Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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Senate Budget Resolution Passes 12 to 10

Chairman Kent Conrad announced the passage of his fiscal 2011 budget resolution by the Senate Budget Committee today on a party line vote of 12 to 10.  The document is a nonbinding framework that doesn’t have to be signed into law by the president, but provides a strong indication of the budget road ahead.

Proposals include a $4 billion cut of President Obama’s discretionary spending request, as well as a freeze of non-security discretionary spending for three years.  

No surprises here – I’m sure we can all think of a few things that might be cut from the President’s request, and since it does make up over half of discretionary spending, it would be prudent to start with defense, right?  Not according to Conrad.

The Chairman’s Mark finds its entire $4 billion cut in the budget for International Affairs, a move that, according to the document, is “strong on national defense” – meaning weak on development and diplomacy?  

Also unexplained is a change to the reporting of discretionary spending.  Unlike previous years, where spending was broken into Defense and Non-Defense, this resolution breaks spending into Security and Non-Security, providing lines for Defense, International Affairs, Veterans and the Department of Homeland Security.  This may seem like a small change, but could be highly misleading.  

On one hand, expanded reporting may simply provide a more detailed breakdown of cuts, separating those programs that are exempt from the spending freeze from those that are not.  Unfortunately, this simple breakdown also implies that the majority of cuts Senate Democrats plan to propose would come from “security” initiatives.  Previously, Conrad’s $4 billion cut would have been listed under Non-Defense.  

In reality, the only portion of the President’s fiscal 2011 budget increase for International Affairs that is left intact is funding for what one might call security:

The Chairman’s Mark, therefore, preserves the increase requested due to our current wars, as well as the supplemental funding. Additionally, the Chairman’s Mark also funds an increase of $1.2 billion for our nation’s allies, including Israel, as part of the Middle East peace process… Given our severely constrained fiscal environment, the Chairman’s Mark focuses on those capabilities crucial to our current wars and the Middle East and increases international affairs funding to $54.8 billion for 2011.

As a result, proposed cuts will likely come from programs related to the things I listed above, development and diplomacy.  

Hezbollah and SCUDS – An Unlikely Combination?

Reports last week that Syria had transferred an unspecified number of SCUD missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon, whilst vehemently denied by Damascus, are now being ignored, ambiguously, by senior Hezbollah sources.  If indeed the allegations are true, then the transfer would represent the first acquisition of SCUD type missiles by a non-state actor, a violation of UN Resolution 1701 – which called for the disarming of all armed groups in Lebanon.  The missiles would also now be the furthest-range and most precise weapons in Hezbollah’s arsenal, reported in 2009 to contain as many as 80,000 short-range rockets.  

Upon closer inspection, however, it seems that any SCUD missiles would have little utility for Hezbollah’s operations in Southern Lebanon.  Thus, if the story is true, reactions which suggest the possible transfer could or should ignite a war seem highly misplaced…

The majority of the rockets Hezbollah fired during the 2006 Lebanon War were either of the Katyusha type, with a range of 20-40km, or improved variants of the Grad type, with ranges in the region of 70 – 100km.  Both rockets are cheap to produce and thus Hezbollah acquired thousands of them.  Because both rocket types were characterized by having man portable, remote, or truck mounted launchers, and were powered by solid fuel, they had the advantage of being able to be used by personnel with little training.  This, combined with the scale of the arsenal, enabled Hezbollah to continue their bombardment even after countless launch operatives were killed by Israeli air attacks.  

Since the 2006 conflict, it is evident that Hezbollah has continued its effort to stockpile rockets like those it used in its war with Israel.  The 2009 claim that they possess 80,000 rockets suggests their arsenal has now increased in size by nearly three times since 2006.  Any advances in Israeli anti-rocket technology will be greatly minimized by the sheer scale of this new force.  In addition, it seems that Hezbollah recently took delivery of the Iranian made Fatah-110, capable of reaching targets up to 200km away using GPS guidance.  Launched from southern Lebanon, the extended range of the Fatah-110 would now enable Hezbollah to target Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.  These factors all greatly increase Hezbollah’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.  In this context, and for a number of other reasons, it thus seems puzzling that they would be interested in acquiring SCUD capabilities from Damascus.  

