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Iran Celebrates its Military Might on Army Day

Army Day marked the unveiling of some um… exciting new possibilities in Iran.  Take this fabulous mock-up of their new stealth fighter (h/t to Stephen Trimble at The DEW Line).  The mock-up was one of two that appeared at the event, both probable variants of Iran’s Sofreh Mahi, tested in February.

Since Iran has trouble just supporting its current force of U.S.-built F-5s, F-4s, F-14s and former Iranian fighters, U.S. Air Force officials have noted that the idea of Iran developing its own stealth fighter or UAV is highly unlikely.  This rudimentary mock-up serves as an excellent example of their thoughts.

During the parade and celebration held on April 18, President Ahmadinejad commented that Iran’s armed forces have such strength that its enemies will not even think of attacking the country.

Just one truly interesting development did come out of the event…

It appears that several canisters, *potentially* carrying Russian S-300s, may have made an appearance.  Hmm…

Egypt is NPT’ed (a.k.a. Not Particularly Thrill’ed)

Lest there are a few of you out there who have flirted with the notion that the so-called “Nuclear Spring” would cause the rest of the world, particularly the non-nuclear weapon states, to hold hands and sing “kumbaya”, Colum Lynch’s report from Monday’s UN General Assembly debate on Disarmament and World Security provides a chilly does of reality.    

Via Lynch:

“There is mistrust,” said Egypt’s U.N. ambassador, Maged A. Abdelaziz, who is serving as chairman of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement. Speaking before the General Assembly debate entitled “Disarmament and World Security,” the Egyptian envoy said the five major nuclear powers are seeking to impose new demands on non-nuclear powers while failing to fully live up to their own disarmament obligations, and permitting a special group of nations — India, Israel, and Pakistan — a free pass to produce nuclear weapons, without having to abide by the obligations of signatories to the NPT. “States outside the treaty are reaping the benefits of the treaty,” he said.

…

The Egyptian diplomat outlined the NAM’s opposition to a series of Western-backed initiatives, including a proposal to punish countries that withdraw from the NPT and a plan to establish a U.N. fuel bank to supply nuclear non-nuclear states. In addition, he said NAM had “serious concerns” about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, promoted last September by Obama, which strengthens the 15-nation body’s authority to confront states that fail to comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. “We are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side,” said Abdelaziz. [emphasis mine].

I suspect that those who actually believe that the NPT Review Conference will be a cakewalk for the U.S. meet in a very small room.  But this does not mean that the Conference is doomed to failure.  Nor is it to say that New START, the NPR, and the Nuclear Security Summit haven’t strengthened the U.S. case that it is revitalizing its commitment to its obligations under the NPT…

Rather, my sense is that Egypt and other NAM states are laying down a marker.  They want to signal that while the actions taken by the U.S. and Russia in recent weeks are welcome, they do not equal disarmament, and as Daryl notes, they certainly do not render null and void the obligations the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states made at previous review conferences.

Three things in particular stood out to me about Ambassador Abdelaziz’s remarks.  First, the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East will once again be a point of contention.

Second, Abdelaziz’s reference to states outside the treaty reaping the benefits of the treaty suggests to me that the U.S.-India nuclear deal could be a much bigger issue at this review conference than some people think.

Finally, while stockpile reductions are important, non-nuclear weapon states certainly do not see them as a panacea.  As Deepti Choubey pointed out in her excellent 2008 study on the attainability of new nuclear bargains,

The lesson from this exchange is that further stockpile reductions alone will not rehabilitate the U.S.’s reputation or provide it with enough leverage to gain more support for its nonproliferation agenda. “The United States would get more credit if it linked its actions to its commitments,” observed one UN official.

The world’s reaction to the Nuclear Posture Review is likely to be especially important in this regard.  These reactions are still coming in.  On Wednesday the Carnegie Endowment hosted an event on international perspectives on the NPR that I was unable to attend, but I look forward to scouring the transcripts to see what came out of the discussion.

In any event, it looks like Ambassador Susan Burk and her team are going to have their work cut out for them in New York come May.

