be a lot ‘cleaner’ than the designs found on the S-300 PMU-1 (but similar to the Ukranian inherited S-300 canisters on display at a Croatian parade in 1995 – which were apparently sold to Iran in 2008).  Thirdly, as explained, Iran’s long-range Nebo type radar (assuming it is part of their launch complex) offers different capabilities to the low-altitude Clam Shell radar employed in the PMU-1 complex.

It’s true that these differences could suggest Iran was merely parading incomplete, mock-up equipment – either to deter potential adversaries or bolster internal prestige.  These same differences, though, could also imply that Iran’s declared pursuit of an alternative to the S-300 PMU-1 is moving forward.  In this light, the mix and match nature of equipment on show could be illustrative of a hybrid design that combines parts of the S-300 with more accessible alternatives for things like surveillance radars and transporter vehicles.  As such, parts of the Soviet-era S-300PTs that Iran bought from Belarus in 2008 could now be employed in conjunction with more modern technologies to form an Iranian variant.

While it is not clear from these photographs how close Tehran is to actually fielding their system (if at all), its possible existence does suggest that there may now be more than just rhetoric going in to the pursuit of an S-300 PMU-1 alternative.  And as suggested by the Planeman, even if this alternative system only equals the capabilities of the S-300PT system, ‘it’s still a huge leap forward and the only credible threat to IAF/USAF air strikes at medium/high altitude’.  As such, it may help buy Tehran some respite as it continues to wait for delivery of the far-superior S-300 PMU-1.

Does Climate Change Affect the 2010 NPT RevCon?

In the arms control community, the third pillar of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — the right to peacefully use nuclear energy — is like the ugly duckling, marginalized while the other two pillars — non-proliferation and disarmament — are more loudly championed.

Nonetheless, the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy technology is an equal pillar of the treaty, and an increasingly important one as the international community struggles to grapple with climate change.

The United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change today released a report that clearly outlines how a carbon-based energy market contributes to climate change:

At the global level, the energy system – supply, transformation, delivery and use – is the dominant contributor to climate change, representing around 60 per cent of total current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

And:

Emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels are major contributors to the unpredictable effects of climate change, and to urban air pollution and acidification of land and water.

The report also emphasizes that the energy industry will have to be at the forefront of reform towards more sustainable, responsible, environmentally-friendly technology in order to mitigate against climate-change causing greenhouse gas emissions:

Reducing the carbon intensity of energy – that is, the amount of carbon emitted per unit of energy consumed – is a key objective in reaching long- term climate goals. As long as the primary energy mix is biased towards fossil fuels, this would be difficult to achieve with currently available fossil fuel-based energy technologies. Given that the world economy is expected to double in size over the next twenty years, the world’s consumption of energy will also increase significantly if energy supply, conversion and use continue to be inefficient. Energy system design, providing stronger incentives for reduced GHG emissions in supply and increased end-use efficiency, will therefore be critical for reducing the risk of irreversible, catastrophic climate change.

Especially after the failure of COP15 and the resulting Copenhagen Accord to provide binding commitments on the part of States Parties to mitigate against rising greenhouse gas emissions, affected nations might look for rigorous support of nuclear energy at the NPT RevCon.

Moreover, the UN report adds that the push for cleaner energy technologies also comes at a time when the Millennium Development Goals call for universal energy access, especially lacking amongst the world’s poor:

Worldwide, approximately 3 billion people rely on traditional biomass for cooking and heating, and about 1.5 billion have no access to electricity. Up to a billion more have access only to unreliable electricity networks. The “energy-poor” suffer the health consequences of inefficient combustion of solid fuels in inadequately ventilated buildings, as well as the economic consequences of insufficient power for productive income-generating activities and for other basic services such as health and education. In particular, women and girls in the developing world are disproportionately affected in this regard.

If the international community designs to both decrease greenhouse gas emissions and expand energy access, then nuclear energy emerges as the least-bad currently available option en route to sustainable energy and away from fossil fuel consumption.

Yes, there are proliferation risks involved in peaceful nuclear energy use.  Yes, there are environmental concerns.  The international community should make every effort to secure nuclear energy facilities while also hastening the move towards other alternatives.

But nuclear energy expansion can be a stepping stone towards those cleaner technologies, a necessary evil that nonetheless should be emphasized and supported as a way to mitigate against climate change-causing greenhouse gas emissions, reduce our dependence on fossil fuel consumption, and broaden energy access to all.  

The end goal is still clean technologies that don’t carry proliferation risks, like hydro, solar, and wind.  However, given our competing priorities – tackling climate change, reducing energy poverty, and providing security against proliferation risks – nuclear energy as a necessary evil en route to a global economy that can fully support renewable energy might be our best option.