First, in contrast to Hezbollah’s current rocket capability, maintaining and operating any variant of the SCUD is substantially harder work.  Being liquid fuelled, SCUDs require trained personnel knowledgeable of how to handle extremely hazardous liquid fuels.  In addition, SCUD missiles and their transporter erector launchers (TELs) require a fair amount of logistics support.  Consequently Hezbollah would have had to send personnel to undergo extensive training in Syria if they did acquire any SCUDs.  And if these personnel were killed in conflict, replacing them would be far harder than replacing the personnel that launch Hezbollah’s short-range rockets.

Second, road-mobile SCUD launchers are substantial pieces of equipment – far easier to see from reconnaissance aircraft and satellites than the improvised rocket launching facilities that Hezbollah used in 2006.  Given the Israeli Air Force’s experience and success in targeting the much smaller mobile launchers of the 2006 Lebanon War, it seems probable that any SCUD launchers would be even easier targets for Israel to destroy today.  And because of this, they could even invite a pre-emptive Israeli strike, something Hezbollah would want only if it was actively seeking war (which is nonetheless possible).

Even if it did not destroy the launchers in advance of an attack, Israel has deployed its advanced Arrow missile defense system throughout the country to protect exactly from the threat of a SCUD type ballistic missile attack.  Indeed, it was precisely because this system is so well suited to intercepting SCUDs that it proved so useless for Israel in defending against Hezbollah’s short-range rocket bombardment in 2006.  As such, it is hard to understand why Hezbollah would now be motivated to procure a system so potentially susceptible to interception.

Finally, unless Hezbollah were to develop a chemical or biological warhead for its SCUDs, it is hard to see what strategic advantage (aside from range) SCUDs might provide over their rocket based alternatives.  Indeed, in using conventionally armed warheads, Iraq’s volley of 39 SCUDS fired at Israel in 1991 resulted in just fourteen deaths.  Thus without non-conventional warheads they offer little destructive advantage.  Paradoxically, because Hezbollah are aware that using non-conventional warheads against Israel would invite a highly severe response (possibly eroding their public support), it seems even less likely that they would be interested in pursuing a non-conventional capability.

While it thus seems unlikely that it would be in Hezbollah’s interest to acquire SCUD missiles form Syria, it does of course remain plausible that a transfer did take place. For these very same reasons though, even if Hezbollah has acquired a limited SCUD capability, little has changed in the balance of power.  As a result, the notion that this transfer is worthy of a military response, especially in the context of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 80,000 short-range rockets, seems ill-advised.  

One Down, Two to Go – and a Big Win for India

On March 29, the U.S. and India reached an agreement which grants India the right to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel, meaning that the landmark U.S.-India nuclear trade deal is one step closer to reality.  The text of the agreement was released on March 30.

The reprocessing agreement includes protocols intended to prevent the diversion of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials to India’s weapons program.  However, the agreement – like the larger deal it is a part of – increases the potential for proliferation and nuclear terrorism…

Timothy Roemer, U.S. Ambassador to India, announced that the reprocessing deal was “part of the great, win-win narrative of the U.S.-India global partnership.”  Other sources, however, note that India has been able to secure significant concessions in the accord.  

For one, reprocessing will be monitored by the IAEA rather than U.S. officials, as Indians “did not want direct American oversight with an American flag on them. It is a symbolic, sovereignty issue for Indians.”  The only other countries operating under this model are Japan and EURATOM.  As Ted Jones of the U.S.-India Business Council noted, “India is now in a special circle. This is a big deal.”

Military facilities and existing stockpiles of nuclear fuel will continue to be exempt from inspections and safeguards. New Delhi has also refused to allow IAEA monitors access to a breeder reactor that can run on plutonium.  