French Nuclear Weapons Policy and Black Swans

Last week, President Sarkozy said in a CBS television interview that France would never give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally because they continue to ‘underpin’ France’s security in a ‘dangerous’ world.  He argued that his nation of 65 million inhabitants’ has ‘fewer conventional weapons than the US, than Russia, than China’.  Although Sarkozy was keen to mention the fact that France has renounced nuclear testing and reduced its nuclear arsenal by one third, he added that he would be ‘jeopardizing’ the security of his country if any further reductions were made.  Since his comments were picked up by a large number of news organizations, one might have initially thought there was something unique about Sarkozy’s position, but to the few French nuclear watchers out there, all of this no doubt sounded like old news…

From Sarkozy’s comments it is evident that French thinking remains wedded to the idea that nuclear weapons make a nation ‘free and independent’.  It’s an idea that has long driven France’s nuclear weapons program, visible in statements by leaders such as Charles De Gaulle, Lionel Jospin, and Jacques Chirac.  France’s defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany in World War II, their subsequent inability to overcome Viet Minh forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (thus ending French-Indochina, a.k.a.Vietnam), and the Sueze Canal crisis and subsequent rift with the U.S., all undoubtedly sowed the seeds of France’s appetite to develop an independent ‘life-insurance policy’ to guarantee its vital interests at home and abroad.   But since then, with the era of decolonization, the creation of the European Union, and France’s reentry into NATO, the rationale for the French nuclear deterrent has essentially evaporated.

France relied on a triad of air, land and sea based nuclear weapons for its deterrence until 1996, when President Chirac announced the retirement of France’s land based missile facilities.  At the same time, France contradicted this positive step towards disarmament by conducting a series of nuclear tests at the Mururoa Atoll and injecting significant resources into modernizing its nuclear weapons.

Similarly, when Sarkozy stated in April 2008 that France would reduce its nuclear arsenal to 300 warheads, it coincided with the inauguration of the first of France’s new ‘Triumphant’ class nuclear submarines and efforts to perfect the new M51 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile.  And despite that reduction, France still remains the third largest nuclear power – surpassing even China, a country with a population some 21 times bigger.  Which raises the question: how does France’s large and modern nuclear arsenal contribute to its ‘independence’?

France’s recent White Paper on Defense and National Security states that the ‘sole purpose’ of nuclear weapons is to ‘prevent [likely meaning deter] any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation’ (although there are some questions regarding the accuracy of this official translation).   In this context, the section on ‘new security parameters’ implies that French nuclear weapons might potentially have a role in responding to future threats such as the ‘the emergence of new weapons’, ‘cyber warfare’, ‘the offensive use of outerspace’, and even “black swan” events (yes, see page 5!).   Given the absence of such threats today, France seems to reason that since it already has nuclear weapons, it might as well keep them as a hedge against future uncertainty.

Looking back, nuclear weapons have so far been useless for France – both in defending vital interests and enabling it to engage in overseas conflicts.  Several low level interventions in Africa, a few contributions to multinational forces in international conflicts, and a stabilization force sent to Haiti – that’s pretty much it for French military intervention over the past fifty years.

Recently Sarkozy pointed to Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs to suggest that ‘the future of Europe is at stake’, but it is hard to understand why this actually might be the case.  Indeed, to think that Iran would ever be developing these programs with Europe primarily in mind seems an absurd and egotistical notion.  Beyond being a key trading partner for Iran, Europe also has vast conventional superiority, is increasingly interconnected (and thus less practical to target), and contains many countries that profit from NATO’s alliance structure.  In fact, as long as France remains a member of a nuclear armed NATO, then there seems literally no justification for Paris to possess its own independent nuclear deterrent.

Of all the countries today with nuclear weapons, France is arguably facing the fewest threats, and as a result of increased European integration, exists in one of the most stable regions of the world.  In this context, if France still thinks it needs its nuclear weapons to keep it ‘free and independent’, then it’s very hard to imagine any circumstances under which it will ever feel comfortable without them.  Realistically, beyond using nuclear weapons to clutch on to an increasingly fading notion of ‘great power’ status, it seems that France has as much justification to own nuclear weapons as its neighbor Switzerland would have.

Validators! Mount Up!, Cont’d

Travis got this ball rolling last week, but we’ve put together a longer list of what some folks with some pretty serious credibility on national security issues have been saying about the NPR and New START.  And it don’t exactly mix and match with what some of our good friends on the right have been saying.  Read the whole thing below the jump.  Here are a few excerpts:

“The chiefs and I fully support the findings of this nuclear posture review, because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies and force structure to meet an ever-changing security environment….Even while it reduces the role played by nuclear weapons – a reduction I wholly endorse – this Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the United States and those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear means than we have at our disposal today.”

Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Press Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 2010

“The Russians may issue a statement saying that they have the right to withdraw if we deploy defenses to threaten the strategic balance.  They issued such a statement in 1991; we issued a statement right back and both of them went into the dustbin of history.  I think it would be – it is for the Senate to decide whether this treaty deserves ratification.  I think it does.  It would be tragic if we allowed Russian statements made for domestic purposes to derail it. [T]here is no restriction in START with regard to our missile defense capability.”