Flexibility, Thy Name is New START

NoH has been arguing for some time that given the delivery vehicle range outlined in the Joint Understanding last July, together with the slow trickle of news that the new treaty would likely contain simpler conversion and elimination rules, the U.S. wouldn’t have to make any significant changes to its current nuclear force structure (long live the triad!) or chop up systems that have been converted to conventional-only roles.

Now that the treaty text and protocol have been released, the amount of flexibility (and by extension the hedge against uncertainty) that the treaty allows for is truly astounding.

Of course, this won’t stop some critics from saying that the treaty could endanger the triad, that it disproportionately benefits Russia – since the deployed number of Russian delivery vehicles is anticipated to drop dramatically with or without a new arms control agreement – and/or that it limits U.S. prompt global strike capabilities.

Indeed, Sen. John Thune (R-SD), who has made ensuring that the triad remains inviolable a kind of pet project of his, flight tested some of these arguments at last Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review.  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Jim Miller and STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton were having none of it, however, and their responses are worth quoting at length…  

The Limits are Key

Chilton really drove home the point that New START prevents Moscow from maintaining a larger number of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles than it otherwise might have without the agreement:

THUNE: Will the Russians have to cut their number of delivery vehicles to get to 700?

…

THUNE: Well and my understanding is that they’re already going to be below that level [700 delivery vehicles]….I guess my next question would be what if anything do we get in return for that concession?

CHILTON: …One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because as you look to the future though Russia may be close to or slightly below them already, when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty… [emphasis mine.]

This gets it exactly right. The fact the some Russian reductions might happen in any event is beside the point. If nothing is put in place to replace START I, we can say goodbye to the important limits on and an essential means of verifying Russia’s still enormous force of deployed warheads in particular, but also delivery vehicles. Such an outcome would make the United States less safe.

Each Side Can Determine for Itself How to Structure its Forces

Unlike START I in its waning days, New START is tailored to the current realities U.S. force posture and planning. It also allows the U.S. to meet the limits without endangering the triad. As Chilton put it, “it not only made sense strategically it certainly is doable to sustain the triad at these numbers [i.e. 700 deployed delivery vehicles] and I believe at lower numbers.” Miller provided still more context:

THUNE: …I also want to know if you could elaborate a little bit on what the implications are for each leg of the nuclear triad under these reductions. How many land-based missiles, subs, bombers will we have to cut to be in compliant with the treaty?

…

MILLER: Senator let me add very briefly that the New START treaty has provisions that allow us to do three things that will allow us to reduce the requirement for the number of strategic delivery vehicles while still keeping the same force structure.  The first one is it eliminates what we’ve called the phantom strategic delivery vehicles, those that are counted under the old START treaty but are no longer associated with the nuclear mission….Second, the treaty also allows further conversion of current dual capable bombers to a conventional only role that would take them off the books as well and we are looking at that possibility for some B52-Hs.  And finally the treaty allows for the elimination of launchers from accountability for submarines through a variety of means including the simple removal of the gas generator that would eject the SLBM.  [emphasis mine.]

The SLBM provisions, which are laid out in detail in the Ninth Agreed Statement and Section IV of Part III of the protocol, are pretty amazing.  In fact, not only can SLBM launchers be converted in the way Miller describes, but converted tubes can be located on the same boomer with launchers that have not been converted.  The treaty makes it a lot easier to convert or eliminate ICBM launchers and heavy bombers, too.  

In other words there is flexibility galore, and DoD could go in any one of numerous different directions to meet the treaty’s limits on delivery vehicles (both Miller and Chilton stated that DoD will provide a specific force structure associated with New START as part of the Sec. 1251 report due to be submitted to Congress with the treaty in early May).  In fact, the U.S. could probably get away with not having to physically destroy a single launcher; it could simply convert and/or deactivate its way below the limits.  This doesn’t mean that the reductions wouldn’t be “real,” but remember that this treaty was never about deep reductions in the first place.  Predictability and stability are its calling cards.  

Prompt Global Strike is Alive and Well

Finally, on the issue of prompt global strike, Miller points out that New START will count ICBMs and SLBMs whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads; thus a prompt global strike capability would be subject to the treaty’s limits. However, a warhead limit of 1,550 and a deployed delivery vehicle limit of 700 would still give the U.S. the flexibility to deploy a small number of conventionally armed submarine- and/or land-based long-range missiles, if it ever decides to do so:

THUNE: The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the development of conventional prompt global strike capabilities.  Will these prompt global strike systems count against the New START limits and require further nuclear cuts to accommodate them?