While the U.S. will be able to suspend Indian reprocessing rights if a “serious threat” to national security or the physical protection of the reprocessing facility arises, in the case of a suspension of reprocessing rights beyond six months, the U.S. may be required to provide compensation for the adverse effect on the Indian economy resulting from the disruption of electricity generation.  

India was also able to secure the right to build additional reprocessing plants in the future.  While America had hoped to limit India to one such facility, New Delhi’s argument that it would be risky to transport fuel from reactors to the reprocessing plant through densely populated areas won the day.

The cooperation deal in general is a huge win for India, as they are still not party to the NPT.  The Indian exemptions have all been obtained despite the fact that diverted civilian nuclear fuel was used to build New Delhi’s first nuclear weapons three decades ago.

Despite the reprocessing agreement, hurdles remain before U.S. firms can break into the billion dollar Indian nuclear energy market.  While two sites have been identified for U.S.-built reactors, no company has yet been able to enter into a contract.  As documented on this blog, India must still pass a controversial nuclear-liability law and provide a letter of assurance on nonproliferation.  

At the recent Nuclear Security Summit, the 47 participating nations endorsed President Obama’s goal of securing all “loose” nuclear material within four years.  Yet the summit largely ignored the dangers posed by reprocessed plutonium.  As Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed out “At a time when nuclear terrorism and proliferation concerns are only increasing, the United States should be doing everything it can to stop existing reprocessing, not facilitate more.”

Yes Virginia, Three to Five Years

The IAEA defines a “significant quantity” of fissile material, or the amount needed to produce one functioning bomb, as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of 90 percent highly enriched uranium. 25 kg of weapons grade uranium, however, does not a deliverable arsenal make.

I don’t pretend to be a physicist, not even close, but this much I know: Any attempt to have a serious conversation about Iran’s nuclear program would be tainted if I were not aware of the most basic principles behind the construction and delivery of a nuclear weapon.

Enter the United States Senate…

Yesterday, a disturbing exchange took place between Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, and the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

During his testimony, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess reported that Iran could potentially produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb within one year. This led a number of SASC committee members to assume that Iran could have a deliverable weapon within one year. Were it not for Committee Chair Sen. Carl Levin, they may have held on to that assumption. Apparently wise to the fact that there are a few more steps involved in the process, Levin asked for further clarification…

In terms of the highly enriched uranium, your answer is clear… it would take a year or more… Now, you indicated in terms of putting together a weapon, of assembling a weapon, that’s a different issue. We need in open session to learn something about that since intelligence officials apparently are indicating that’s something more than a year… Otherwise, the headline tomorrow is, ‘Iran could get a weapon in a year’… Should they make a decision today to put together a weapon, we know the uranium piece of it; tell us about the other piece what you can in open session.

Gen. Cartwright responded that it would take “another two to three, potentially out to five years to move from the idea of having the material to… something that can actually create a detonation, an explosion that would be considered a nuclear weapon.” Cartwright went on to clarify for Levin that, should the enrichment of uranium and the development of a weapon take place simultaneously, “experience says that it’s gonna take you three to five years.”

At that, Sen. John McCain expressed his shock:

You’re saying – to this committee – that before the Iranians would have a deliverable (also wrong in the context, but let’s not nitpick, yet) nuclear weapon it could be as long as five years? … That is obviously a very critical point in this entire situation. If it’s two to three to five years, then that’s one thing. If it’s one year, then that’s another… Every report I’ve seen is a year to eighteen months, that’s why I’m somewhat astonished to hear you say it could be two to three to five years. Now [getting flustered] this doesn’t clarify it to me.

Levin specifically asked again, receiving the same clarification, and then went on to tack on one more step: that ‘deliverable’ part McCain referred to earlier:

“Now on the missile piece, what can you tell us about that?”

Cartwright responded, “…again, not knowing exactly where they are, their capabilities… it would still take them another three years. That does not necessarily mean it would be sequential.”