Ambassador Linton Brooks, former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Press Briefing on Understanding New START and the Nuclear Posture Review, April 9, 2010

“There’s a particularly important point that I think will strengthen us for the future under the NPR.  It’s something I’ve advocated for in the past, and this is the funding that is, and the commitment to funding and the focus on improving the nuclear enterprise under NNSA; this will truly strengthen the deterrent, not only for today but for 20, 30, 40 years from now.  And the NPR’s endorsement of that I think is one of the most important aspects of that for strengthening our deterrence posture for the future.”

General Kevin Chilton, Commander, STRATCOM
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 2010

What Key U.S. Military Leaders and Influential Moderates and Republicans are Saying About the Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense, and Modernization

Critics of the New START agreement and the Nuclear Posture Review claim that the new policy limits U.S. nuclear options, constrains missile defense, and fails to modernize our nuclear weapons complex.  Our military leaders disagree.

U.S. can maintain a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent under the Nuclear Posture Review and New START

“We have more robust deterrents today, because we’ve added to the nuclear deterrent missile defense. And…with the phased adaptive approach that the president has approved, we will have significantly greater capability to deter the Iranians, because we will have a significantly greater missile defense. We’re also developing this conventional prompt global strike, which really hadn’t gone anywhere in the — in the Bush administration, but has been embraced by the new administration. That allows us to use long range missiles with conventional warheads. So we have — we have more tools if you will in the deterrents kit bag than — than we used to.”
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense
Interview Jake Tapper of ABC’s “This Week,” April 9, 2010

“The chiefs and I fully support the findings of this nuclear posture review, because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies and force structure to meet an ever-changing security environment….Even while it reduces the role played by nuclear weapons – a reduction I wholly endorse – this Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the United States and those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear means than we have at our disposal today.”
Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Press Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 2010

“No, I don’t feel constrained in the least, really. I think we have more than enough capacity and capability for any threat that we see today or might emerge in the foreseeable future. The capabilities that have been brought onboard with our missile defenses and other general purpose forces have been pretty substantial. The capabilities that we have in our existing nuclear fleet are more than adequate for the threats that we know of and that we are — we believe we could face.”
Marine Corp General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review from the Pentagon, April 6, 2010

“Based on [STRATCOM’s] analysis and through continued discussions with DoD leadership, my view is that [the NPR and New START] and associated budgetary investments continue to support these deterrence requirements, and that the New START agreement warhead and platform numbers provide appropriate military flexibility….I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to deliver global security for America today and in the future….START does not limit anything that we’d need to do.”
General Kevin Chilton, Commander, STRATCOM
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 2010

“We believe that the substantial edge the U.S. has developed in conventional military capabilities, which the NPR notes, permits this country to sharply reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.”
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, April 14, 2010

New START does not limit U.S. missile defenses

“Missile defense is not constrained by this treaty.”
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense
White House Press Briefing on the Announcement of the New START Treaty, March 26, 2010

“There are no constraints in this treaty associated with our missile defenses or our prompt global strike capabilities, read conventional.”
Marine Corp General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review from the Pentagon, April 6, 2010

“[T]here is no restriction in START with regard to our missile defense capability.”
General Kevin Chilton, Commander, STRATCOM
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 2010

“The New START Treaty has no constraints on current and future components of the BMDS development or deployment. Article V, Section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers, and vice versa, while “grandfathering” the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB already converted for Ground Based Interceptors. MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg and intends to hedge against increased BMDS requirements by completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we determined that if more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI missile field (which is not prohibited by the treaty). Regarding SLBM launchers, some time ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive option. As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable ships. Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START Treaty actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program.”
Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 15, 2010

“The Russians may issue a statement saying that they have the right to withdraw if we deploy defenses to threaten the strategic balance.  They issued such a statement in 1991; we issued a statement right back and both of them went into the dustbin of history.  I think it would be – it is for the Senate to decide whether this treaty deserves ratification.  I think it does.  It would be tragic if we allowed Russian statements made for domestic purposes to derail it. [T]here is no restriction in START with regard to our missile defense capability.”
Ambassador Linton Brooks, former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Press Briefing on Understanding New START and the Nuclear Posture Review, April 9, 2010

The Obama administration has put forth a credible plan to enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons complex

“So the chiefs, and I and – and the directors of the nuclear labs are all very comfortable that – that this [the Nuclear Posture Review] puts us in a position to modernize the stockpile and – and the $5 billion dollars that Hillary [Clinton] has referred to is actually just what’s in our budget to – for this program.”
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense
Interview Jake Tapper of ABC’s “This Week,” April 9, 2010

“So both for myself, as a previous commander at STRATCOM, and also for General Shelton, we both feel very comfortable with these numbers and with these descriptions of reuse, replace, refurbishment, so to speak.”
Marine Corp General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review from the Pentagon, April 6, 2010