MILLER: Senator Thune….[t]he NPR explicitly looked at that as it did force structure analysis and looked at further reductions under the 700 and 800 combined limit that would leave room for that and indeed would leave room for a small number of conventional ICBMs. [I]f…the determination were made that that was desirable it would be a very small number. [emphasis mine.]

New START provides space to deploy a small number of advanced conventional ICBMs, though the wisdom of such a course is another matter.

What this all adds up to is that New START is a huge win for U.S. security.  Our entire military leadership strongly supports it.  It should be a no brainer in the Senate.

(Note: Last Thursday’s hearing was incredible on many different levels, not the least of which was the shouting match that broke out between Sen. John McCain and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, and will probably be the subject of some future NoH posts.)

Iran Celebrates its Military Might on Army Day

Army Day marked the unveiling of some um… exciting new possibilities in Iran.  Take this fabulous mock-up of their new stealth fighter (h/t to Stephen Trimble at The DEW Line).  The mock-up was one of two that appeared at the event, both probable variants of Iran’s Sofreh Mahi, tested in February.

Since Iran has trouble just supporting its current force of U.S.-built F-5s, F-4s, F-14s and former Iranian fighters, U.S. Air Force officials have noted that the idea of Iran developing its own stealth fighter or UAV is highly unlikely.  This rudimentary mock-up serves as an excellent example of their thoughts.

During the parade and celebration held on April 18, President Ahmadinejad commented that Iran’s armed forces have such strength that its enemies will not even think of attacking the country.

Just one truly interesting development did come out of the event…

It appears that several canisters, *potentially* carrying Russian S-300s, may have made an appearance.  Hmm…

Egypt is NPT’ed (a.k.a. Not Particularly Thrill’ed)

Lest there are a few of you out there who have flirted with the notion that the so-called “Nuclear Spring” would cause the rest of the world, particularly the non-nuclear weapon states, to hold hands and sing “kumbaya”, Colum Lynch’s report from Monday’s UN General Assembly debate on Disarmament and World Security provides a chilly does of reality.    

Via Lynch:

“There is mistrust,” said Egypt’s U.N. ambassador, Maged A. Abdelaziz, who is serving as chairman of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement. Speaking before the General Assembly debate entitled “Disarmament and World Security,” the Egyptian envoy said the five major nuclear powers are seeking to impose new demands on non-nuclear powers while failing to fully live up to their own disarmament obligations, and permitting a special group of nations — India, Israel, and Pakistan — a free pass to produce nuclear weapons, without having to abide by the obligations of signatories to the NPT. “States outside the treaty are reaping the benefits of the treaty,” he said.

…

The Egyptian diplomat outlined the NAM’s opposition to a series of Western-backed initiatives, including a proposal to punish countries that withdraw from the NPT and a plan to establish a U.N. fuel bank to supply nuclear non-nuclear states. In addition, he said NAM had “serious concerns” about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, promoted last September by Obama, which strengthens the 15-nation body’s authority to confront states that fail to comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. “We are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side,” said Abdelaziz. [emphasis mine].

I suspect that those who actually believe that the NPT Review Conference will be a cakewalk for the U.S. meet in a very small room.  But this does not mean that the Conference is doomed to failure.  Nor is it to say that New START, the NPR, and the Nuclear Security Summit haven’t strengthened the U.S. case that it is revitalizing its commitment to its obligations under the NPT…

Rather, my sense is that Egypt and other NAM states are laying down a marker.  They want to signal that while the actions taken by the U.S. and Russia in recent weeks are welcome, they do not equal disarmament, and as Daryl notes, they certainly do not render null and void the obligations the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states made at previous review conferences.

Three things in particular stood out to me about Ambassador Abdelaziz’s remarks.  First, the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East will once again be a point of contention.

Second, Abdelaziz’s reference to states outside the treaty reaping the benefits of the treaty suggests to me that the U.S.-India nuclear deal could be a much bigger issue at this review conference than some people think.

Finally, while stockpile reductions are important, non-nuclear weapon states certainly do not see them as a panacea.  As Deepti Choubey pointed out in her excellent 2008 study on the attainability of new nuclear bargains,

The lesson from this exchange is that further stockpile reductions alone will not rehabilitate the U.S.’s reputation or provide it with enough leverage to gain more support for its nonproliferation agenda. “The United States would get more credit if it linked its actions to its commitments,” observed one UN official.

The world’s reaction to the Nuclear Posture Review is likely to be especially important in this regard.  These reactions are still coming in.  On Wednesday the Carnegie Endowment hosted an event on international perspectives on the NPR that I was unable to attend, but I look forward to scouring the transcripts to see what came out of the discussion.

In any event, it looks like Ambassador Susan Burk and her team are going to have their work cut out for them in New York come May.