So, at the end of all this (further clarifications not included) our minimum assumption becomes three to five years. Not one, not two, three to five.

This misperception of imminent danger becomes even more disturbing when we note that McCain opened the same Senate hearing by stating that Iran will get the bomb unless the United States begins to act more boldly…

I think “pull the trigger” may have been the gist of his statement.

Interesting developments in the Russia / Iran S-300 deal?

Back in February I blogged about the ongoing delays surrounding the delivery of Russia’s S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Iran.  At the time, Russia cited technical problems as being the cause of the delay whilst simultaneously promising Tehran that they would still honor the sale.  But according to a new story from Russian media outlet RIA Novosti, it seems that the Iranians are still no closer to getting their hands on the advanced air defense system.  This time the delay has been explained as being caused by ongoing ‘talks’, again with the Russian caveat that ‘contracts have been signed, and they are being implemented’.

Since the S-300 contract was signed in December 2005, it would seem that the only talks that could be delaying delivery are those not involving the Iranians.  As Richard Weitz recently pointed out, in light of the ongoing nuclear impasse, its likely that Israel and the U.S are exerting significant diplomatic pressure on Moscow to delay delivery for as long as possible.  Iran’s hope that ‘Russian officials [are not] swayed by political pressure from other countries’ reflects their frustration at what appears to be the continuing success of Israeli and American efforts.  But as Weitz suggests, these efforts ‘will matter little if China chooses to sell them its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, which is characterized as “a not-so-bad Russian S-300 for less money.”’  Which is where things get interesting…

Just three days ago it was reported that Russia had shipped China 15 batteries of the S-300 missile defense system.  According to a Russian language source (translated using Babelfish) these missiles were of the advanced PMU-2 variant, and were ordered in August 2007. This Interfaks source suggests the Chinese ordered 15 battalions, not the 15 batteries reported by RIA Novosti, which would be a far larger order.

China’s purchase of the S-300 system is nothing new, having ordered an initial batch of the PMU-1 variant back in 1992.  However, following substantial orders in the early 90s, Russia gave China clearance to begin manufacturing their own clone of the S-300 PMU1 in 1995, which Beijing called the Hongqi-10 (HQ-10).  China then built upon this technology and since 2002, has been producing its very own longer-range modification – the HQ-15.  But given that the HQ-15s 200 km extended range now matches that of the S-300 PMU2, why did China feel the need to order 15 battalions / batteries from Russia in 2007?

One explanation could be that despite its similar range, the HQ-15 might not yet be on par with the PMU-2 system in other technical areas.  As such, the Chinese may have invested in the PMU-2’s in order to reverse engineer them, with the aim of refining their own HQ-15 technology.  But given the already close nature of the two systems, might it not have made more sense and been cheaper for the Chinese to simply invest in one or two ‘evaluation’ systems to work from, instead of the reported fifteen batteries / battalions?  Perhaps, but given China’s ample fiscal resources it’s also possible that they sought to field a large network of PMU-2s as soon as possible, supplementing them with refined HQ-15’s as and when possible.  

If this theory is true, and assuming these PMU-2s are designed to replace older (but still relatively modern) surface to air missile systems such as the HQ-9 / HQ-10 or Russian made S-300 PMU-1s, it’s possible that China may now have fifteen spare air defense systems.  Keeping in mind that Iran only ordered five systems from Russia, and that Tehran has recently alluded to the possibility of buying alternatives from the Chinese, Beijing’s spare capacity could serve as the basis of a China-Iran deal if and when it were to come up.

Alternatively, although far less likely, is that China ordered some of these PMU-2s directly on behalf of Iran, and may transfer them either overtly or clandestinely at a future date.

Even if neither of these theories is true, the bottom line is that the quick order-to-delivery time of China’s PMU-2’s illustrates that Russia can and will sell its defense systems promptly if it wishes.  Which is why Iran’s frustration with Russia is likely only growing.