“There’s a particularly important point that I think will strengthen us for the future under the NPR.  It’s something I’ve advocated for in the past, and this is the funding that is, and the commitment to funding and the focus on improving the nuclear enterprise under NNSA; this will truly strengthen the deterrent, not only for today but for 20, 30, 40 years from now.  And the NPR’s endorsement of that I think is one of the most important aspects of that for strengthening our deterrence posture for the future.”
General Kevin Chilton, Commander, STRATCOM
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 2010

“The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirms President Obama’s commitment to providing the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the resources required to support the President’s nuclear security agenda and maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground testing….This NPR reflects that commitment [to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal] and our budget request, if approved, would provide the resources required to make that possible….Further, the Administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile ensures the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities that are essential to their recruitment and retention.”
Thomas D’Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 14, 2010

“Now that the NPR is completed, we see that it is compatible with our recommendations. The review gives a comprehensive and pragmatic plan for reducing nuclear risks to the United States. We believe it offers a bipartisan path forward — while allowing for healthy disagreements on specific issues….We also see that the NPR puts special emphasis, as our report recommended, on improving the nation’s complex nuclear infrastructure and enhancing programs to recruit and keep the nation’s best scientific minds. The administration’s commitment to increase investment in our national laboratories also ensures that they continue their important role in sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal and in solving many other problems facing the nation.”
William Perry, former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, April 14, 2010
April 14, 2010

“So I think that it is hard to come up with a definition of supporting modernization that the Nuclear Posture Review isn’t responsive too….[A] strong case can be made that the Nuclear Posture Review is responsive to the concerns that we be able to modernize, in the sense of finding new and better ways to keep the arsenal safe, secure and reliable, while forswearing modernizing to the extent that, that means doing something fundamentally new.”
Ambassador Linton Brooks, former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Press Briefing on Understanding New START and the Nuclear Posture Review, April 9, 2010

Imitation is the Best Form of Flattery

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry yesterday released its ‘Memorandum on the N-Issue’.  The majority of material is nothing new.  For example the memo states that the North’s nuclear program was motivated primarily in response to the threat of the U.S., that its weapons have ‘drastically’ reduced the potential for a war, and that a peace treaty is required as a prerequisite to denuclearization.   But beyond these recognizable declarations, the document does delve into some new areas – all of which are seemingly interlinked by an underlying attempt to assert and legitimize North Korea’s international nuclear status…

Although North Korea’s desire to be formally recognized as a nuclear weapon state are nothing new, yesterday’s document expresses these desires in a new context.  The document suggests that North Korea’s external relations department have been keeping a close eye on the recent flurry of non-proliferation activity and news.  Consequently it seems that North Korea has concluded that jumping on the non-proliferation bandwagon is now the best way for it to assert its nuclear weapon status.

First – in the context of the recent Nuclear Security Summit, the Foreign Ministry’s call to ‘join the international efforts [on] nuclear non-proliferation and on nuclear material security’ can be read as an attempt to inject some credibility into the concept of North Korea as a responsible nuclear steward.  A country that should be regarded on an equal footing with others in the nuclear ‘club’, that could presumably even contribute expertise to the next Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in 2012 in South Korea.  

Next, it seems the mostly positive international reaction to the U.S Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has motivated North Korea to attempt to win similar praise.  Thus the articulation of the ‘mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK’, which describes Pyongyang’s arsenal largely in defensive terms, appears to be an overt attempt to emulate Washington’s mainly defensive posture.  By going down this path, North Korea may be hoping to win some hearts and minds and be seen in a similarly responsible and non-aggressive light – characteristics it realizes are required in order to get the recognition it so desires.  Note: It’s worth pointing out that Pyongyang didn’t catch up to Washington in one respect: It’s posture statement includes its own version of the so-called “Warsaw Pact” clause, which the U.S. NPR just ditched.

Finally, North Korea’s PR people seem to have also picked up on the momentum surrounding the forthcoming NPT Review Conference as a way of aligning their nuclear status with that of the five recognized nuclear states.  Indeed, part of the Memorandum is strongly reminiscent of the language and obligations found in Article VI of the NPT. Compare:

From North Korea’s posture memo: ‘[North Korea will] neither participate in [a] nuclear arms race nor produce more than it feels necessary… [And will] join the international nuclear disarmament efforts’
To:

And from Article VI of the NPT: ‘[Parties will pursue] effective measures relating to [the] cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’

This similar choice of language attempts to paint North Korea as an advocate for disarmament and as a responsible nuclear steward – again, no matter how incredible that might sound to some.

In short, it appears the objective of this Memorandum is to present North Korea’s nuclear weapon status to the rest of the world as an irrefutable and justifiable fact, using the language and rationales traditionally used by the other nuclear weapon states (apart from Israel).   Just like them, North Korea is now saying that it will keep nuclear weapons until ‘they are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world’.  You could say imitation is the best form of flattery.